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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the hypothesis that Japan's aid policy 
was subject to serious organisational constraints, which prevented a 
positive response in the 1970s to criticism of her programs. It is a 
study of the Japanese bureaucratic process, for policy-making was 
dominated by procedures and, at the same time, it assesses ideas about 
policy-making in Japan. In analysing foreign aid, it adopts a "policy 
area" approach to test how a policy is defined within government.
Chapters 1 to 3 examine ideologies and organisational change, 
and include a study of the creation of the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency, an aid implementing organisation. They reveal a 
link between perceptions of aid in Japan and the development of the 
aid machinery. Chapters 4 and 5 deal, respectively, with the fact 
that the relationship between aid policy and structures of government 
was irregular, and with the complex formal and informal procedures for 
aid policy formulation and management. Chapter 6 details to what 
extent aid policy is determined by budgeting, while Chapters 7 and 8 
fill out the analysis of non-bureaucratic influences on policy 
introduced earlier in the thesis. Politics is shown to have affected 
policy, by promoting certain "special" bilateral relationships. The 
concept of the "aid cycle" (the steady accumulation of aid flows to 
selected recipients, as implementation narrowed future policy options), 
demonstrates that bureaucracy was dependent on private enterprise 
(especially consulting engineers) to induce policy innovation.
The original hypothesis is found to be valid. Internal 
policy change was inhibited because power was balanced between 
ministries, political will was erratic, and the affiliation of
iv
officials was to the immediate task of the primary work group. 
Coordination was therefore unavoidably weak and the only adaptive 
element reinforced predominant policy "biases" in favour of bilateral 
capital project aid. These conclusions challenge some widely held 
beliefs about Japanese policy-making, and Japanese aid in particular.
Finally, the usefulness of the "policy area" approach is 
confirmed by the fact that foreign aid, as it related to other 
government concerns, was being continually redefined by policy-makers, 
and policy represented attempts by participants to adjust contents to 
changing perceptions of policy limits. This suggests that "policy" 
should be conceived of as a fluid set of ideas and interpretations, 
and government as a "map" of interdependent and similarly shifting
policy areas.
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INTRODUCTION
By the late 1970s, Japan was one of the world's main foreign 
aid donors, and aid was an important component of her economic and 
foreign policies. She was the largest single contributor of aid funds 
and services to many developing countries and actively supported aid 
financing institutions, but was not an influential force in 
international aid fora. For the twenty years after she embarked on 
aid programs in the mid-1950s, Japan faced criticism from both 
recipients and donors for meagre aid flows, protracted decision-making 
and a too ready association of aid and export policies. The Japanese 
Government and its agencies were, in turn, slow to respond and by the 
late 1970s had hardly altered their policy objectives from those of 
the fifties.
This thesis considers why the Japanese Government did not 
respond directly to the aid challenge. In order to answer this 
question, we shall describe how the Government made and implemented 
foreign aid programs and what effect this had on future policy. Our 
central argument is that the character of the domestic aid 
administration decisively affected Japanese aid performance, for aid 
policies were inseparable from processes. The study concentrates on 
the bureaucratic aspects of policy-making, which were dominated by 
three relationships:
1. between ideas circulating in Japan about aid, and aid 
organisation and processes;
2. between the degree of priority enjoyed by aid within 
Japanese domestic politics, and the range and pattern of 
participation in policy-making;
2 .
3. between the interaction of officials, agencies and
procedures on the one hand, and narrowed aid policy options 
for the Japanese Government on the other.
These relationships had a direct cumulative impact.
Conflicting perceptions in Japan of aid and its uses encouraged 
ministries, in the 1950s and early 1960s, to consolidate their 
influence in the administration of aid and economic cooperation, which 
all regarded as lying within their own jurisdiction. The result was 
diffuse structures which produced distinctive processes for different 
types of aid.
The low priority afforded aid within Japanese politics led 
to sporadic participation by ministers and a dependence on information 
and advice from outside Government. Lack of political interest in aid, 
except in the case of large bilateral loan projects, meant that 
staffing of aid institutions and administrative reform were given 
little attention, agencies were overloaded and high level advisory 
bodies weakened. Structures replaced politics as the major influence 
on patterns of participation.
Predominantly bureaucratic participation impinged on 
Japanese policy choices. Budgeting imposed serious constraints on 
aid flows, and traditions of Japanese Government personnel management, 
which discouraged aid specialisation, limited the direction and 
content of flows. Broad policy planning suffered under the weight of 
coordination difficulties and an absence of policy guidelines led to 
an emphasis on detail and procedure. Government loans became the 
centre of policy and, with sections of the technical cooperation program, 
directed aid flows into a self-reinforcing "cycle" of aid to selected
recipients.
3 .
Two further problems arise from a study of how Japan made 
aid policy. One is comparative: whether Japan's case is unique and
how other donor systems react to similar problems. Patterns are 
indeed remarkably consistent and one of the aims of this study is to 
provide further empirical evidence for comparison of donor structures, 
budgeting, project development and bilateral ties.
The second question arises out of the relationship between 
process and policy content and the problem of how "aid policy", 
wedged as it is between foreign, trade and finance policies in Japan, 
is actually defined. Our answer, that there is no fixed definition or 
boundary, is derived from the broad view of aid obtained from a 
"policy area" approach. This is a middle range method, not limited to 
analysing a single decision or forced to generalise about social forces.
1. The Impact of Ideas
Ideas about aid in Japan, as suggested above, directly 
influenced the development of the aid bureaucracy, but ideas, to
2borrow Richard Simeon's words, "do not provide complete explanations".
When institutionalised in ministry approaches to problems, however,
they are highly relevant. As Simeon puts it, ideas "are especially
important in providing the assumptions which define the problems and
3limit the range of policy alternatives considered at any point". 
Nevertheless, this influence was felt indirectly in Japan, through 
institutions and processes.
Ideas helped define the organisational presence of aid.
They emerged as conflicting "interests", as in Allison and Halperin's
4bureaucratic politics paradigm, although not with the same force as 
those writers would ascribe to them. Robert Art's argument that the
4.
paradigm "undervalues the influence (or weight) of ... generational
mind-sets ... on the manner in which top decision-makers approach
5foreign policy" is most pertinent, because one aspect of the "mind­
set" relating to aid was the international debate on development 
assistance problems.
Argument about foreign aid in Japan involved questions
which were, naturally enough, common to the aid debate generally.
"Foreign aid" is a tricky and sensitive subject. The term can refer
to certain economic phenomena (the "explicit transfers of real
6resources to less developed countries on concessional terms") which
admit of a variety of origins, commercial or official. It can also
be defined more narrowly as "government-sponsored flows of resources
7made available on concessional terms to foreign governments", where 
origin and point of receipt are more clearly described. In both 
cases, foreign aid involves a movement of resources from one country 
to another in a way designed to assist the latter's development. It 
is generally accepted, furthermore, that this movement falls within
Qthe ambit of government policy to some extent.
"Aid" is also used as a much broader concept, where precision 
is lost and distinctions between kinds of resource flows are blurred. 
Here aid is lumped together with other foreign economic policies of 
governments and their subsidiary agencies. "Foreign aid" as a 
defined exchange of concessional resources becomes equated with the 
more encompassing notion of "economic cooperation". In Japan, as we 
shall see, a precise concept of "foreign aid" was never clearly 
distinguished from that of "economic cooperation". In this thesis it 
is accepted that the latter is a far more comprehensive category which 
includes non-explicit transfers of resources, such as those realised
5 .
through trade and tariff policies. The term "foreign aid" is used to 
refer to official development assistance, or ODA, as defined by the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The DAC definition was 
usually adhered to by the Japanese Government in the period under 
discussion. This study is of Japanese official development assistance 
policy, not of economic cooperation policy, although the two overlap.
Since the making of ODA policy affected other flows of assistance, we 
shall discuss these as they are relevant.
Global efforts towards development in the 1960s and the
9ensuing debate extended the scope of the aid idea. Commentators
argued about the form which aid should take for development purposes1^
and, later, about the rights and wrongs of foreign aid as an activity
of governments.'1'1 The explicit linking of aid and other economic
policies in donor countries prompted forceful criticisms of foreign
12aid in the "aid as imperialism" debate. Discussions of the "new 
international economic order" went even further, to the point where 
both developed and developing countries claimed benefits from aid and 
economic cooperation policies.
Perceptions of aid in Japan were regularly cited as the 
main influence on Japanese policies and the discussion of those 
ideas normally led into arguments about causes. Explanations of the 
nature of Japanese aid assumed that there was a strong consensus regarding 
aid in Japan, for reparations experience and the imperatives of 
domestic economic growth dominated Japanese approaches to the 
subject. The debate in the West about aid had little impact on 
Japanese policy-makers shaping their own priorities for aid in terms 
of the home economy. It is important, nevertheless, to realise the
6 .
extent to which Japan's aid role was attributed to common perceptions 
of aid. One writer, Hasegawa Sukehiro, detailed five views of 
Japanese motivations:
(a) economic rationalism, advocated by those who saw the 
nation-state as the focus of the international system;
(b) non-ideological economic expansion, supported mainly by 
foreign observers;
(c) ideological economic expansion, asserted by Marxist scholars 
in Japan and abroad;
(d) self-preservation, presented by those who saw an economic 
need for Japan to pursue aid policies;
(e) world communalism, put forward by supporters of aid as a
13step towards a world community.
Views such as these were expressed in assessments of the aid
program. John White observed in 1964 that Japanese aid was criticised
as "inadequate, wrongly motivated and administered, too narrowly and
selectively applied, and out of line with the aid programmes of other 
14donors". The DAC, in its annual Aid Review, always found Japan's aid
15wanting by comparison with the efforts of other member nations.
Japan was constantly called upon to increase grant aid (especially 
technical assistance), improve the terms and raise the grant element 
of loans and expand ODA in line with her 1970 undertaking to attain 
ODA equalling 0.7 percent of GNP. Japan was never, despite DAC 
pressure, able to meet successive DAC recommendations on terms. 
Continuous criticism, at home and abroad, had no lasting impact on 
the way Japanese policy was made.
7.
It appeared to some observers that an effective barrier to
change was the widespread agreement both within the Japanese
Government and in the country at large about what aid policies should
be followed. The whole system, it was thought, was united. Hasegawa,
for example, distilled a composite "historical national evolutionist
view", according to which aid "is seen as an instrument of Japan's
national policy to serve the kokueki, or national interest, of
'secularized postwar J a p a n E d g a r  C. Harrell suggested that
different groups influenced aid policies over the 1950s and 1960s
because they agreed about the relationship between foreign aid and
domestic economic growth. Priorities were agreed upon, elites made
policy, and "a divergence of views, when it surfaced, was generally
about a specific project, country emphasis or the structure of aid 
17administration." Other critics of Japanese aid policy supported
this "consensus" view and attacked Japan's performance, usually in
terms of a "monolithic" approach to Japanese behaviour. Halliday and
McCormack"s neo-imperialism analysis is the best known of these but
it was unable to account for the fact that Japanese foreign aid
18policies and administrators were never united. Ideas similar to 
Hasegawa's composite view were common to Japanese decision-makers, 
although to differing degrees.
Nevertheless, in practice, policy as implemented was not 
an immutable whole; Japanese foreign aid was of many kinds, some 
more important than others, but her aid effort embraced no single "aid 
philosophy", except appeals to the national welfare cast in 
predictable terms by each ministry. Aid policy was little more than 
a collection of disparate programs supported by self-serving slogans 
voiced by any donor. Rather than explaining aid policy with
8.
cliches, however, it is more useful to assume that a certain degree of 
consensus existed and focus on the persistent disagreements among 
policy-makers which had, in the long run, a greater impact on policy.
2. Politics and Policy-Making
The influence of social, political, economic and
administrative environments on policy is a constant theme in the
literature of decision-making. Environments can be both international
or domestic, as Frankel argued in the context of foreign policy-making.^
Recent writers have continued in the same vein with their emphasis on
20the influence of domestic structures on foreign policy, while the
concept of environment as a factor in policy-making has been taken to
21its extreme in the "transnational interdependence" paradigm. This 
thesis will assess to what extent environment (especially the political) 
influenced aid policy in Japan.
Questions of politics are important to most aid donors, not
only Japan, although little has been done to identify the comparative
aspects of donor policy-making. The fact that policy formulation in
donor countries has been so little discussed constitutes a sizeable
gap in the literature on foreign aid, for aid policy formulation
depends on much more than elite attitudes and initiatives. Studies of
donor administrations support the view, stated by Viviani, that "for
the most part it is the way in which political responsibility for aid
is exercised, together with the way bureaucratic control is located
22that decisively shapes an aid program." Those studies revealed a
23great diversity of donor structures but Viviani argued that the main
factors in donor administration were political responsibility for aid,
24bureaucratic control of aid and organisational impact on policy.
9.
Political and organisational aspects are assessed by Judith
Tendier in her study of the impact of organisation on the tasks of
the United States Agency for International Development (AID). She
concluded that political pressures impinged on the organisation as
criticism and as incursions by other public agencies into the
territory of AID. "Criticism and incursion", she wrote, "affected
the agency's performance by changing the AID technician's concept of
25what he wanted to do". In Japan, much of the politics of foreign 
aid took place within the bureaucracy and low levels of political 
support for aid reinforced this tendency. Although reduced in the 
case of aid, politics had a marked effect on policy-making 
nevertheless.
The link between politics and participation was the subject 
of a great deal of past research on Japanese policy-making, although 
the relevance of the relationship to the bureaucratic process was not 
usually discussed. Japanese scholars often used to take a static
institutional approach in their studies of the national bureaucracy.
_ 26Okabe's Gyosei kanri (Public administration) was typical of the
"public administration" style of analysis, whereas Tsuji developed a
process paradigm in his work on the ringisei, or circular decision- 
27making system, a treatment which was taken further in the 1970s by
28such scholars as Kawanaka, Kojima and Ide. ’ They stressed process 
rather than structure and, in doing so, came up with some significant 
conclusions about Japanese policy-making as a whole. Fukui showed in 
his survey of the literature on policy-making in Japan that the 
emphasis of earlier writings by Japanese scholars on the power of the 
LDP or, alternatively, of the ruling elite of party, business and 
bureaucracy had given way to "a picture of Japanese policymaking
10.
which is characterized above all by fluidity, complexity, and
variability, rather than by the regularity, stability, and constancy
29which the power-elite perspective projects."
Western scholars contributed much to our understanding of 
the Japanese policy process, although the multiplicity of case studies 
chosen for analysis produced policy-making patterns distinguished by 
issue, policy type and the nature of the participants. While the 
popular literature, both in Japan and in the West, continued to 
uphold theories of the elitist dominance by the national bureaucracy 
over society and over government, a few scholars completed detailed 
studies of policy-making in which officials actively sought certain 
policy outcomes, but did not monopolise policy-making in the way some 
popular writers suggested.30
When we consider how best to approach the bureaucratic 
process in Japan, it is important to realise that policy was not 
simply a reflection of prevailing political power structures or of 
social elite groupings. In this thesis we assess to what extent the 
Japanese bureaucracy was a locus of policy-making and one possible 
approach is to adopt the bureaucratic politics paradigm. We shall 
aim to demonstrate, however, that the organisational process of 
routine bureaucratic decision-making proved to be of even greater 
importance.
3. Process and Policy
In arguing that organisational process can help explain 
Japanese aid policy, we take up an idea put forward by John White in 
his study of the politics of foreign aid, where he concluded that "the 
makings of an aid policy lie in the hands of those who actually
11.
administer it." This raises the question of how aid management 
procedures channelled bureaucratic politics and affected actual policy 
content, a subject which has arisen in studies of project
32administration and development planning in several countries. The 
influence of procedures on policy-making in Japan suggests that the 
aid administration by itself was one variable in the aid relationship 
which cannot be ignored.
We are also interested in how the implementation of aid
policy limited future policy alternatives. This problem enters the
literature in the debate about the developmental impact of aid on 
33recipients, but the effects of feedback on the donor policy process 
have not been discussed. One reason for this is that, even though
34feedback is supposedly expressed in policy evaluation by aid donors, 
it is not always easy to define. We shall employ the concept of the 
"aid cycle" in examining what we describe as "biases" in Japan's aid 
program.
Policy is derived from the actions of individuals in certain
patterns within institutions. The organisational environment and its
constraints on actions and interactions in Japan occupy our attention
throughout. Standard operating procedures and the implications of
these for policy-making - incrementalism, partisan mutual adjustment,
35"satisficing" as described by Lindblom, March and Simon - are as 
much a part of Japanese as of Western bureaucracies, but are not the 
only factors at work.
However important the organisational dimension - and it is 
important - outcomes are also affected by individuals. It is hard to 
allow as much scope for individual influence as Allison's bureaucratic
12.
politics paradigm suggests, but Heclo and Wildavsky's study of British
budget politics displays the full scope of the human drama of 
36organisations. Campbell, Fukui and others have begun to analyse
relationships between individuals, organisations and policy in 
37Japan; the complexity of inter-ministerial jurisdictions and 
processes of coordination in Japanese foreign aid provides an 
opportunity to pursue similar themes.
Patterns of participation are the outward evidence of
policy-making, but we are not so much interested in ideal types of
policy-making processes as in the dynamics of policy and the roots of
that dynamism. Crozier perceptively explained these forces in the
3 8French case without positing inflexible models and Allison and
Halperin have both suggested ways of viewing policy-making from the
39individual's standpoint. Heclo provided a weighty account of the
social and economic bases of policy in two European countries and,
with Wildavsky, took a more socio-anthropological line on financial 
40policy-making. We shall observe Japanese aid with the benefit of 
all these perspectives.
4. Policy Questions
A study of Japanese foreign aid policy must confront a basic 
analytical dilemma. Aid is not a well defined phenomenon but merges 
with other policies and social processes and is in constant flux 
as a donor government's policy priorities shift. A real problem 
for us is how aid policy is defined, what separates it from other 
government pursuits, how constant are its boundaries. For that 
reason it is useful to employ a "policy area" approach. We shall
13.
not confine ourselves to elucidating a single decision, or
42processes in a single ministry, or the play of politics across a
43number of government policies. Adopting a policy area framework 
may seem, at first glance, theoretically limiting but this is not so 
for the following reasons:
(a) It includes a reasonably well defined, but not a narrow,
set of circumstances, where we work across ministries and
across several individual policies. We are not restricted
to the uniqueness of single decisions nor to the
generalisations of system-wide analysis, but can see out to
the shape of political power in the system and inwards to
44the activities of "proximate policy-makers".
(b) It highlights dynamism and continuity in policy-making, 
which Heclo emphasised in his assessment of the utility of 
policy classifications:
These classification efforts by political scientists have
been analytic in the sense of seeking to decompose reality
into a group of categories ... attention is devoted to
categories rather than relationships. Yet behaviour, and
particularly behaviour connected with policy, is dynamic;
the phenomena at issue are moving events, routines,
strategies, and adaptations. The challenge is not to
decompose process or content but to find relationships which
link the two, not to reify collectivities into individual
deciders but to understand the networks of interaction by4 5which policies result.
(c) We can see how actors and institutions fit into the broader 
political system. This is not possible in single-decision 
case studies, where the relationships between the decision 
and the routine operations of government are ill-defined, 
especially if the study is of a "crisis" decision.
14.
(d) The policy area approach does not separate policy
formulation from implementation and evaluation, for the 
link is essential to analysis of power in policy processes. 
Heclo was concerned with this when he noted that "the 
content of a policy can itself be a crucial independent
46factor in producing effects on the policymaking process".
His "policy as social learning" model is an excellent, non-
47mechanistic attempt at linking policy effects and contents 
and he succeeded because he chose to study social policy, a 
diverse area of government in which these were always visible.
The scope of this thesis is more limited but no less 
challenging. Foreign aid is not such a pressing issue as social policy 
for governments of advanced industrial countries. It does not arouse 
comparable domestic political interest. It is, nevertheless, basic to 
relations with some developing countries and is closely allied to 
sensitive policy areas such as trade and international finance. The 
policy area approach provides a framework for testing relationships 
between stages of the policy process, between policy and the political 
system and between policies themselves.
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first three 
chapters look at ideas about aid in Japan and the development of aid 
organisation. Chapters 1 and 2 trace the growth of the Japanese aid 
administration and the changing place of aid within national priorities 
and Chapter 3 analyses in detail one aspect of this development, the 
creation of the Japan International Cooperation Agency. The second 
section examines the relationship between national government and 
politics and the aid bureaucracy. Chapter 4 focuses on structures, 
while Chapter 5 describes procedures for aid policy formulation and
15.
Chapter 6 the aid budget process. The last section, Chapters 7 and 8, 
places official aid policy in a broader context which includes 
bilateral relationships between Japan and particular recipients and 
the role of private enterprise and domestic politics in the continuing
cycle" of aid policy.
16.
CHAPTER 1
OFFICIAL APPROACHES TO THE AID PROGRAM
The making of foreign aid policy in Japan was always 
strongly influenced by the thinking of government officials. They 
were not, as some have argued,1 united in their views on aid and 
economic cooperation. They found themselves in conflict about 
the best form of aid, the direction, size, methods and terms of aid 
flows, the precise objectives of aid and the nature of relationships 
between aid and other domestic and foreign policies. The problem for 
policy-making was whether or not the debate within ministry circles 
fostered a Government approach to aid.
Official attitudes were formed over five distinct but 
overlapping periods:
(a) the years of reparations and tentative technical assistance 
until the first yen loan was made to India in 1958;
(b) the period until the early 1960s when the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD was set up;
(c) throughout the 1960s from DAC until the Second United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 
1968, when Japan became accepted as one of the world's 
economic powers and herself took on more of the responsibility 
attendant on that status;
(d) from the late 1960s until the oil crisis of 1973, the 
height of the Japanese aid effort;
(e) the ensuing economic recession lasting into the latter half
17.
of the 1970s.
Economic Cooperation and Trade
Japan initially gave foreign aid in the early 1950s in the 
form of technical assistance. In the mid- to late 1950s, she entered 
a number of reparations agreements, and made her first official loan in 
1958. Between 1960 and 1976, the total net flow of resources from 
Japan to the developing countries and multilateral agencies increased 
more than sixteen-fold from US$246 million to US$4,002.6 million, with 
US$5,844.2 million donated in 1973 representing the peak of this 
growth (see Table 1-1). Total flows grew steadily over the period, 
although the peaks and troughs reflected fluctuations in the level of 
private capital flows (mainly direct investment). The most 
concessional portion of the total (official development assistance or 
ODA) was outstripped by private flows and as a percentage of GNP, ODA 
was always considerably lower than the DAC average. Although Japan in 
1976 was the fourth largest donor among DAC members, sheer quantity 
did not offset the below average Japanese performance in quality.
This rapidly expanding effort drew mixed reactions. Other 
aid donors and some recipients did not acknowledge it as a true 
contribution to international aid. In Japan herself, there was no 
strong agreement about Japan's proper role and it was clear from the 
outset that a problem of definition and terminology existed.
During the 1950s, Japan for the first time took part in
international technical cooperation schemes, such as the United Nations
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Colombo Plan. She
concluded agreements for reparations with Burma, Indonesia and the
2Philippines and for quasi-reparations with Laos and Cambodia. The
18.
establishment of the Export-Import Bank of Japan (Eximbank) in 1952 
signalled the beginning of full scale Government assistance to exports 
and encouragement to private investment overseas. Total official net 
flows rose from an average of US$10 million between 1950 and 1955 to
3US$285 million in 1958. In this period to 1958, the concept of 
"economic cooperation" was used to describe Japanese attempts to 
further economic relations with developing nations, especially with 
those of Asia. The distinction between this and "aid", however, was 
not made. The two terms were more often confused than clarified.
Different ministries separately defined economic cooperation 
but never explicitly identified an aid component. The Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Economic Planning Agency 
(EPA) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) each drew up its own 
set of priorities into which economic cooperation was fitted, the 
common factor being that Japan's domestic economic well-being was 
placed foremost. In their separate approaches to these policy 
problems, emphases overlapped but distinctions remained.
The first postwar economic plan of 1955, prepared by the
4EPA, included economic diplomacy and trade promotion in Asia as two
5of its important policy goals. The second plan of 1957 took these 
further, for it expressed in more detail the long-term perspective of 
Japan's economic planning and made explicit the need to coordinate 
domestic and international economic strategies. Measures to redirect 
Japan's industrial structure from light industry to heavy and chemical 
industries depended on the promotion of trade to the developing 
markets of Southeast Asia by means of international economic policies, 
especially economic cooperation. According to the plan, economic 
cooperation included development planning, capital exports, the
19.
extension of credits, overseas investments, the procurement of 
resources and long-term import policies for food and raw materials.
The EPA relied on broad definitions and omitted any mention of 
"aid".6
In the first edition in 1958 of MITI's Economic Cooperation:
7Present Situation and Problems, economic cooperation was blatantly 
linked, although without the long-term perspective of the EPA, to the 
goal of Japanese trade promotion. The MITI report represented the 
view, expressed early in the 1950s in business and government
g
circles, that Japan's main economic task was the promotion of trade
to secure the resources necessary for Japan's industrial growth, and
to develop markets for the products of Japan's industry. Economic
9cooperation became "the new axis of postwar trade policy", for the 
developing nations were valued as markets or as potential markets in 
which demand could easily be stimulated.
While this object was clear cut, it did not help to clarify 
the terms used. The 1958 report stated that the words keizai 
kyoryoku (economic cooperation) could refer not only to relations 
between developed and developing nations, but also to those between 
developed nations. MITI focussed on the former and claimed that 
economic cooperation involved a very broad (and ill-defined) area of 
both government and private participation in the development of the 
"under-developed countries". This cooperation could, according to 
the report, be either bilateral or multilateral, and include capital, 
technical and trade flows. No reference to aid (enjo) was made.
The first foreign policy review published by the MFA in 
1957 planted economic cooperation more firmly within the scope of
20.
Japan's national policies and international interests.10 Like MITI 
and the EPA, the MFA considered economic cooperation to be necessary 
for Japan's own growth, and it openly acknowledged the significance 
of Asia in this respect: "Our own development is not assisted by an
Asia without peace, progress and prosperity". The Southeast Asian 
nations were regarded as increasingly important sources of food and raw 
materials for Japan, as well as markets for Japanese exports.11
Specifying where economic cooperation would be best
directed still did not advance any real definition of the concept.
The MFA made clumsy distinctions between economic cooperation and
two of its components, reparations and foreign aid. These were
finely distinguished by the MFA, which maintained that countries not
claiming war damages were entitled to receive foreign aid. The 1957
review stated further that economic cooperation included reparations,
technical cooperation, private cooperation and government assistance
12to private business, such as that undertaken by the Eximbank. What 
precisely constituted aid, however, was not explained.
Within the category of economic cooperation, the MFA gave
priority to private cooperation and technical assistance, because it
judged that only limited resources were available for government
capital assistance. This suggested that the MFA even in 1957
regarded aid as government flows of capital excluding reparations,
which were included in an economic cooperation effort undertaken by
13both government and business.
By the end of the 1950s, Japan was deeply involved in 
economic cooperation. Private flows of investment and technical 
assistance, both official and private, formed the core of policy, with
21.
Southeast Asia as Japan's main target. The economic and diplomatic
interests of several ministries were directed towards developing
close and potentially large markets. This, it was hoped, would
ensure the economic, social and political stability of Asia, which
14Japanese officials considered essential to peace in the region.
Economic cooperation had likewise become an integral part of Japan's
long-term policies. Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke's active diplomacy
and his initiatives towards improved Japanese relations with Southeast
Asia demonstrated a keen appreciation of how economic cooperation
would affect Japan's future. Government initiatives were fully
15supported by the economic diplomacy of Japanese business.
Yen Loans: Extending Horizons
In the late 1950s, Japan's economic cooperation expanded
significantly but, at the same time, official attitudes to the
issue diverged further. The Japanese Government granted its first
yen loan in 1958 as part of contributions by the World Bank
16Consortium for India. That nation was then regarded in many
countries as the cornerstone of stability in Asia and the Consortium
17of which Japan was a member endorsed this view. Other early
government loans were made to Paraguay, South Vietnam, Pakistan and
Brazil but, while private investment and export credits rose in the
period 1958-61 from $33 million to $160 million, total net official
flows in fact fell from $285 million to $221 million, due largely to 
18a fall in grants. The period was remarkable not so much for the 
changes in the direction of economic cooperation but for the hardening 
of institutional arrangements and a greater awareness of economic 
cooperation and aid arguments in Japan. New objectives and new modes
2 2 .
of cooperation replaced reparations as the central features of 
Japanese policy. The demands of trade promotion and a long-term 
Asian policy remained strong, but they represented Japanese attempts 
to be accepted in Europe and America as a responsible trading 
partner, which would enhance Japan's claims to membership of the 
principal international economic organisations.
MITI showed appreciation of the new direction when it
referred in 1960 to economic cooperation as "the mission of the
world's industrial nations". In practical terms, however, this moral
goal was to be achieved by increasing direct loans and investment
overseas to secure vital raw materials from resource-rich developing
19nations through policies of "development import". MITI's
recommendations for increasing the quantity and quality of economic
cooperation were designed primarily to further not the development of
the recipient nations but Japan's own trade and economic policy ends.
The 1961 report enlarged on this by stating that Japan undertook
economic cooperation to develop her own industry. She did not do so
out of support for Cold War political objectives or support for
20development as part of decolonisation policies.
This oblique reference to the aid policies of Western 
donors was the first comparison by the Japanese Government of her own 
and Western efforts. It marked also the first defence of Japanese 
economic cooperation in terms of the aid debate then fashionable in 
the United States and Europe, but MITI seemed to have little 
compunction in dismissing the development claims of the Third World. 
"Aid" as a separate endeavour was ignored.
2 3 .
The MFA, on the other hand, appeared to be more aware of 
Japan's unique position as an aid donor and presented a much more 
sophisticated case for Japan. The terms "economic cooperation" and 
"aid" were still confused, on occasion being used alternatively in 
respect of technical assistance, but by 1961 the distinctions were 
more pronounced in Ministry statements. It was suggested then that 
official flows represented the "aid" component of a complex pattern of 
official and private transactions.
The MFA put forward three arguments in support of Japan's 
economic cooperation:
(a) it justified the persistent bias towards Asia by citing 
interdependence between the Japanese and the Southeast 
Asian economies and the need to ensure their stability and 
prosperity;
(b) it said that aid (enjo) should be increased because some
22nations were politically unstable. This took the 
argument beyond Southeast Asia, introducing the North-South 
debate and US-Soviet relations;
(c) this in turn led the MFA to maintain that the moral basis of 
Japan's economic cooperation, which was first provided by 
commitment to reparations, was still firm. It saw a 
"natural role" for Japan as Asia's largest economy in world 
attempts to alleviate the development problems of the Third 
World.
It was doubtful, however, whether the MFA took these 
rationalisations seriously, for it continued to defend the small size
2 4.
of Japan's economic cooperation effort by claiming that Japan's
economic capacity was limited. It offered increased technical
assistance as a means of lightening the impact on Japan's meagre 
23finances. The "natural" responsibility which Japan recognised was
only natural, it was admitted, "because we depend on them [the
24developing nations] for 45 percent of our trade".
This mixture of political and economic motivations for
economic cooperation was reinforced by the Income Doubling Plan of 
251960. It was this document which set the pattern for the next 
decade of economic activity and which linked domestic economic policy 
and economic cooperation to achieve the best use of domestic 
resources. While it placed foreign economic policy at the centre of 
Japanese policy, the Plan relegated economic cooperation as such to 
a subservient position. It diverted Japanese attention from the 
widening aid debate, the imperatives of the United Nations Development 
Decade and hopes for a positive contribution to the Development 
Assistance Group (DAG) and the DAC. These aspirations were replaced 
by an introspective policy emphasis, an international policy based on 
unyielding domestic interests and an aid effort divorced from concern 
for the welfare of the developing nations. It appraised Japanese aid 
in terms of its prospects for quantitative growth rather than qualitative 
achievement, a standard which was never displaced. In short, Japan 
entered the 1960s determined to undertake economic cooperation, but 
only to the extent of her national capabilities and primarily for trade 
development, domestic economic prosperity and broad international
political objectives.
25.
Japan and the DAC
In 1961 Japan joined, as a founder member, the Development 
Assistance Committee of the OECD and thus made a place for herself 
among the aid giving nations of the world. The move highlighted 
several developments. It showed that other nations, especially the 
United States, encouraged Japan in aiding Asian nations and it 
demonstrated Japan's own recognition of this task. It revealed also 
Japan's increasing determination to be accepted as a responsible 
member of the club of advanced nations, despite criticism of Japanese 
development assistance policy from other donors.
Japan's membership of the DAC has been referred to as "an
26apparent historical anomaly". In 1960, the Development Assistance 
Group was established in the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC). It was an ad hoc meeting, the result of 
increasing American pressure on its allies to join in a coordinated 
international effort on aid. In 1961, when the OEEC became the OECD, 
the DAG was reconstituted as the Development Assistance Committee. 
Nine founder members of OECD (Belgium, Canada, France, West Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, UK, USA) joined, as well as Japan, 
although she had not been a member of OEEC and did not enter OECD 
until 1964.^
Japan joined originally, it seemed, to give herself "a
foot-hold in the group of the more powerful states and greater
influence in both world and regional affairs where it had both
28commercial and political interests". The Nihon keizai shimbun 
recognised the possible restrictions and obligations involved in
membership, but acknowledged that joining "would help bring [Japan]
26.
out of her isolation" and would be important in promoting Japan's
30membership of the OECD. Nevertheless, Japan remained cautious. The
Government's representative, Shima Shigenobu, went to Washington on
8 March 1960 with "no intention of making clear Japan's detailed plans
for foreign aid". His purpose was instead to "show Japan's face" and
31"press for participation in the new aid organisation". The Director
of the MFA's Economic Cooperation Division, Sawaki Masao, made it
clear that Japan joined from a desire to avoid long-term disadvantage
by getting a foot inside the OECD door. European nations were, in his
opinion, still opposed to Japan's entry to that body, but membership
of the DAG could give her a valuable link to the parent organisation.
America was seeking the solution of aid problems "at a world level"
and this assisted Japan, especially since she would be the only Asian
nation to join the DAG. Sawaki also admitted that they asked the US
Government if they might join only after they had satisfied themselves
that the DAG was not a body which bound its members to agreed aid
commitments. He believed that the greatest benefit arising from
Japan's entry would be an understanding of the policies of the other
donor nations, which Japan had been trying unsuccessfully to gain for 
32some time.
The United States concentrated on persuading West Germany
and Japan of their special obligations as former recipients of Allied
33aid and as nations which spent little on defence. At the DAG 
meeting in London in March 1961 the US asked for a group target for 
aid to be set at 1 percent of GNP. The Japanese MFA stressed that 
Japan was not necessarily required to produce this amount, although it 
did recognise the need for expansion of present aid budgets. It 
envisaged Japan reaching such a target only by retaining private
27.
investment as the core of any policy.
MITI, in a later assessment of the DAC, pointed to the
American policy of "spreading the burden" as a strong influence which
emerged in the early meetings of the DAG. Although Japan claimed
independence of this policy, MITI contended that the Government joined
out of serious motives. It wished to avoid isolation from other
advanced nations, to be close to those countries working together in
the OEEC and also to bring the benefits of DAG membership to its own
35economic cooperation and trade policy.
Japan at this early stage seemed concerned that she would
not be allowed to determine her own level of aid. The Fifth DAG
Meeting was held in Tokyo in July 1961. In a speech to the Group, the
Prime Minister, Ikeda Hayato, declared that Japan would cooperate to
the limit of her ability, while the MFA used the occasion to announce
one of its periodic "rethinkings" of aid, this time noting the need
for increased technical assistance within the framework of a long-term
policy. The July meeting agreed that Japan should join the DAC, but it
3 6did not alter its reservations about her participation in the OECD.
Japan therefore set up a DAC liaison office in her Paris Embassy in
October 1961 and announced her intention to cooperate as fully as
possible with the DAC policy of greater aid contributions, although
one newspaper suggested that the encouragement of machinery exports
37was the main reason for this positive expression of support. As a 
member of the DAC, Japan was given the right to attend and speak at 
OECD Directors' Meetings when DAC items were under discussion.
Entry to the DAG and then the DAC affected Japan's aid effort 
in several ways. Although there were claims that not even MFA
28.
38officials fully realised the significance of Japan's membership,
Japan was able to evaluate other donors' programs and assess her own 
in the light of this knowledge. She was forced into the mainstream 
of the aid debate centred on the DAC and was made more aware of her 
responsibilities as a donor, although these were not always fulfilled. 
This awareness encouraged a sense of competition with other members 
and later Japanese reports on her economic cooperation were careful to 
note Japan's relative position in terms of quantity of aid given.
Quality featured less prominently.
Membership of the DAC helped the Japanese to clarify the
meaning of the terms "economic cooperation" and "aid", although this 
39took some time. Throughout the 1960s, the Japanese distinguished 
"economic cooperation" and "aid" as concepts, but did not carry the 
distinction very far. The two terms were often used interchangeably.
MITI economic cooperation reports consistently argued that "economic 
cooperation" in its broadest sense consisted of three kinds of 
cooperation - capital, technical and trade. Japan's annual economic 
cooperation was determined by adding the value of all capital, most 
technical and a fraction of trade cooperation, to give the "flow of 
financial resources" as defined by the DAC. MITI insisted, however, 
that while the DAC category was termed "aid", it was only "economic 
cooperation" in the narrow sense. It claimed that true "economic 
cooperation" took account also of trade policies towards the 
developing nations.^
The general thrust of thinking of the 1950s continued into 
the 1960s. Japanese officials came to use the word "aid" as a 
synonym for one type of "economic cooperation", but laid any blame for 
misuse at the feet of the DAC. They treated "aid" (enjo) as that part of
29.
Japan's economic policies towards developing countries defined by the 
DAC as "development assistance", government and private flows included. 
"Economic cooperation" in the wide sense was retained to describe the 
full sweep of Japan's foreign economic policies. In this way, 
terminology was isolated from the debate about motivations.
The MFA accepted the identification of "aid" with a narrow 
form of "economic cooperation". The 1969 Blue Book declared that
The precise definition of "economic cooperation" has yet to 
win international acceptance, but in the Development 
Assistance Committee of OECD it is taken to mean the 
cooperation between advanced and developing countries 
through "the flow of financial resources". The 
classifications within economic cooperation are not yet 
standardised but here we divide it into capital and 
technical flows, and contributions to multilateral 
agencies.
Foreign aid, when distinguished from economic cooperation,
became for the Japanese Government what the DAC defined it as, that is,
concessional flows of resources to the developing countries. The
concept was not narrowed further to refer only to Official
Development Assistance (ODA) or Official Flows. The distinction which
continued thereafter was between economic cooperation and DAC defined
42flows of financial resources.
The 1960s: An Expanding Japanese Role
The foreign aid given by Japan in the 1960s was quite 
different in scope and quantity from that provided in the 1950s. Over 
the period 1960 to 1968 the total net flow of official and private 
resources from Japan to the less developed countries increased from 
$246 million to $1,029.8 million (see Table 1-1) and Japan became the 
fourth largest donor in the DAC in 1968. Official flows did not, however,
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rise as quickly, increasing from only $145 million to $356.2 million. 
In relation to GNP, which grew rapidly in the 1960s, ODA rose only 
from 0.24 percent in 1960 to 0.25 percent in 1968, although total 
flows increased as a percentage of GNP from 0.57 percent to 0.73 
percent.
There was continued heavy dependence on private assistance, 
especially on export credits and direct investment, as the basis of 
total flows. ODA fell as a proportion of the total, from 58 percent in 
1961 to only 34.5 percent in 1968. From 1968, the category of "Other 
Official Flows" (OOF) was introduced by the DAC into the statistical 
presentation of aid flows, and, when earlier figures were reconverted, 
Japan stood out as the member with the highest OOF portion of total 
flows. Furthermore, Japan's ODA as a percentage of GNP ranked very 
poorly, being the seventh lowest of all members in 1960 and the fifth 
lowest in 1968.
Within ODA, however, direct loans increased from $48 million 
in 1960 to $191.3 million in 1968, by far the largest increase of any 
ODA category. Bilateral grants and grant-like flows (including 
reparations) rose from $67 million to $117 million and contributions 
to multilateral organisations from $30 million to $48 million. 
Technical assistance increased nearly six-fold from $2.4 million in 
1961 to $13.7 million in 1968. Technical assistance and grants as a 
whole remained small even in the late 1970s but as a percentage of ODA 
in 1968, Japan's technical assistance was only 3.8 percent compared to 
the DAC average of 23.3 percent. On the other hand, multilateral 
contributions as a percentage of ODA in 1968 were higher than the DAC 
average, 13.4 percent as compared with 10.8 percent.
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Japan's aid giving performance always remained poor when
43compared with other DAC members. For example, one feature of 
Japanese aid in the 1960s which continued into the 1970s was the low 
concessionality of Japanese official lending. Japanese terms for 
official bilateral loans were always harder than DAC averages and at 
no time, despite DAC pressure, did Japan comply with successive DAC 
recommendations on terms, although quality did improve. The grant- 
cost measure of concessionality of aid loans was computed by Hasegawa 
to have increased from 19.85 percent in 1960 to 38.98 percent in 1968
44and then to 42.65 percent in 1973 (at a discount rate of 10 percent).
The pattern of geographical distribution of Japanese aid was
established in the 1960s, especially through the extension of
bilateral loans to many countries outside Asia. While investments in
the 1950s showed a marked emphasis on Central and South America and 
45the Middle East, official development assistance later became 
heavily concentrated in Asia. In 1963, 56 percent of total flows was 
directed to Asia, but 98.7 percent of ODA. In 1969, 73.8 percent of 
total flows went to Asia and likewise 100.9 percent of ODA, of which 
48.5 percent was to Southeast Asia. Japan's pursuit of an Asian 
foreign policy was bolstered by flows such as these, and their gradual 
diversification to other regions was only beginning to take place in 
the mid-1970s (see Table 1-2).
These figures reflected the objectives of Japanese economic 
cooperation and aid policy in the sixties. They showed also that the 
agreement between domestic ministries on the broad outlines of aid 
policy in the 1950s was weakened by the expansion of the aid 
program in the 1960s, particularly in the face of mounting 
criticism by both recipients and other donors. Heavier regional
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TABLE 1-2
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF NET FLOWS OF FINANCIAL 
RESOURCES FROM JAPAN TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(percent)
of which Near & Central
Asia Southeast Middle Africa & South Europe Other
Asia East America
1963 98.7 93.0 0.3 0.3 0.4 _ 0.3
1965 98.1 90.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.2
1967 97.6 71.5 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.6
ODA 1969 100.9 48.5 0.8 1.2 -3.9 0.8 0.2
1971 98.4 51.2 0.9 3.0 -2.6 -0.2 0.5
1973 88.1 53.8 0.1 2.6 4.6 3.0 1.3
1975 75.0 50.1 10.6 6.9 5.6 0.0 1.9
1963 33.5 22.8 14.1 29.1 13.5 8.7 1.0
1965 32.3 26.4 3.2 37.6 17.0 9.9 0.1
OOF & 
Private
1967 33.8 5.6 14.8 42.7 9.7 -1.0 -
1969 62.5 21.5 13.1 6.4 11.2 6.8 -
1971 52.3 11.8 7.3 10.5 23.2 4.2 2.6
1973 30.4 15.8 3.2 8.5 53.4 3.0 1.4
1975 53.0 38.5 14.0 6.7 24.8 1.1 0.4
1963 56.0 34.4 8.0 16.4 10.3 4 .9 4.4
1965 53.4 27.8 1.9 22.4 13.4 5.9 2.9
1967 58.5 25.2 8.1 23.3 5.2 -0.4 5.3
Total 1969 73.8 29.5 9.5 4.9 6.7 5.0 0.1
1971 64.1 21.8 5.6 8.6 16.6 3.0 2.1
1973 39.1 21.5 2.7 7.6 46.1 3.0 0.2
1975 60.3 42.4 12.9 6.8 18.4 0.7 0.9
Note: ODA = Official Development Assistance.
ODF = Other Official Flows.
Sources: 1963-1967: Gaimushö keizai kyöryokukyoku, Wagakuni no shikin
no nagare no chiikibetsu bunri (shishutsu 
jungaku), (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic 
Cooperation Bureau, The geographical distribution 
of Japan's flow of resources [net disbursements]), 
June 1968.
1969-1973: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic Cooperation
Bureau, Economic Cooperation Division, Japan's 
Economic Cooperation in 1973, June 1974.
1975: Gaimushö keizai kyöryokukyoku, Keizai kyöryoku
kankei shiryö, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Economic Cooperation Bureau, Materials on 
economic cooperation), October 1976.
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responsibilities, such as those which arose from Japan's participation 
in the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Inter-Governmental Group on 
Indonesia (IGGI) and the Ministerial Conference on the Economic 
Development of Southeast Asia (MEDSEA), exacerbated differences
46between the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the MFA in particular.
In the 1950s, all the ministries concerned with economic
cooperation in its wider sense were aware of the potential benefits
to Japan in this area. Prompted initially by Japan's reparations
obligations, all had established sections to administer different
parts of the program. International commitment, however, was soon
replaced by the vested interest of ministries in organisational 
47growth. The ministries appreciated the contribution of economic 
cooperation to Japan's own prosperity and to trade promotion 
specifically. Predictably, however, each was concerned with its own 
policy responsibilities. Thus the MFA tended to present an analysis 
of Japan's position as an aid donor and growing world power, which was 
intended to foster stable political relations between Japan and the 
developing countries, while the EPA focussed on the implications for 
Japan's economic prospects. MITI concentrated exclusively on the trade 
impact of foreign economic cooperation and the MOF paid closest 
attention to the balance of payments and to the financial burdens 
imposed on the national budget by foreign aid and trade.
These disparities arose notably in 1961 concerning the
48question of control of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF).
As a result of arguments between MITI, the MFA and the MOF, a compromise 
solution gave control to the EPA, with which it still remained in 1977. 
The immediate differences then were about bureaucratic influence but
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there were underlying questions of interpretation of the purpose of
the OECF and soft loans in economic cooperation policy and of associated
jurisdiction over policy. While they may have presumed to be so, none
of the ministry emphases was fully representative of the national
interest. They were instead contrasting interpretations of that
interest, additional to those ideas held by private enterprise and 
49political groups. The rapid entry of Japan into aid other than 
reparations meant that at no stage was a "government" view of Japan's 
objectives in undertaking economic cooperation ever drawn up. Any 
articulated objectives were the product of separate ministry 
assessments of economic cooperation. Inter-ministerial conflict meant 
that their interest was more in defending a particular interpretation 
at home than in formulating Japanese Government guidelines for a 
comprehensive aid policy.
The MFA maintained throughout the period that economic
50cooperation was a vital component of foreign policy. It defended
the concentration of aid in Asia and stressed the importance of the
region and its economic development to Japan. Nevertheless, it
recognised the need for projects which Japan was involved in, both in
Asia and elsewhere, to be visible. In its view, Japan's economic and
51political interests were to go together. As the sixties passed,
Asian recipients received greater priority and references to the
52natural role for Japan in Asia became commonplace. The MFA was also
the main channel of communication between the developing countries,
international aid organisations and Japan. A stronger note of respect
for the Third World emerged towards the end of the period, with
53recognition of its influence in the United Nations. The MFA paid more 
attention to the responsibility of Japan, as an advanced nation and a
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senior member of the DAC, to give improved aid in order to contribute
54to the solution of the North-South problem.
The two UNCTAD meetings in 1964 and "1968 had a visible
impact on MITI thinking. Its single-minded pursuit of the trade
effects of aid was arrested in UNCTAD I. A negative Japanese
Government speech to the Conference brought swift critical reaction
from the developing countries and equally rapid moves by the Prime
Minister, Ikeda Hayato, to override the Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Finance, and International Trade and Industry and impose a more
55acceptable policy for re-presentation at Geneva. The 1966 MITI
report reflected changed attitudes on the part of the Ministry. It
revealed a greater awareness of the problems, and the influence, of the
LDCs and gave more space to discussion of development per se. MITI
continued to put its own case, however, and drew attention to Japanese
domestic economic problems (such as lower per capita income, low levels
of social capital) and to the needs of the international economic
o r d e r . L a t e r  MITI statements showed a dual development of Ministry
ideas. Firstly, they demonstrated wider interest in how Japan fitted
into the international, and not only into the regional, economy.
Renewed suggestions that economic assistance be used for security of
57resources were one result of this shift in thinking. Secondly,
MITI appreciated that the quality of Japan's aid should be upgraded,
and a cautious standard for her capacity to improve performance was
58proposed. It would be "to the extent of national capacity".
The MOF supported similar arguments. Its control of much of 
aid policy through budgeting made it conservative on the aid 
question. The Ministry gave evidence to the Fiscal Rigidity Study
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Committee of the Advisory Council on Fiscal Affairs (Zaisei shingikai
zaisei kochoku kenkyu iinkai) on 25 October 1967 and pointed out that
while it recognised the demand for economic cooperation, Japan could
not increase the amounts given. It considered that merely maintaining
the present ratio of aid to national income would require constant
effort. The UNCTAD recommendation for 1 percent of National Income to
be given as aid did not have to apply to Japan, since per capita
income was lower than that of Europe and reserves of social capital
were poor. It was necessary, when examining new commitments,
according to the MOF, to calculate the future fiscal burden of foreign
aid already committed. The Ministry stressed that any improvement in
terms should only be agreed to after properly judging the prospective
recipient's needs, and care should be taken to ensure that other
59recipients did not demand the same terms.
Similar opinions were regularly put forward by other MOF 
officials, echoing the "poor fellow my country" arguments about low 
per capita income and social capital accumulation, low reserves of 
foreign currency and limited experience in relations with developing 
countries.^0 The MOF's main criterion in assessing aid requests was 
whether or not the aid recipient really wanted to, and could, develop. 
Its guiding principle was that "If there are requests for cooperation 
for promoting self-help, or requests which arise out of efforts at 
self-improvement, then these should be given precedence.
The chief concerns of the MOF at the time were, in order of 
priority, the fiscal situation and the budget impact of aid, the 
effect of aid on the balance of payments, the capacity of recipients 
to develop and the related security of committed funds, and the 
capacity of the country for self-help in development. The result was
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a cautious and exceedingly negative approach to the whole foreign aid 
question.
The Turn of the Decade
The period from 1969 to the end of 1973 marked the height of 
the Japanese aid effort. While Japan rose to become second largest 
donor in the DAC, aid was now indispensable to foreign and domestic 
economic policy. It was better understood and better integrated into 
other policy. The concentration in Asia, however, of Japan's aid and 
the extent of private business representation there created tensions 
which brought strong reactions against the Japanese presence and 
methods.
Total Japanese flows increased from $1,263.1 million in 1969 
to $5,844.2 million in 1973, while ODA rose from $435.6 million to 
$1,011.0 million in the same period. As a percentage of GNP, ODA in 
fact dropped from 0.26 percent in 1969 to 0.25 percent in 1973, 
although DAC averages fell also (see Table 1-1). Technical 
cooperation increased from $19.0 million to $57.2 million but 
increased only slightly as a percentage of ODA. Contributions to 
multilateral organisations increased as a percentage of ODA from 22.0 
percent to 24.3 percent and remained at slightly above the 23.9 percent 
average for major DAC nations in 1973. Increases in OOF and private 
investment were the most remarkable aspects of Japanese economic 
cooperation flows in the period, rising from $375.8 million to 
$1,178.9 million and from $541.7 million to $3,647.5 million 
respectively. DAC comparisons of aid giving performance, however, put 
Japan's grant element of total official flows at 0.34 percent in 1969 
and 0.19 percent in 1973, a fall in ranking among DAC members from
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6 2tenth to fourteenth. Geographical distribution (Table 1-2) 
showed a swing in ODA away from Asia (100.9 percent in 1969 to 88.1 
percent in 1973), although the proportion going to Southeast Asia 
rose (48.5 to 53.8 percent), as did flows to Africa and Central and 
South America. Private flows and OOF showed a remarkable drop in 
the proportion of resources going to Asia and a large rise in those 
directed to Central and South America.
The DAC continued to pressure Japan to improve her
performance. Japan accepted the target of 1 percent of GNP as
development assistance at UNCTAD II in 1968 and agreed to the 0.7
percent ODA target in 1970, but without a target date. She was at
the forefront of international coordination on the untying issue and
by late 1972 had removed all legal obstacles to untying on Eximbank 
6 3and OECF loans.
Ministry attitudes did not really converge. The MFA
continued to put the most comprehensive case for economic cooperation
and argued that aid should not be given only when foreign exchange
was plentiful. It should be considered as one of Japan's basic
policy priorities, the Ministry maintained, a means to prosperity and
welfare both for the developing countries and for Japan. In its
opinion, Japan should not become isolated in the interdependent
64economic order of the 1970s. The emphasis fell on Japan's standing
as an advanced industrial nation and on her international and regional 
65responsibilities.
An internal MFA document of July 1972 was more frank. It 
criticised other ministries for their narrow views of foreign aid and 
tried to explain the myths held about Japanese aid for so long: the
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practice of tying aid to exports, the negative attitude towards
commodity aid and technical assistance and the uninformed ideas about
social development in the Third World. The report stated that
although Japan was, in one way, forced to give aid, she should really
be giving it to assist LDC development, not to further the policy 
6 6goals of Japan. In another paper, Counsellor Kikuchi of the
Economic Cooperation Bureau attacked the use of the words "economic
cooperation", suggesting "development assistance" (kaihatsu enjo)
G 7as the more appropriate subject for debate.
MITI still regarded economic cooperation from the viewpoint
of international economic policy. Koyama Minoru, Director of MITI's
Economic Cooperation Department, wrote that in the 1970s Japan had to
change her industrial structure and promote the long-term
international division of labour and international economic harmony.
MITI's "aid philosophy", as he called it, was to promote aid which
was for the recipient's real benefit, but which more importantly was
6 8for Japan's eventual benefit also. The 1971 Report put it more 
abstrusely:
Japan's relations with the LDCs are more important than 
those with other advanced nations. Whether or not the LDC 
economies can show healthy growth has a big bearing on our 
own economy. We cannot afford to neglect friendly economic 
relations with the LDCs. Our position is that Japan's 
economic cooperation does not simply stop at an inter­
national responsibility but is an unavoidable requirement 
for the smooth management of our own economy.69
The MOF continued to monitor the effectiveness of the
resources Japan was giving and changes in the requirements of the
70particular developing country. In conjunction with this, it 
was considered important that LDCs made further efforts to help 
themselves, although the MOF also stressed that before aid could be
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sanctioned by the Government, there must be "national consensus" on
the need for that aid. Aid budgets could be increased only when this
consensus was reached. One commentator pointed out that ministries
were all quick to identify a consensus when the MOF raised the
question in aid budget negotiations. The MOF used the consensus
tactic most effectively, it was claimed, when the "low per capita
income" and "weak balance of payments position" arguments of the
711960s became less plausible.
There proved to be, in fact, little public awareness of the
aid issue in Japan, despite regular Government efforts at public
72relations. Only two full official surveys of public opinion on 
Japanese aid were conducted, in 1969 and 1970, the first of which was 
not published. The second showed conclusively that there was little 
understanding of aid or of Japan's aid policy, although the survey 
itself was not well constructed. While knowledge of the existence of 
economic cooperation to assist the developing countries was widespread 
(69 percent), especially among university educated persons (95.4 
percent) and males between 20 and 29 years (84.5 percent), only 34.6 
percent of all respondents knew that private aid was a part of Japan's 
economic cooperation. On other detailed questions asking what 
economic cooperation entailed, responses were not informed or positive 
Questions on attitudes to economic cooperation revealed a broad range 
of ideas about motivations for aid-giving ("humanitarian duty" 44 
percent, "world peace" 28.2 percent, "improvement of Japan's world 
standing" 22.6 percent, "creation of export markets" 21.6 percent, 
"balancing Japan's international payments" 8.8 percent, "don't know" 
33.0 percent). There also emerged a strong appreciation of the need 
to look to Japan's social development first (even by 40 percent of
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those who thought Japan should push ahead positively with economic
cooperation) and a generally negative attitude to Japan's own aid
policy (only 44 percent thought Japan should positively promote
aid and only 26 percent thought that government aid should be
increased). Even taking into account the problems of the poll, it
indicated that the Japanese public did not demonstrate any real
appreciation of foreign aid or of Japan's participation in the
73international aid effort.
Crisis and Recession
The years following the oil crisis brought recession to the 
Japanese economy and stagnation to Japan's aid. After having 
been the second donor in the DAC in 1973 she was the fourth in 1976. 
The huge volume of total flows of 1973 was cut to $4,002.6 million in 
1976 after being more than halved to $2,879.6 million in 1975. ODA 
increased from $1,011.0 million in 1973 to only $1,104.9 million in 
1976, falling markedly as a percentage of GNP from 0.25 to 0.20 
percent. The general decline resulted from a massive fall-off in 
private direct investment after the oil crisis, for the $3,647.5 
million in private flows of 1973 dropped to $352.4 million in 1975.
It recovered to $1,548.1 million in 1976.
Although Japan's ODA effort worsened, most other DAC 
members improved their performance. Great Britain, for example, 
increased ODA from 0.34 to 0.38 percent of GNP between 1973 and 1976, 
while the Netherlands pushed hers from 0.54 to 0.82 percent. Japan's 
poor record was a result of low loan disbursements and a policy of 
restrained commitment, a fall in grants due to lower reparations 
payments and only small rises in technical cooperation
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disbursements. Geographical distribution widened over the period, 
especially because of large commitments and disbursements to the 
Middle East following the Yom Kippur war and the Arab oil embargo. Of 
ODA in 1973, 88.1 percent went to Asia and 0.1 percent to the Middle 
East but in 1975, 75 percent was directed to Asia and 10.6 percent to 
the Middle East.
Japanese aid in 1977 faced a testing period. Forecasts of
0.22 percent of GNP for 1976 ODA, based on commitments and patterns of 
75disbursements, fell wide of the mark when only 0.20 percent was 
recorded. It was recognised in Japan that only a thorough reform of 
the aid system, substantial growth in the aid budget and smoother 
implementation could improve the aid figures.
The ministries persisted in their independent interpretations
of aid, although the oil crisis brought them closer together on the
link between aid and resources. There was no movement towards a basic
government policy on development assistance, despite the work of an
Ad Hoc Ministerial Committee in 1975-76. There was, nevertheless,
growing appreciation of the complexity of the development issue and of
the need to realign aid policy to provide aid which suited the economic
7 6conditions of the country in question. The MFA turned more to aid as
a tool of Japan’s foreign policy and, according to some officials, it
77was "Japan's only real weapon" against the developing nations.
MITI, too, regarded aid and economic cooperation as coming 
primarily within resources policy. One senior International Trade Policy 
Bureau official admitted that while MITI's attitude might appear "poor" 
from the outside, MITI and Japan must disregard criticism and adopt
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the position that Japan was a resource-poor trading nation whose
domestic and foreign economic policies must be served by foreign aid
policy. He believed that Japan should be positive and energetic
towards aid policy but that the relevant issues were resources,
industrial location (which applied in the case of the aluminium
refinery in the Asahan project in Indonesia) and exports. It was his
opinion that only a ministry, such as MITI, with the power of
administrative guidance, could effectively manage increasingly complex 
7 8policy questions.
The MOF's emphasis remained different. One International
Finance Bureau official, while admitting that the MOF had been too
harsh on aid requests in the late 1960s and early 1970s, argued that
in 1976 the fiscal situation was still severe and only a foreign aid
79policy "appropriate to a low-growth economy" was possible. An
officer of the Budget Bureau involved with aid echoed these sentiments.
For him, it was important "to proceed from the standpoint of economic
cooperation rather than aid" and to ensure that aid was given most
efficiently and in a way which also assisted the Japanese economy.
He reiterated the consensus argument, claiming that approval by the
Japanese people of foreign aid was essential. In his view, only
8 0aid which brought benefits to Japan could win that sanction.
Conclusion: Ideas and Policies
Within a period of twenty years Japan became one of the 
world's largest foreign aid donors, but failed to formulate an 
accepted set of policy guidelines to assist ministries in assessing 
aid requests. Many Japanese looked to foreign aid as a safeguard 
against apparent economic vulnerability, but basic agreement in this
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regard was not carried over into the details of policy. Ministries 
involved with foreign economic policy justified aid in terms of 
their own vision of Japan's best interests. Their contributions to 
aid policy and their attitudes to the nature of foreign aid developed 
separately but in distinct stages.
In their arguments about policy, ministries appealed to 
similar ideals. For example, the duty and responsibility to provide 
aid were often invoked, although the demands of major power status 
were also acknowledged. Similarly, fairness and mutuality became 
standard expressions in statements about Japan's aid responsibilities. 
The concept of exchange in this kind of thinking resulted from the 
identification of foreign aid with one narrow aspect of economic 
cooperation. The end result, rather than the motivation, was always 
decisive in domestic argument on aid questions. These ends tended, 
however, to be viewed in the short-term and the shifting bureaucratic 
battle over aid policies was not founded either on lasting consensus on 
policy objectives or on agreement about what Japanese foreign aid 
could in practice achieve.
This sketch of the official ideologies of Japanese foreign 
aid has revealed that foreign aid was a policy area rich in 
relationships between people, power and institutions. Aid policy was 
dependent originally for its articulation on ministry ideas and 
perceptions, but the matching of aid and other policy priorities 
shaped outcomes. Criticisms of Japan's aid did not fully account for 
the diversity of Japanese approaches to aid; the gap between official 
intention and actual performance will need to be examined. To assess 
this problem, the following chapter considers how the Japanese aid
bureaucracy developed.
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CHAPTER 2
THE GROWTH OF THE AID BUREAUCRACY
As the Japanese aid program grew rapidly after 1955, so did 
the tasks of ministries and agencies with a policy interest in economic 
cooperation and aid. The present chapter describes this growth and 
considers what made Japan's aid bureaucracy so divided. In assessing 
Japan's aid performance it is important to know whether administrative 
change kept pace with aid flows.
Some existing explanations will be explored. John White
maintains that the choice of one type of aid administrative structure
rather than another "is usually the outcome of historical accident
combined with the administrative conventions of the country
concerned".^ Certainly a wide variety of donor structures existed in
1977. Patterns of aid administration within DAC member nations ranged
from that of the United Kingdom under the Labour Governments of the
1960s and 1970s, where a minister was responsible for aid and in
charge of an aid ministry, to the extremely decentralised French or
Japanese situations, where a number of ministers controlled different
2parts of the aid program.
We point out how reparations and the need for export growth 
led administrators to focus on economic cooperation, a concern which 
was later heightened by the influence of domestic argument about policy 
directions and appropriate forms of development financing. The 
competition between ministries to assure their presence in the aid field 
reached its peak in the early 1960s, but after this final spurt in its 
growth the bureaucracy was not reorganised, even though the demands on 
it expanded greatly. Despite their considerable impact in Japan,
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however, accident and convention do not fully explain administrative 
change over twenty years. The unsteady relationship between aid and 
politics was decisive in linking diverse official motivations with 
actual policy mechanisms. How this occurred and with what result 
profoundly affected the making of aid policy.
The Early Years: Reparations and Exports
An administration for Japan's economic cooperation appeared
without ceremony when an Economic Cooperation Division was established
3in the International Trade Bureau of MITI in 1953. MITI was
responsible for promoting and regulating trade, administering foreign
exchange in relation to commerce and furthering economic cooperation 
4in trade. As part of the economic reforms carried out under the
Occupation, the former Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Shokosho)
was reconstituted as MITI in May 1949, a move which one writer claims
to have revealed a clear shift "from an emphasis on the domestic
economy and increased production to an emphasis on international trade
5and the promotion of exports". The primary goal of export growth was 
well reflected in MITI's early structure, in which trade functions 
were given to all the commodity bureaus. The Economic Cooperation 
Division of 1953 (formerly the Export Commodities Division) was a 
catch-all section, designed to manage international cooperation,^ but 
responsible also for the administration of customs for commodities 
handled by MITI, the export and import of internationally scarce 
commodities, and arrangements for expositions and trade fairs.
Apart from exports, long-term economic policy and reparations 
led to expansion of the aid bureaucracy in this early period. The EPA
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was created in 1955 and an Economic Cooperation Office was set up in
the Director's Secretariat from the beginning, to fit foreign economic
policy into the long-range economic planning with which the new Agency 
7was charged. In July 1955, the MFA formed a Reparations Department in
gits Asian Affairs Bureau, marking official administrative recognition 
of Japan's postwar economic relations with developing countries. The 
Department replaced the Special Reparations Office which had been 
established in the Asian Affairs Bureau some time before (see Chart 2-1).
This Department eventuated after the MFA had spent eight years
slowly setting up a more active foreign affairs bureaucracy. Japan's
international tasks had been first acknowledged when an International
Cooperation Division was set up in the Treaties Bureau in April 1947
as part of a general overhaul of the Ministry after the war. The
Division, created mainly to handle negotiations over the Peace Treaty,
was retained in the MFA reorganisation of 1949, when the new Foreign
Ministry Law (Gaimusho setchiho) was passed. The MFA's interest in
economic policy was affirmed by the creation of the International
9Economic Affairs Bureau in June 1951. It was intended that the Bureau 
would improve the administration of Japan's overseas economic and 
commercial policies as a prelude to the approaching San Francisco 
Conference, and its responsibilities included liaison with international 
organisations and economic agencies.1  ^ A further change in December 
1951 consolidated the MFA's economic administration but introduced 
overlapping jurisdictions. The International Economic Affairs Bureau 
was renamed the "Economic Affairs Bureau" and the International 
Cooperation Division in the Treaties Bureau was expanded to full 
bureau status to manage relations with the United Nations and other 
international bodies. While those reforms signalled the end of the
49
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Occupation period and the beginning of the new era of the Peace 
Treaty, with its emphasis on reparations and independent relations 
with other nations,^ "*" they also laid the grounds for future disputes.
The Reparations Department therefore followed naturally from
postwar changes in the MFA. It was set up in the Asian Affairs
Bureau, rather than in one of the functional bureaus, because reparations
were then considered only with Asian nations. The Department
administered the Reparations Agreement with Burma (concluded in April
1955), negotiations under way with Indonesia and the Philippines and
relations with other domestic ministries involved with reparations.
These included MITI, because of its control of export licences and
trade in general, and the MOF because of its regulation of budgeting
12and international finance.
The first large administrative unit for international
financial management was the MOF’s Foreign Exchange Bureau, created in
August 1952. This accompanied a widespread pruning of various
commissions and agencies which was intended to reorder economic
management. The Foreign Exchange Control Commission and the Foreign
Capital Commission, which supervised exchange policy under the
Occupation, were both abolished. The new Foreign Exchange Bureau
took over the foreign exchange functions of these commissions and
assumed responsibility for policy towards the International Monetary
13Fund and the World Bank.
In this way, four ministries had by 1955 placed themselves 
squarely in those areas of the national administration destined to 
become the centres of economic cooperation policy from the late 1950s. 
The MFA had the main jurisdiction in relations with international 
organisations and the developing nations, the MOF v/as responsible
52.
for international monetary policy (and, of course, budgeting), MITI 
was the controlling authority in exports and trade with developing 
countries and the EPA undertook overall economic planning.
1958 - 60 witnessed notable developments in Japan's aid and 
aid administration, and more frequent Government expressions of aid 
policy. The first yen loans made by Japan in 1958 and 1959 initiated 
Japan's capital economic assistance and at the same time called forth 
new assessment procedures for economic cooperation. New administrative 
arrangements followed in all four ministries.
In April 1959, in response to an increased workload, MITI
replaced the single Economic Division in its Export Promotion
14Department with two divisions. The MOF added an Overseas Private
Investment Division to its Foreign Exchange Bureau to take charge of
overseas investment by Japanese nationals, which totalled US$185.8
15million by the end of fiscal 1959. The MFA also significantly set 
up its first comprehensive economic cooperation administration, an 
Economic Cooperation Department within the Economic Affairs Bureau.
This was designed to bring together all the economic cooperation
16functions of the ministry, making administration more effective. The
Department had two divisions, one for economic and one for technical
cooperation. Under its brief the Department had to plan for economic
cooperation as it affected foreign policy, manage agreements with other
countries, protect Japanese investment interests abroad and promote
exchange of technological research. This was the first time the
Japanese Government had explicitly linked economic cooperation with
diplomatic and political objectives and was a marked contrast to the
export orientation of the counterpart division in MITI. 17
53.
The Advisory Council and the OECF
These broad developments at the end of the 1950s formalised,
but in no way coordinated, Japan's incipient economic cooperation
effort. They helped to decentralise, not consolidate, the aid
administration, a process which continued into the 1960s. On 25 July
1959 the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) established its Special
Committee on Overseas Economic Cooperation (Taigai keizai kyoryoku 
18tokubetsu iinkai) as a unit of the Party's formal decision-making
machinery. At an early stage the Committee recommended setting up a
high level council on economic cooperation in the Prime Minister's
Office and on 30 April 1960 the Advisory Council on Overseas Economic
Cooperation (Taigai keizai kyoryoku shingikai) came into being. It
incorporated two other committees established in 1958, the Overseas
Economic Cooperation Consultative Committee and the Special Committee
on Economic and Technical Cooperation. Fukuda Takeo, who at the time
was Director of the Prime Minister's Office, discussed the bill to
establish a council in the Cabinet Committee of the House of
Representatives on 18 March 1960, saying that the body would be
composed of Cabinet members and of "other suitably qualified people".
The membership was to be no more than fifteen, making it small and,
19hopefully, strong. Its first meeting was held on 7 December 1961, 
with the Prime Minister, Ikeda Hayato, as Chairman and there were in 
fact eighteen members, including six ministers.
The Council was set up to advise the Prime Minister on aid 
goals and to act as a coordinator of aid policy. There were 
insistent demands from industrialists for this, given the need which 
they saw to use aid as effectively as possible in the promotion of 
exports. Olson considers that the early committees of 1958 were
54.
"honorific and moribund", but the new Council's membership was
indicative of its importance and it seemed likely that it would be able
to stimulate the development of new Japanese aid programs. The Council
went into recess, however, after only two meetings. Although it did
not reconvene for many years it was not abolished but continued to
21draw a budget to cover administrative expenses. The delay in
choosing members (not completed until June 1961) and in actually
meeting, perhaps revealed the barriers to the Council's success posed
by inter-ministerial differences. The Council was eventually
restructured and revitalised in 1969, but until then its function as a
22body to initiate and coordinate policy was unfulfilled.
Rather than inhibiting the tendency for each ministry to
expand its own economic cooperation administration, the establishment
of the Council in 1960 may well have encouraged ministries to ensure
that their voices were clearly heard at the ministerial forum. In
April 1960, the MFA added a Policy Division to its Economic
Cooperation Department, both to coordinate and initiate aid policy
23within the Department. The Economic Cooperation Division also gained 
new planning duties. A year later, in May 1961, the Technical Cooperation 
Division was split into two, the new division taking responsibility for 
overseas training centres and multilateral technical cooperation 
agreements.^
In January 1961, the EPA created within the Coordination
Bureau, its first Economic Cooperation Division, which was given wide
legal powers for overall coordination, policy initiation and planning
(Chart 2-2). It was also made responsible for the Overseas Economic
25Cooperation Fund (OECF). The Division became the only body in the 
entire Government economic cooperation administration with the formal
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authority to undertake broad policy coordination, although it remained 
unused. This was mainly because of the EPA's lack of influence in 
domestic politics, which was itself a result of the strong control of 
the Agency by officials from other ministries (notably the MOF and 
MITI) attached to it.
The new Division's work in economic planning was in keeping
with the aims of the Agency. Both the National Five-Year Plan of
1955 and the New Long-Term Economic Plan of 1957 recognised
international economic policy as being essential to stable domestic 
26economic growth. An article written in 1957 by the Director of the
EPA's Planning Division argued explicitly the need to incorporate
economic cooperation policies in the national planning framework. He
claimed that there were obvious drawbacks in a short-term view of
economic cooperation and its effects, because the industrial development
of underdeveloped countries could draw on supplies of limited resources
and lessen the country's export capacity. The author maintained,
however, that economic cooperation should be regarded primarily in the
long-term, for only by aligning economic cooperation policy with Japan's
industrial development and industrial structure policies could economic
cooperation be of greatest benefit to Japan and to the recipient 
27nation. It was this rather "neutral" stance of the EPA, directly 
concerned with the orderly planning of economic cooperation as part of 
a domestic economic strategy, which gained it administrative direction 
of the OECF.
The OECF grew out of the Asian Development Fund set up in
1957 with support from the Prime Minister, Kishi Nobusuke. That Fund
28was intended as a "regional international financial institution" and 
was contingent on subscriptions from the United States and other Colombo
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Plan donors. Harrell maintains that it was a replacement for a
proposal to the Prime Minister in 1958 by the Federation of Economic
29Organisations (Keidanren) to establish a government agency, but this
is doubtful. The internationalist mood of the times, and not merely
Keidanren ideas, would have encouraged the creation of an organisation
for Asian development financing, especially given Japan's contribution
to the Consortium for India and Pakistan. The United States, however,
was not forthcoming with its subscription and, for convenience, the
Fund was placed within the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank). It was never
drawn upon, for by its charter it could not be used without additional
30donations from other countries.
The Fund did not constitute a formal agency and certainly was
not of the kind envisaged by the Keidanren, the LDP Special Committee
or even the International Technical Cooperation Association, which also
31called for proper use of economic cooperation funds. These 
organisations pressured the Government for a new financing institution 
offering more concessional terms than could be provided by the Eximbank. 
This was one aspect of mounting dissatisfaction among business and the 
ministries with the scope of Eximbank operations. The International 
Technical Cooperation Association in its August 1960 appeal noted that 
the Eximbank was not fulfilling its function of encouraging trade and 
overseas investment. Its purely commercial base and high interest rate 
structure, coupled with a low rate of government funding for the Bank, 
worked against its accomplishing its objectives. The Association 
recommended replenishment of the Bank's capital, revision of existing 
interest rate levels and loan conditions and the removal from Bank 
operations of certain national development projects requiring large
32amounts of concessional capital, such as Brazil's Usiminas steel plant.
50 .
The Chairman of the LDP Special Committee on Overseas
Economic Cooperation, on returning from a trip to Southeast Asia in 
1960, expressed similar reservations, commenting that:
The important reason for this trip was the feeling that we 
cannot continue economic cooperation on just the commercial 
Eximbank basis that we have at present... Although there 
has unavoidably been a lack of a national policy on economic 
cooperation until now, we as a Government must take it up as 
a national policy, lay aside present commercial objectives 
and deal with it from a long-term viewpoint. For this
budget measures and consider
movement to strengthen the Eximbank had begun within government circles
in early 1959. This was, he suggested, fundamentally because economic
cooperation had become more of an international issue, with Third
World development having a stronger impact on relations between the
West and the Communist bloc. Appreciation in Japan of the benefits of
economic cooperation with the developing nations had increased; the
Government realised that cooperation was necessary for expanding exports,
obtaining raw materials through "development import" schemes, and for
assisting the achievement of the Income Doubling Plan. MITI put
forward the idea of an Overseas Economic Cooperation Corporation
(Kaigai keizai kyoryoku kabushiki kaisha), to be fully funded by the
Government to finance projects which the Eximbank could not assist,
such as non-commercial national projects. Unfortunately for MITI,
ministerial discussions led to the Asian Development Fund being used
34as the foundation for the new OECF.
The primary purpose of the Eximbank was the promotion of 
exports, and it financed overseas development projects only as a
A MITI economic cooperation official wrote in 1961 that a
secondary function. The premise of its operations was "sound banking
59.
through the supplementation (hokan) of private funds, but the OECF
was intended to finance those development projects considered
beneficial to the recipient country, with no necessary direct ties
to export financing, although this did not mean that the long-term
35benefits to Japan of the particular project were not assessed. The
Eximbank itself had problems, including pressures to revise its loan
conditions to bring them into line with "international interest rate
patterns", and the need to increase substantially the funds available
to the Bank so that it could achieve the export growth targets set
3 6down in the Income Doubling Plan.
According to a former Department Director of OECF, who 
joined in its first year, one of the main reasons for the establishment 
of the OECF was that Eximbank financing was restricted to credits, and 
only to projects where Japanese could supply over 70 percent of project 
content. There were some projects, however, where many materials could 
be procured locally rather than from Japanese exporters, but the Japanese 
Government would not give approval for Eximbank financing in these 
cases. The OECF was a more appropriate source of finance and was also 
able to support survey work in the developing areas and direct
investment in large projects such as North Sumatran oil and Usiminas
* , 37steel.
The movement towards the new Agency was thus well defined, but 
it could be argued that what spurred its establishment at that time was 
the availability of ¥5 billion in idle economic cooperation moneys. A 
former executive of the early OECF declared that there was no 
definite plan at the time to establish a fund for the development of 
overseas projects. Although it was generally agreed within the 
domestic economic cooperation community that some sort of government
60.
organisation to promote relations with Southeast Asia was necessary,
the idea of the OECF germinated as a vague notion to use the unspent
38budget of the Asian Development Fund.
A bill to establish the OECF was presented to the 34th Diet
39in 1960 and became law in December of that year. Its stated purpose 
was to "contribute to the economic development of Southeast Asia and 
other developing regions ... by conducting such business as necessary 
for facilitating the supply of funds for their development which are 
difficult to obtain from the Export-Import Bank of Japan and from 
ordinary financial institutions, and thus to promote international 
economic cooperation". The objectives of the OECF were therefore 
essentially different from those of the Eximbank.
Arrangements for administrative control of the OECF posed
difficulties, for it came within the jurisdiction of three ministries:
the MFA, the MOF and MITI. To avoid having the OECF associated too
40closely with any one, responsibility was given to the EPA. The OECF 
was placed under a domestically weak agency and at the same time 
officials from other ministries entered it in strategic policy 
positions. The OECF was emasculated from the start and made subordinate 
to bureaucratic interests rather than to those objectives of 
international development espoused in the OECF Law.
This control was not welcomed by all. One of the original
directors of the OECF remarked how little the MOF understood development
ideas and how its attitude to aid was clouded by a domestic orientation
41and by a concern for budgets and financial stringency. OECF personnel 
were, with one or two exceptions, drawn from the ministries and no new
61.
recruits entered until 1964. The General Affairs Department of the 
OECF was staffed by men from the MOF, the MFA and MITI because of 
their joint overseeing role. The Loan Department was headed by an 
officer from the Bank of Japan and its two Division Directors were 
from the Eximbank and the Japan Development Bank, with desk-level 
staff transferred from the Eximbank, making the Loan Department, in a 
sense, an extension of that organisation.
There were attempts in the early years to merge the two
financing agencies. Criticisms were made by politicians and officials
that the Fund was an organisation which was too small for its purposes
and that the division of functions between Fund and Bank should be
more explicit. In 1963, a committee was set up to investigate these 
42charges but some, such as the Asahi shimbun, demanded a bigger role
for the OECF, independent of Eximbank control, so that Japan could
43fulfil her obligations to the developing countries. The MOF
certainly did not want to see this happen. On 19 September 1963, the
Finance Minister, Tanaka Kakuei, met with the Prime Minister, Ikeda
Ilayato, and suggested that since the OECF was still small and, in
recent fiscally difficult years, was not allowed by the Government to
undertake much financing, the Eximbank should take over more of its
duties in order to unify aid policy and allow greater capital for
official lending. There was strong opposition from the MFA and from
MITI, which saw benefits to the LDCs and Japan alike in softer loans
44than the Bank could provide. Morinaga Sadaichiro, President of the
Eximbank, was non-committal in his comments, stressing that the
45Government "should consider the plan with caution". Yanagida Seijiro, 
President of the OECF, prevailed upon the Finance Minister, who backed 
down. When questioned by the Opposition in the Finance Committee of
62.
the House of Representatives on 19 February 1964, he replied that the 
Government would not amalgamate the two organisations, even though the 
Fund's business was limited. The Minister went on to suggest that 
much of the problem lay in conflict between the MFA, the MOF and MITI 
concerning aid and export finance, an admission not often made in 
public.46
From the outset the ministries took control of most of the
Fund's affairs. The "four-ministry deliberation system" (yon shocho
kyogi taisei) was formed, which made it difficult for the OECF to
establish its own identity. Under this system, the four main ministries
(the MFA, the MOF, MITI and the EPA) consulted about, and had to agree
47on, the provision of all loans by the Fund. By the 1970s, it was the 
heart of the decision-making process for official loans.
Completing the Structure
1962 was an important year for Japan's aid administration, 
for it marked the end of its substantive development. The MFA, the 
MOF and MITI all modified their economic cooperation bureaucracies, and 
the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA) was established under 
the control of the MFA. They were the last significant reforms in the 
MFA until 1969, and in MITI until 1973 and ended the growth in their 
administration for economic cooperation.
In May 1962, the Economic Cooperation Department of the MFA
became a fully-fledged bureau, separate from the Economic Affairs
Bureau. Partition proved successful in expanding the size of the
48Department, whose workload had greatly increased, and in easing 
tensions between it and the Bureau caused by diverging interests. The
63.
latter's responsibility for Japan's economic relations with the
advanced nations was not always welcomed by a Department increasingly
aware of the importance to Japan's future of economic cooperation with
the less-developed countries. The Fifth Meeting of the OECD Development
Assistance Group (DAG) held in Tokyo in July 1961 gave a new perspective
to international aid and it is likely that Japan's efforts to actively
49participate in that body included administrative change. The new 
Bureau had four divisions and the existing Policy Division took on 
added functions. It became the channel for liaison with international 
economic cooperation organisations and was charged with policy research.
The MOF, also in May 1962, added an Overseas Investment
50Division to its Foreign Exchange Bureau, which indicated a clear 
response by the MOF, especially by its Exchange Bureau, to the 
establishment of the OECF and to the developments within the DAC. The 
new Division was given broad authority over economic cooperation 
finance, the first time that the MOF had so defined its work in the 
area. The Division was concerned generally with policy for economic 
cooperation, policy initiation for technical assistance and export 
credits, relations with international economic cooperation meetings 
(including the DAC), research, and the OECF (see Chart 2-3).
In April 1962, the International Trade Bureau in MITI was
reorganised and a separate Economic Cooperation Department was
established within the Bureau to cope with an increased workload in
51economic cooperation (see Chart 2-4). It had three Divisions, the 
former Second becoming the new Technical Cooperation Division and the 
former First splitting into the Policy Division and the Capital 
Cooperation Division. The first gained the new responsibility of
liaison with international bodies and the latter the task of monitoring
64 .
65.
capital cooperation carried out by the new OECF. The formal separation
of economic cooperation from export promotion (which was managed by a
new Export Promotion Department) did not alter the MITI attitude to
economic cooperation in general. A former official of the MITI
Economic Cooperation Department in the early 1960s, and in 1977 a
senior departmental official, when asked about the main functions of
52the early Department, answered simply "export promotion".
The advent of the OTCA in May 1962 was not accompanied by
inter-ministerial controversy of the kind which occurred over the
OECF. It was set up to combine all official technical assistance
programs and many smaller schemes operating under different private
groups. The Asia Society (Ajia kyokai) was the core of the new 
53agency, which was placed under MFA control, although the MOF retained 
power over the budget. Consultation was required with other ministries 
which had competence in the technical cooperation area, such as in the 
provision of technical experts. It was clear, nevertheless, that much 
effort was needed to ensure an easy path for the OTCA. Kai Fumihiko, 
the Director at that time of the MFA's Economic Cooperation Bureau, 
wrote that:
The tasks of the new Agency are important and are closely 
related to Government policies but, since they are wide- 
ranging and complex, it is impossible for the Agency to 
carry them out by itself, however hard it tries and whatever 
effort the Foreign Ministry makes. Close contact, harmony 
and coordination between related ministries and private 
organisations are absolutely necessary for the Agency to 
implement its tasks. The tasks which the Agency must carry 
out are spread over all administrative areas of our Government 
and unless there is cooperation with all ministries, whatever 
their differences, we cannot expect smooth implementation.
For this reason the need for the Foreign Minister to consult 
with commissioning ministries is written into the Law but the 
Agency, which receives these commissions, must also make
C Aefforts to strengthen its ties with them.
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The MFA's First Technical Cooperation Division was given jurisdiction 
over the OTCA in June 1962.
Thus the Government's second agency for implementing economic
cooperation was established under the direction of at least six
ministries - more, in fact, than were involved with the OECF. While
general supervision rested with the MFA and the MOF, MITI, as well as
the Ministries of Agriculture and Forestry, Welfare, and Labour, had
technical training programs and institutions which operated under
government technical cooperation policy. This regulatory tangle around
the OTCA remained throughout the 1960s and affected the formation of
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), OTCA's successor,
55in 1974.
The establishment of the OTCA concluded the main formative 
period in the development of Japan's aid administration. By 1963, the 
lines which were to determine the overall patterns of policy-making from 
then on had been drawn, the ministries having "staked their claims" in 
the different areas of economic cooperation. The four-ministry 
deliberation system was operating, the MFA had majority control in 
technical cooperation, and responsibility for cooperation with 
international aid organisations was divided between the MFA and the 
MOF. By 1963, Japan's aid administration had fully developed, and 
bureaucratic economic cooperation interests had become institutionalised 
in four ministries. The 1960s were to see the Japanese aid effort 
become one of the largest among DAC member nations, but the basic 
structure of her aid administration did not change.^
In May 1964, the MFA rationalised its reparations 
administration. The Reparations Department in the Asian Affairs
69.
Bureau was abolished and all three of its divisions were transferred
to the Economic Cooperation Bureau. At the same time, the two
technical cooperation divisions were combined, making in total six
57divisions within the Bureau. This was followed in May 1965 by the 
merging of two of the reparations divisions and the splitting off from 
the Policy Division of the International Cooperation Division, which 
was given the task of liaising with international organisations on 
economic cooperation (which the Policy Division had dealt with until 
then). There were no further readjustments within the Bureau 
until 1969.
In April 1965, MITI decided to make fuller use of its Economic
Cooperation Department. The Export Promotion Department of the
International Trade Bureau became a complete Trade Promotion Bureau,
and the Economic Cooperation Department moved out of its former home
59into the new bureau, retaining its three divisions. As was the 
case before 1962, this strengthened the link between economic 
cooperation and trade promotion, a fact which MITI frankly admitted.
The official explanation was that the International Trade Bureau had 
become overloaded and the new arrangements were to lighten the burden 
and place more emphasis on the urgent task of trade promotion.
Economic cooperation was transferred simply because it was "closely 
connected to trade promotion".^  This reorganisation left the Economic 
Cooperation Department under the direct influence of export policy 
administration until the general MITI restructuring in 1973.
The MOF altered its economic cooperation administration only 
slightly. In June 1964, the Foreign Exchange Bureau was renamed the 
International Finance Bureau, although its functions remained the 
same. According to the Finance Minister, this shift in emphasis
70.
represented a maturing of Japan’s outlook on economic controls:
It is now a world of liberalisation of trade and foreign 
exchange ... we have moved to IMF Article 8 nation status 
from 1 April and thus the notion of "foreign exchange 
control" is most unsuitable. It is necessary to state 
clearly that we will no longer "control" foreign exchange.
The tasks of domestic finance, as well as international 
finance, have become increasingly complex. On the 
international stage there are completely new responsibilities 
in the postwar period ... such as the IMF, IBRD, OECD, IDA 
and even Japan's own international cooperation activities ... 
In this sense, the Foreign Exchange Bureau gives way to the 
International Finance Bureau, its national tasks greatly 
changed, but basically the same body. Its job, however, will 
mean a much more forward-looking international finance 
policy.61
This new image for the MOF's economic cooperation work was
underlined in 1966 by the establishment of an Overseas Public Investment
Division. This involved the formal separation of bilateral aid
(for which the new Division was given responsibility) from private
6 2investment and international aid policy. With this, the MOF economic
6 3cooperation administration was complete.
Restructuring the MFA and MITI
The only remaining administrative changes which affected
economic cooperation, apart from the addition of a Second Economic
Cooperation Division to the Economic Planning Agency's Coordination
64Bureau in June 1972, were to the MFA and MITI. For both ministries 
the reforms were significant, but they left the structure of economic 
cooperation divisions little altered. In the case of the MFA, however, 
policy-making was further complicated and many new problems created for 
aid administrators.
The MFA reorganisation in January 1969 was based on the 
recommendations of an intra-Ministry Reorganisation Committee set up in 
1966 at the behest of the Ministry kambukai (the meeting of senior
71.
officials two or three times a week). The move, referred to as the
"unification of politics and economics" (seikei gattai), involved a
rationalisation of duties handled previously by both regional bureaus
(such as the Asian Bureau) and functional ones (such as the Economic
Affairs Bureau). It was the result of recognition by the committee
of the complexity of Japan's economic relations and of the increasing
political responsibilities which accompanied her enlarged international
economic role. It reflected real changes in MFA thinking and, as a
result, the economic aspects of Japan's foreign policy figured more
65prominently in policy planning.
The MFA differed from other ministries in that the same 
issues were handled by both regional and functional bureaus, often 
causing problems of jurisdiction and intra-ministry rivalry. In the 
official euphemism, regional and economic bureaus managed the same 
problems "in a system of close c o o p e r a t i o n " T h e  1969 changes 
involved the transfer to the respective regional bureaus of the 
responsibility for bilateral relations previously administered by the 
Economic Affairs and Economic Cooperation Bureaus. The two economic 
bureaus retained planning for economic and economic cooperation policy 
and direction of multilateral relations. They gained the function of 
assessing and coordinating bilateral relations in their own specialist 
fields.
In real terms, the Economic Affairs Bureau suffered most and
the Asian and American Affairs Bureaus gained. The reorganisation
can be seen in one sense as a result of pressure from the Ministry's
two chief regional bureaus (Asian and American Affairs) to curb the
6 7growth in size and power of the Economic Affairs Bureau. The latter 
consisted previously of ten divisions but it lost six of its regional
72.
divisions, the work of which was absorbed by the regional bureaus. In 
the end it retained only five divisions, including a new Resources 
Division, which was destined to become central to the MFA's diplomacy 
in the 1970s.
The regional bureaus all underwent divisional reorganisation.
In the Economic Cooperation Bureau also there were changes, but since 
all the divisions were functional ones already, there was no wholesale 
transfer of powers to regional bureaus. The existing structure was 
largely retained, but the Reparations Division was renamed the Second 
Economic Cooperation Division. Japanese payments for war damage were 
nearing completion and the work of the division came closer to grant 
aid than to reparations administration. The First Economic Cooperation 
Division's role in non-grant aid was reaffirmed and the Reparations 
Accounting Division became the Accounting Division, and dealt with the 
financial aspects of both reparations and grant aid.
The seikei gattai meant greater complexity in inter-bureau
relations in the MFA. The regional bureaus in 1976 handled economic,
economic cooperation and political relations with their own geographic
regions and countries, and the Economic Cooperation Bureau, for example,
had to consult them about bilateral economic cooperation. This was
irksome to many officials and, according to one former Division Director,
the Economic Cooperation Bureau resisted the reorganisation. He argued
that it was incomplete, and carried through in respect of only a few
important recipient countries, namely South Korea, Indonesia, South
6 8Vietnam and recently the Middle East. There was extended inter­
bureau discussion on policy towards these countries, he complained, but 
on others the regional bureaus were too busy to handle the work and 
did not have the necessary expertise. He raised the example of problems
73.
regarding policy to Bangladesh, with which Japan's relations were
mostly economic. The Economic Cooperation Bureau could not make
decisions on its own, being a functional bureau, but the responsible
regional section (the South-West Asia Division of the Asian Affairs
Bureau) had neither the time nor the inclination to consider aid fully
69in its approach to Bangladesh. Such issues prompted intra-bureau
debate in 1975-76 on the need for bureau reorganisation along regional
lines. It was recognised, however, that duplication of effort was
likely and that increased reliance on other ministries for specialist
knowledge would only weaken the MFA's position and probably the overall
aid program. Officials also thought that wider responsibility for
regional bureaus would encourage greater politicisation of issues. The
patronising attitude of the regional officers in offering "to give you
chaps a hand" when the Economic Cooperation Bureau became busy was said
70to b«2 symptomatic of the trend.
Later MFA changes included the addition of another Technical
Cooperation Division in May 1972 and the abolition of the Accounting
Division, the staff of which were dispersed throughout the Bureau. The
formation of the new Technical Cooperation Division was partly due to
an increase in the budget allocated for technical cooperation in fiscal
711972 and to the inability of one division to handle the work. In
April 1975, the Development Cooperation Division was set up, ostensibly
to administer development projects overseas where both capital and
technical cooperation were involved, especially development surveys and
72projects promoted by private enterprise. As most of this work was to 
be carried out by the new Japan International Cooperation Agency, in 
fact the MFA tried to assure itself of predominance in what was
envisaged as a major area of future Japanese economic cooperation. 73
74.
The MITI reorganisation of 1973 was the only full scale
ministry reorganisation after the 1950s and the only rationalisation
of an immediate post-war bureaucratic structure to meet current policy 
74demands. It was a move away from the emphasis on industrial 
development and trade promotion, to an alignment with new economic and 
social needs such as technological development, environmental protection 
and internationalisation of the Japanese economy. Based on a report of 
the Industrial Structure Council, advisory body to the Minister, the 
reorganisation strengthened policy-making bureaus and further integrated 
those designed for industrial policy implementation. This was done by 
changing specific industry bureaus to deal with industries on a broader 
policy basis. The dual trade-industry structure of MITI was retained 
while policy coordination ministry-wide was improved and greater 
flexibility allowed in approaches to groups of industries. In respect 
of international economic policy, an International Trade Policy Bureau 
was set up for policy planning and an International Trade Administration 
Bureau for implementation. The Economic Cooperation Department was 
placed in the former:
Until now, economic cooperation has been seen as an integral 
part of export promotion, but at a time when the balance of 
payments is over $10 billion in surplus, this thinking is 
inappropriate. It is necessary for economic cooperation to 
be taken from the recipient country viewpoint and to be given 
according to the wishes of the underdeveloped nations. 5^
Economic cooperation remained, in effect, firmly tied to the 
trade policy concerns of the Ministry. Policy for bilateral economic 
cooperation was handled in the Department, although implementation was 
overseen by the country market divisions of the Bureau outside the 
Department.
The Department was, however, reduced, the Policy and Economic 
Cooperation Divisions being merged. This was rather surprising to
75.
some, for it was unusual that the numbers of divisions and staff should
fall when no reduction in the workload occurred.^ The newly named
Economic Cooperation Division had its work enlarged enormously. One
Departmental official alleged that while the cut was probably a result
of a wider MITI rationalisation of divisions, it was inappropriate and
the former division was necessary to MITI's economic cooperation
function. In his opinion, the change was a failure, because the new
Division Director, the man with responsibility for the entire
Department, became so busy it was almost impossible for him to give
sufficient attention to any one matter. The opinion of the Director
was necessary in all discussions and it made departmental coordination
77more difficult when he was unavailable.
The problem was partly solved by the establishment, in 
October 1976, of an Economic Cooperation Coordination Office in the 
Division, staffed by one officer of division director level. This was 
a complete reversal to the pre-1973 situation.
A Central Aid Agency
Questions of administrative reform in Japanese aid lead to 
the subject of a central aid agency. There is a long history of 
recommendations that such an agency be established in Japan and, 
although JICA was the closest approximation to a multi-purpose aid 
agency, at no time in its gestation period between 1972 and 1974 was 
there a suggestion that it should take on responsibility for the 
formulation and implementation of all aid policy. Indeed, there was 
never a well developed movement or political impetus for reform which 
was able to overcome the weight of the established bureaucracy, and 
ideas for change appealed always to notions of administrative unity
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which it was in the interests of ministries (even the MFA) to avoid.
Calls for some form of economic cooperation agency in Japan
usually followed criticism of the aid administration, especially of the
need for internal coordination and policy consistency. The first such
recommendation came from the Matsumura Committee (a group comprising
LDP members wishing to promote relations between Southeast Asia and
Japan) to the Prime Minister, Kishi Nobusuke, in August 1957, although
its initial suggestion of an economic cooperation agency outside the
MFA was diluted to that of an economic cooperation bureau within the 
7 8Ministry. This report was followed in January 1958 by recommendations
from a Keidanren committee for a government agency, and by the Second
Report of the LDP Special Committee on Overseas Economic Cooperation,
which suggested that the Government "centralise the administration of
79economic cooperation". As it eventuated, only a department was 
created in the MFA and it was not until 1962 that a full bureau came 
into being.
These early moves helped the MFA aid bureaucracy expand, and 
eventually led also to the establishment of the OECF in 1961. Later, 
jurisdictional disputes between the Fund and the Eximbank prompted, at 
a ministerial level, new pressures for reform of the administration.
These arguments were seen in the efforts of the Finance Minister, Tanaka 
Kakuei, to amalgamate the OECF and the Bank and in an idea of the Foreign 
Minister, Shiina Etsusaburo, as reported in the Asahi shimbun of 20 
September 1964, to set up a new fund to promote aid to developing 
countries. He envisaged this as a replacement for the OECF which would 
merge with the Eximbank.
Later reports showed that ministers and senior economic
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spokesmen continued to be concerned with the issue of an aid agency.
Four senior men involved in economic cooperation recognised in 1966
the need for an agency, along the lines of those organisations in
8 0other DAC member countries, able to coordinate and formulate policy.
In March 1967, the Foreign Minister, Miki Takeo, pledged reforms during
a policy speech to the Diet.^1 In a further statement in April, he
acknowledged pressure from recipients to improve the aid system and
said in particular that the MFA was studying the viability of an agency
82as a prelude to a complete restructuring of the system.
While the MFA decided to shelve the agency plan and settle
for an enlarged Economic Cooperation Bureau, Miki again called in July
1970 for a foreign aid agency under the control of the MFA. He hoped
8 3that this would encourage the development of a long-term aid policy.
As with most such appeals by officials and politicians, however, his
ideas lacked detail and impact. In fact, it was in the interest of the
MFA to opt for the status quo and retain the wide control it had over
aid, if for no other reason than to maintain the strong foreign policy
input into aid policy. According to an editorial on aid problems in
February 1968, bureaucratic territorialism (kakkyoshugi) remained the
obstacle to change, by preventing coordination between ministries
84involved in the aid administration.
Ministers were not the only ones to raise the question of 
reform. The study of aid administration carried out by the Special 
Committee on Administration (Rinji gyosei chosakai) in 1963-64 made no 
recommendations about an agency, but suggested strengthening the MFA’s 
Economic Cooperation Bureau and rationalising the division between the 
OECF and the Eximbank. It proposed a ministerial Advisory Council, with 
a Cabinet Counsellor (naikaku hosakan) as secretary, to initiate and
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coordinate policy.
In February 1968, the Japan Committee for Economic Development
(Keizai doyukai), one of the three major economic organisations in Japan,
published a report by its Special Economic Cooperation Committee in
which it recommended the creation of an economic cooperation agency to
8 6achieve consistency, flexibility and comprehensiveness in aid policy.
This was echoed three years later in an interim report of the Advisory
Council on Overseas Economic Cooperation, which advocated an economic
cooperation agency for policy formulation, to be headed by a minister
8 7but not responsible for implementation. The Council's final report, 
however, advised instead that an Overseas Development Cooperation 
Promotion Office be established in the Prime Minister's Office. This 
downgrading suggested the impact of ministry pressure on the Council.
Its compromise was that the Office "promote the improvement of 
administrative arrangements" while "respecting as much as possible the 
independence of implementing ministries and agencies".
The Government party also put forward its proposals. One
newspaper reported in March 1970 that the LDP's Special Committee on
Economic Cooperation had decided to seek the merger of the OECF, the
OTCA and the Japan Emigration Service (JEMIS), as part of a revision
8 8of the LDP's aid policy. There was no explanation of why these three
agencies in particular should be integrated, but the idea was important
in the light of the eventual form which the Japan International
Cooperation Agency took in 1974. Later meetings of the Committee
concentrated on the reform of the OTCA and attempted unsuccessfully to
garner support for proposals to give that Agency the power and money to
provide cheap finance for business ventures overseas, especially
89development projects.
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Pressure came not from within Japan alone. The DAC, in its
annual examination of Japan's aid effort, often referred to the need
for administrative reforms. In the first examination in 1965, the
Japanese authorities apparently acknowledged that there was room for
improvement and in 1966 the DAC Secretariat report noted that "a
central administration would seem to be increasingly essential" as
90Japan undertook new programs of direct government lending.
References were again made in the 1967 and 1968 reports, while the
1971 report criticised the administrative structure as being ad hoc
and complex. In 1973, the Secretariat noted that "the administrative
structure of Japan's aid remains highly decentralised ... it appears
that the administrative structure of the Japanese programme is
considerably smaller than that of other DAC members with comparable
or smaller volumes of flows. This factor may prove to constitute a
91restraint on the expansion of the programme".
I
By 1976, the momentum to bring about a central aid 
administration was weaker. Officials were less positive in assessing 
how to accommodate ministry pressures and few were able to indicate 
what concessions could be made. It was evident that the Government 
recognised the necessity for centralisation, but it was not clear from 
where the impetus could come. Minato Tetsuro, an LDP Diet Member who 
vigorously advocated an aid program for Japan, favoured an aid agency 
in 1974 but by 1976 had abandoned that position and urged qualitative 
policy improvements within the existing fragmented administrative
4- 9 2system.
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Conclusion: Aid and Administrative Change
The general conclusion of John White, when applied to Japan, 
is substantially correct. Historical accident and administrative 
convention indeed greatly influenced the structure of the Japanese aid 
bureaucracy. The growth of that bureaucracy, however, was not purely 
reactive, for political motives and pressures were a significant, if 
only negative, influence. The Japanese aid administration stagnated 
after the mid-1960s. As the economic cooperation program grew, the 
division of responsibility for policy did not keep up with the need 
to adjust procedures to new demands. Functions were further dispersed 
as more ministries dealt with foreign aid and no method for 
coordinating the different programs was devised. The strength of 
Japanese administrative tradition (and the persistence of divergent 
ideas about aid, described in Chapter 1) meant that power over policy 
was divided and therefore weakened and no natural policy leader emerged 
from among the ministries.
The development of new bureaucracies, resulting from the
93"constant flux in the nature of policy space", is well known, but
apart from the interaction of existing bureaus with the environment,
the effect of ideas on policy outcomes is also important. Herbert
Simon showed in 1953 how environmental forces interacted with
conflicting conceptions of the tasks of the United States Economic
94Cooperation Administration to shape that agency's development. 
Throughout the history of the Japanese aid program, contrasting 
perceptions of aid were the stimulus for change in aid management 
structures. These were domestic attitudes, mainly a product of 
ministry approaches to problems, although moulded by politics also.
Apart from supervision by the Administrative Management
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Agency and the Budget Bureau of the MOF, administrative changes in the 
aid policy area were the prerogative of each ministry. Much of the 
growth was a response to the diversifying Japanese international role 
of the 1950s and 1960s. Workloads never diminished, but each ministry 
set its own goals for economic cooperation in the light of wider policy 
considerations. Economic cooperation, and its administration, were
9expanded or restrained by ministries pursuing these broader interests. 
Thus MITI's economic cooperation divisions were aligned to export 
promotion policy for most of the period; the MFA divisions were 
separate from regional policy bureaus but were never independent of 
their influence. The MOF's overseas investment divisions always 
followed the international monetary policy goals of that Ministry.
When ministry perceptions clashed, however, system reform and 
centralisation became political issues.
Political support for aid policy was sporadic and given only 
for specific ministry interests. Because of this, it was crucial in 
controlling administrative change and preventing comprehensive reform. 
This was not difficult to achieve. Proponents of change in Japan did 
not promote the beneficial effects on aid flows of a restructured 
system and no debate arose about the developmental impact of donor 
administration. Discussion centred instead on the vague notion of 
"unifying" policy, so bureaucratic inertia overcame piecemeal reform 
proposals.
There was, therefore, no sense of immediacy about reform. 
Not until the early 1970s, when international conditions began to 
move in favour of a more coordinated approach to aid management, did 
at least one ministry (the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry) link 
its own policy strategies with administrative solutions to Japan's
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aid performance. Aid and development then assumed long-term political 
significance in Japan. The following chapter traces some effects of 
this change.
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CHAPTER 3 
"SCRAP AND BUILD":
THE ORIGINS OF THE JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY
The Japan International Cooperation Agency (Kokusai kyoryoku 
jigyodan, or JICA) began operations on 1 August 1974, to implement 
government sponsored technical cooperation programs, emigration 
services and funding of development projects in agriculture, forestry, 
mining, industry and social development. It was not designed as a 
central aid agency and came under a complex set of controls by several 
ministries.
This chapter is a case study of the relationship between aid 
and diffuse policy currents within the Japanese Government. It 
illustrates the shifting balance of interests in aid policy, the 
ordering imposed by budget procedures and the legislative process, and 
the separation of the domestic politics of aid from ideas of economic 
development. It discusses how ministry perceptions of aid clashed over 
problems of organisation and how this conflict influenced the eventual 
structure and functions of JICA. Bureaucratic politics, it will be 
argued, directed the debate and narrowed the final options, but proved 
unable ultimately to resolve an issue which impinged on the goals of 
aid sections in different ministries.
Bureaucratic Conflict and Politics
In August 1972, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
(MAF) requested 1973 Budget funds to establish an agency for the 
development of agriculture in developing countries.^ The substantial 
(¥12 billion) request was prompted by MAF concern about two issues: 
agricultural import policy and MAF influence in the domestic aid
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administration, which was restricted by its specialised, domestic 
orientation.
Those sections of the Ministry responsible for agricultural
trade clearly understood the effect on Japan's food supplies of trends
in international agriculture, and recognised the need to increase
assistance to the primary sector of developing countries. Japan
depended heavily on imports of farm products and the developing
countries in 1972 provided 52.2 percent of her primary produce imports.
MAF officials hoped that policies of overseas agricultural development
might help diversify sources of agricultural commodities, for a few
2developed countries provided the bulk of staple food imports.
Administrative questions were also prominent. Within the
MAF the International Cooperation Division of the Economic Affairs
Bureau was, as one commentator put it, a "special (tokushu) section",
3out of place within an inward-looking ministry. If policies were to 
be pushed forward, it was realised, aid divisions of the MAF needed 
more power in the bureaucracy than their status within the Ministry 
afforded them. Officials of the Division aimed to achieve this, but 
the MAF had no power base in the national aid administration. The MAF 
was not included in the four-ministry group which made decisions on 
capital aid policy and its secondary task in technical cooperation was 
to provide specialist staff for agricultural technical aid projects.
The MAF, however, had a rival in its attempt to create a new 
agency, for MITI had requested funds for a Small and Medium Industry 
Overseas Investment Agency. Because of the nature of both proposals,
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considerable difficulties were expected in negotiations with the MOF.
The MAF plan presented problems in the balance between agricultural
and forestry projects, for emphasis on the latter was likely to
involve the Government in schemes too obviously designed out of
domestic self-interest. The MITI plan was not envisaged at any stage
to be wholly government-operated but was to rely on cooperation from
4private enterprise.
Initially, the MOF adopted a negative approach, asserting 
that aid administration was a problem beyond the scope of MAF jurisdiction 
alone. It suggested rather that the Ministry examine its proposal more 
carefully. Although ¥30 million was allocated for further research
5into the scheme, the MAF foreshadowed a request for the following 
year's budget^ and set up a coordinating study group within its 
Economic Affairs Bureau in June 1973. Seven missions were sent abroad
7to research trends in agricultural production and food demand.
The MAF regarded movements in world food production and demand 
as being important for national security because of their effect on
Q
Japan's long-term food imports. The Planning Division of the Minister's
Secretariat, for example, conducted in 1972-73 its own study of the
food problem, which had been highlighted in the summer of 1972 when the
Soviet Union embarked on a program of buying up grain stocks. Until
the "food crisis" of 1972-73, Japanese agricultural cooperation
consisted mainly of assistance with rice cultivation and with projects
which resembled rather closely the "development import" ideas current
9ten years earlier in MITI circles and revived in the late 1960s.
Opposition parties had attacked the policy as having only a minor 
effect on the stability of Japan's food imports, and agricultural 
pressure groups opposed it as a threat to the incomes of Japan's rice
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farmers. The international situation which emerged in 1972 gave 
renewed force to the arguments put forward by the MAF's International 
Cooperation Division that overseas agricultural development projects 
were necessary. ^  Thinking in the Ministry was supported, ironically 
enough, by the United States Government's announcement on 14 June
1973 that exports of cereal products would be restricted. This involved 
a 50 percent cut in contracted export quantities of soya beans, and the 
vulnerability of Japan's food supplies suddenly became apparent to all.
The soya bean "shock" was perfectly timed to the MAF's 
advantage, coming only two months before ministry requests for the
1974 Budget were made. Greater public awareness of the food issue 
gave legitimacy to agricultural development proposals,"^ and serious 
lobbying by "sponsors" of MAF ideas and intense political involvement 
replaced the apathy of 1972 and countered expected opposition from the 
MFA and the Administrative Management Agency (AMA) to the very idea of 
agricultural cooperation. Both had argued this way a year earlier, but 
their objections in 1973 were to be instead over the emphasis and 
organisational implications of policy.
A Committee on Overseas Agricultural Cooperation was set up
in June 1973 by Tokonami Tokuji, an LDP Member of the House of
Representatives and chairman of the Agricultural Sub-committee of the
LDP Special Committee on Overseas Economic Cooperation, paralleling
12the study group in the Economic Affairs Bureau of the MAF. At the 
end of August the Tokonami Committee produced a proposal for an inter­
ministry committee on agricultural cooperation and an Overseas 
Agricultural Development Cooperation Agency, which was to include the 
Japan Emigration Service (JEMIS). It would concentrate on agricultural 
cooperation with the Latin American countries and be supervised jointly
87.
by the MFA and the MAF. Minato Tetsuro, another LDP member actively
interested in aid, believed that this proposal converted many within
13the LDP to the idea of agricultural cooperation.
A report from the study group within the MAF's Economic Affairs 
Bureau led to a ¥40 billion request in the 1974 Budget, for an agency 
combining government and private efforts to stabilise Japan's food 
imports. Unfortunately, the emphasis was too obviously on the benefits 
to Japan rather than to the developing country, which gave grounds for 
MFA opposition and for the eventual displacement of agricultural 
development as the primary function of the proposed agency.
Partly out of pique, MITI responded to the MAF request by
seeking funds for an Overseas Trade Development Cooperation Corporation,
for financing industrial and resources projects in developing countries.
It was to absorb the Japan Overseas Development Corporation (JODC), a
body set up in 1970 to assist private firms in developing Asian 
14resources. While MITI's reaction was an attempt to expand alongside
15the MAF, to keep up with its bureaucratic neighbour, the plan contained 
elements of that rejected by the MOF the year before and was also 
consistent with MITI policies of industrial relocation, international 
division of labour and support for private initiative in resource 
development.^
The proposals brought immediate responses from other
ministries. The EPA was against both, for as administrator of the
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) it was concerned about the
17impact of the proposed agencies on the scope of OECF lending. The 
MFA also opposed the two plans but on wider grounds than in 1972. It 
objected on the basis of administrative feasibility, policy coordination
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and principles of development policy. As the ministry in charge of the
Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA), it saw no need for a new
agency, since technical cooperation was already well managed, and it
did not consider that either plan was capable of properly coordinating
technical and financial aid. It likened the development import content
of each to "resources plunder" which it claimed was against Japan's
18long-term interests. The MFA's attention was not entirely upon
development issues, however, and as in 1972 it obviously desired to
preserve its own position in the aid administration. To that end,
official MFA policy was to regard the new agency as unnecessary, but
the Ministry believed that, if it were inevitable, it should be as
comprehensive as possible and not restricted to one sector of aid
policy. Only by adopting this attitude could the MFA ensure that its
19organisational interests were protected.
Domestic agricultural groups were not all convinced of the
worth of the MAF request. Within the Ministry itself debate was about
whether the emphasis should be placed on development import or on
development cooperation, for recipient benefits featured more prominently
in the latter. To many, such as those in the Agricultural Structure
Improvement Bureau, development import was a positive course to
follow (given their concern for the future of Japan's primary industry
structure) whereas it was only in mid-1973 that other sections, such as
the Animal Industry Bureau and the Forestry Agency, came to consider
either approach as useful to Japan's agricultural policy. Events
made it clear to them that diversifying the sources of stock feed
20and timber imports would assist Japan. The Overseas Agricultural 
and Forestry Development Policy Group (brought together in the 
Minister's Secretariat with officials from the Secretariat and from the 
Economic Affairs Bureau), especially its Director, Kawamura Koichi,
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with support from the International Cooperation Division of the
Economic Affairs Bureau and from its Director, Ashikaga Tomomi,
succeeded in shifting the emphasis of its proposal from "import" to
"cooperation". It did this to show that, in contrast to MITI, its
ideas approached the development solutions sought by the LDCs
themselves, without jeopardising Japan's long-term food import
structure or the domestic industry. Making this distinction was vital
in terms of the domestic political balance. By moving the main theme
of the argument from pursuit of Japan's interests to the promotion of
LDC goals the Policy Group quietened MFA opposition and won over many
21of its opponents in and around the Ministry.
The efforts of MAF officials to turn the debate to their 
advantage were bolstered by a fortuitous turn in political events.
This came as the process of bureaucratic politics reached the difficult 
budget negotiation stage, in which politicians and parties were to 
become involved. While this would open up the debate to wider political 
forces, the strict timetable of the budget process imposed its own 
organisational order and allowed the MAF's supporters in Cabinet to 
protect its interests.
As a result of the sudden death of the Finance Minister, Aichi
Kiichi, the Prime Minister, Tanaka Kakuei, reshuffled his second Cabinet
on 25 November 1973. Three rural Diet Members, among the most powerful
men in the LDP and all of the same Fukuda faction, took over portfolios
directly associated with the agency question: Fukuda Takeo became the
Minister for Finance, Kuraishi Tadao Minister for Agriculture and
Forestry, and Ilori Shigeo the Director of the AMA. 22
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Lobbying continued as part of the normal budget process
through November and the first half of December, although it merely
hardened the positions of the ministries. The backing of LDP policy
committees and business groups was sought, but private enterprise was
not united, even though many larger firms stood to gain from both 
23schemes. Nevertheless, at the time, the MAF plan was perhaps more 
politically acceptable, again helped greatly by chance. The Middle 
East war had begun in October 1973 and once more Japan was made 
painfully aware of the instability of her resource imports. It became 
"fashionable" to promote agricultural development and the political 
edge enjoyed by the MAF was reflected in the discrepancy between its 
own ardent attempts to ensure support and MITI’s rather tepid approach.
Because of the controversy, the result of the budget requests
of the two ministries was not surprising. In the MOF Budget Draft of
22 December 1973 no funds for an agency were allocated to either
ministry and a decision was held over until the "revival negotiations"
25between the MOF, ministries and ministers had taken place. While it
was evident that a political decision was required, other non-political
factors had influenced the MOF. Its policy for the 1974 Budget was, in
2 Gresponse to the effects of the oil crisis, highly deflationary and an
enlarged administration was not a priority in that fiscal climate. In
addition, the AMA's "scrap and build" policy required the abolition or
absorption of existing agencies when new ones were created. None of
the ministries, however, wanted to relinquish any of theirs to form a
new conglomerate aid organisation, and the MAF had upset calculations
27by requesting one other agency in the 1974 Budget.
Bureaucratic politics, therefore, brought the issue to a
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political decision, although fate and serious policy motives on the 
part of some MAF officials were also instrumental. Ministry rivalry 
forced a compromise but organisational process, in the form of 
budgeting, channelled ministry arguments into a strict timetable.
For this reason, debate turned to the immediate task of success in 
bureaucratic and budgeting terms, and the purposes of the proposed 
agency became a secondary problem.
Politicians and the Decision
The decision to establish the new Japan International
Cooperation Agency was made formally at Budget Cabinet on the morning
of Saturday 29 December 1973, after agreement between the Finance
Minister and LDP leaders in the final budget negotiations on the night 
28of 28 December. In its last week the budget process attracted the 
close personal attention of the Prime Minister to the aid question and 
involved heated negotiations between politicians, top bureaucrats and 
budgeting officials, in which the claims of MITI, the MAF and the MFA 
were all accommodated in a considerably narrowed set of options.
The first step in breaking the impasse between ministry
positions came when Minato Tetsuro, in a proposal on 21 December,
suggested the establishment of both a Policy Office in the Prime
Minister's Office to coordinate aid policy and an Overseas Economic
Development Corporation. The corporation was to be formed from three
existing agencies, the JEMIS (under MFA direction), the JODC (MITI) and
the Overseas Agricultural Development Fund (a small financing organisation
29under the MAF), with tripartite control. It was a curious document, 
for it was clear that different administrative problems had to be
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resolved. The status of the OTCA was left uncertain and there was
room for conflict between the supervising ministries, and between the
new and existing agencies. The proposal had been written in close
consultation with the Minister for Agriculture, Kuraishi, and suggested
30an MAF initiative to force a favourable compromise. One LDP informant
corroborated this by claiming that Minato wrote the paper "for the
31Party and the ministries".
Minato went further in his efforts to resolve the issue and
32made a private visit to the Prime Minister on Sunday 23 December.
These talks were a turning point, for as a result Tanaka issued a 
directive to government officials on Tuesday 25 December to establish 
new machinery for economic cooperation. Minato asked the Prime Minister 
for three things: a "control tower" for aid in the form of a
responsible minister; a stronger aid advisory council; and an agency.
There was some disagreement over these requests. Minato 
thought that, because of the existing complications in the aid 
administration, one of the present ministers could be given the added 
aid responsibility. Tanaka, however, was adamant in preferring a new 
ministerial position. In regard to the proposed agency, Minato now hoped 
to include not only the JEMIS and the JODC, but also the OTCA and even 
the OECF and the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) in a conglomerate 
organisation. This was a far broader proposition than his proposal of 
21 December and reflected something of the MFA attitude. Both Tanaka 
and Minato realised, however, the administrative conflicts which would 
arise in such a collection, and Minato yielded to a simplified 
arrangement. The Tanaka "memo" to officials incorporated all three of 
Minato's suggestions, with Tanaka's amendments.
In the meantime, the normal budget process continued and
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"revival negotiations" (between ministries and the MOF about initial
MOF allocations) were concluded at desk-officer level by Monday 24
December, while the policy committees of the LDP continued to conduct
33hearings with ministries. On the morning of Tuesday 25 December, the
Prime Minister instructed the Councillors' Office of the Cabinet
Secretariat to prepare detailed proposals in accordance with his 
34"memo". In the evening, a meeting of the LDP Policy Affairs
Research Council (PARC) Deliberation Commission decided on Party policy
for the 1974 Budget and at 11.00 a.m. the following day a special
meeting of the LDP Executive Council was held to ratify the previous
evening's eight-point budget program. The Council decided that the
Party should recommend the merger of the two agency plans, finalise
ministerial discussions by the 28th and have the Budget approved by
35Cabinet on the 29th.
The focus was, at this point, on two issues: the form of
the new aid agency and the status of the proposed new minister for
economic cooperation. The Yomiuri shimbun of the evening of Wednesday
26 December reported prematurely (and inaccurately) that the LDP had
decided to set up a new ministerial post for economic cooperation and
a new agency, after agreement had been reached between Ohira, Fukuda
and Tanaka. While the Prime Minister met his two top ministers
separately on the morning of the Tuesday and no doubt mentioned his
3 G _plans to them then, discussion was brief. Ohira opposed the plan for
a minister, warning of the dangers of "double diplomacy" and interference
with his own portfolio. Fukuda's initial attitude appeared in his
statement with Hori on the following day that, in view of the difficult
budget situation, no new government agencies would be established
except the Housing Development Corporation. 37
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These were early negotiating stances. The Finance Minister,
Fukuda, again met the Prime Minister on the morning of Thursday 27
December but would not accede to the creation of an agency, stating
that budget policy demanded a strengthening of aid in qualitative
38rather than in quantitative terms. The two also differed on details
of the new Cabinet position, even though they agreed in principle that
it should be created. Tanaka preferred a post with full powers and a
complete staff but Fukuda suggested that, for mobility and impact, a
"roving" minister with only a small staff would be better. The minister
would be without portfolio, to avoid administrative complications.
Fukuda hoped to see the minister "complement the already over-worked
39Foreign Minister".
Tanaka met the Foreign Minister, Ohira, on the afternoon of
the same day but first demonstrated his own firm resolve to finalise
these initiatives in the aid area. He instructed the Director of the
40Cabinet Legal Office to draw up legislation for a ministerial post,
and recorded an interview for NIIK, the national broadcasting and
television network, to be broadcast at 8.00 p.m. that night, in which
he announced the Government's intention to establish an agency for
41overseas food and resources development. Meanwhile, Suzuki Zenko,
Chairman of the LDP Executive Council and one of Ohira's closest
political associates, expressed reservations about the appointment of 
42a minister and the MFA came out with a fresh suggestion to shelve
that proposal but to create an agency combining both the MAF and MITI
ideas, and incorporating JEMIS. While one newspaper claimed that this
43gained concessions for the MFA, it would seem rather to represent a 
weakening of its stance and an expression of its desire to negotiate 
on the minister-agency questions, perhaps to avoid the former by
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agreeing to the latter.
Tanaka met with Ohira and several MFA officials at 1.00 p.m.
on Thursday 27 December. The meeting became difficult when Ohira
demanded retraction of the plan for an economic cooperation minister
and even threatened resignation. He warned Tanaka against moving too
quickly, and said that if a ministerial position were allowed, the
MFA would provide no staff, "except a secretary and a girl to make the
tea", and that the minister would have to be subordinate to the
Foreign Minister. Tanaka apparently reacted strongly to the MFA
44attitude, and the meeting proved inconclusive.
Newspapers on the morning of Friday 28 December reported that
on the previous day the Government had finalised arrangements for the
minister. This referred to guidelines drawn up by the Cabinet
Secretariat, which recommended that the minister should neither have
a ministry nor the power to negotiate with foreign governments. He
would chair an Economic Cooperation Committee which would be set up in
the Prime Minister's Office, absorbing the Advisory Council on Overseas
45Economic Cooperation. This format clearly separated the question of 
the minister from the agency proposal and left room for the MFA to 
accept one without the other.
A meeting of senior ministers after Cabinet that morning made 
the final decision. The Prime Minister, Fukuda, Ohira, Hori and 
Nikaido Susumu, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, were present, but Kuraishi 
and Nakasone were notably absent. Despite opposition from Ohira, it 
was agreed to establish a ministerial post, but without portfolio and 
with only a few assistants. The committee idea was rejected, but an 
economic cooperation agency to be called Kokusai kyoryoku jigyodan
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was to be created. In a vague five-point directive, later to be 
nicknamed the Gokaijo no goseimon after the Charter Oath of Emperor 
Meiji issued on his assuming power in 1068, it was agreed:
(a) that the OTCA and the JEMIS would be the foundation of the 
agency;
(b) that the Foreign Minister would supervise, while the Ministers 
for Agriculture and Forestry and International Trade and 
Industry would have joint responsibility with the MFA in 
relevant areas;
(c) that the JODC and sections of the Overseas Agricultural 
Development Fund would be included;
(d) that the present structure of the OTCA would be retained, 
with new departments for agriculture, mining and industry, 
and emigration;
(e) that a law would be enacted along the lines of the OTCA
r 46Law.
This agreement was ratified as a budget item in talks between 
the Finance Minister and LDP leaders on the evening of Friday 28 
December and approved in Budget Cabinet on the morning of Saturday 29 
December. The agency was allocated by the MOF a surprisingly large sum
47of ¥5 billion, plus moneys already set aside for the OTCA and the JEMIS. 
The Decision: Two Issues
The political bargaining which forced a hurried compromise 
left no room for considering the implications for future policy. Scant 
regard was paid to resolution of the policy conflicts between the MAF
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and MITI, or to the effect of proposals for overseas resource
development on technical cooperation policy. The decision to abolish
the OTCA, an effective independent agency, came at a very late stage
and was not a direct attempt to improve Japanese technical assistance
administration. Even though the AMA was engaged at the time on a
48report criticising many technical cooperation procedures, the MFA 
thought that the OTCA was performing its duties reasonably well.
The possibility of including the OTCA in the proposed agency
was not raised until Minato's private meeting with Tanaka on 23 December.
Until then, the MAF and the MFA had agreed that the JEMIS would be
49provided as the zabuton, or "cushion". However, since the MFA had
always considered that to be most effective a new organisation should
be comprehensive, it recognised the potential benefits to the OTCA of
its being incorporated in a larger body, although the possibility was,
50until late in the process, remote. The Tanaka "memo" on 25 December
(directing the abolition of both the OTCA and the JEMIS) surprised the
MFA but, at an emergency meeting of senior officials, a representative
of the Economic Cooperation Bureau suggested that it provided a good
opportunity to enhance the role of the OTCA by having it "scrapped"
instead of the JEMIS. Appeals were made to Ohira by emigration and
economic cooperation officials, but the Minister could not convince
51Hori, Director of the AMA, that both should not be abolished.
The OTCA was a victim of political circumstance and lack of 
foresight on the part of MFA officials, who took too late the chance to 
see the OTCA. used constructively in the agency, over which the MFA 
gained majority control only by a late tactical about-face. In
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this instance politics ran ahead of bureaucratic manoeuvrings, where 
participants were inward-looking and defensive, and the Prime Minister's 
aggressive use of the scheme for a new minister to soften the MFA 
opposition to a new agency proved the most positive feature of the 
final negotiations.
This leads us to ask why Tanaka pressed so strongly for a
minister for economic cooperation in spite of firm opposition from
other LDP leaders. Ilis apparent neglect of the details was overshadowed
by his personal enthusiasm and impatience for a quick decision. One
newspaper suggested that it was one of his few personal directives for
the 1974 Budget, and Hori Shigeo was quoted as saying that "it is not
an administrative problem but one of the Prime Minister's own 
52concerns". The motives behind Tanaka's attitude were, however, not
obvious. He certainly seemed to be in favour of a new coordinating
agency, for as recently as October 1973 he had expressed dissatisfaction
with the slow administration of aid and had demanded in Cabinet that yen
loan agreements and the progress of disbursements be reported to him 
53directly. There may have been more immediate issues in his mind,
however, since he was apparently keen to press ahead with economic
cooperation to Brazil, and his pending visit to Southeast Asia in
54January 1974 demanded some kind of aid policy initiative.
Tanaka's decision in late December to institute the new post
for a minister for economic cooperation was unexpected, although the
idea itself had been raised before by Minato. It is possible that the
success of Miki Takeo's trip to the Middle East between 10-28 December
1973 as Special Ambassador encouraged Tanaka, for some of his statements
about the Foreign Minister's load indicated that the burdens of that
55office should be lightened. The MFA, however, had always opposed the
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recommendation on the grounds that, unless the minister was a junior 
or assistant minister, the position of the Foreign Minister could be 
compromised, but legislation which lent support to Tanaka's wishes was 
already before the Diet. It had been presented in February 1973 and, 
although still pending in December, provided for a system of Cabinet 
Councillors (naikaku sanyo) to assist in high level policy, including
economic cooperation. They could have acted as advisers to the new
. .  ^ 56minister.
The proposal for a minister was obviously unworkable. Not
even his responsibilities were clearly delineated and one newspaper
57described the position as "pathetic". The lack of detailed
preparation suggested that Tanaka used the plan successfully to force
MFA agreement on the agency question, while Fukuda and his fellow
ministers took the opportunity to undercut Ohira, who was then regarded
as the likely successor to Tanaka.88 Tanaka was able to publicise both
initiatives during his trip to Southeast Asia in January 1974, but
allowed the bill to create a ministerial post to be quietly shelved.
The bill was presented to the Diet separately from that providing for
a new Minister for National Development (contrary to the earlier ideas
59of the Cabinet Secretariat), and was still on the notice paper, 
undebated, in 1976.
Drafting the JICA Legislation: Conflict and Compromise
The compromise between bureaucratic and political interests 
suggested an uncertain future for the new agency. Guidelines for its 
tasks, for the distribution of control over it betv/een ministries and 
for its relations with other aid financing bodies, were only outlines, 
but officials acted swiftly to prepare legislation to be introduced at
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the forthcoming 72nd Diet session.^ At the suggestion of the Deputy- 
Director of the Cabinet Secretariat, Kawashima Hiromori, a small 
team was set up in the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, headed by 
Yanagi Kenichi, Director of the Economic Cooperation Bureau's First 
Technical Cooperation Division. It began work on 4 January 1974 on 
the first draft of the proposed bill, which was to be used for inter- 
ministerial negotiations at a higher level.
Subsequently a senior drafting committee was formed in the 
Councillors' Office of the Cabinet Secretariat with a strictly limited 
membership. Because of the controversy surrounding the legislation, 
members were restricted, by Prime Ministerial directive, to the 
relevant bureau directors (or their equivalent) in the responsible 
ministries. The chairmanship of this group fell to the Director of 
the AMA's Administrative Management Bureau, Hirai Michiro.^
This was an unusual appointment, but one of significance to 
the early resolution of drafting problems. Legislative work in the 
Councillors' Office usually came under the jurisdiction of the
(bureaucratic appointee to the Deputy Directorship of the Secretariat,
but Hirai was well acquainted with the problem in his capacity as the
officer in charge of the oversight of administrative reorganisation.
6 3Whether or not he was the Prime Minister's own choice, he was a 
neutral chairman. Nevertheless, his status as an AMA official meant 
that his authority over the committee was legally tenuous and he had 
to rely primarily on persuasion to effect changes in the draft of the 
bin.64
The Hirai Committee was small, very powerful and designed for 
quick and effective policy work. This was important since time was at 
a premium, and many of the problems associated with JICA in 1976 were a
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consequence of truncated committee deliberations. January-February 
1974 was a period of intricate legislative work and continued bargaining, 
conducted both formally within the Committee and informally between 
desk officers in the ministries. The lines of argument were explicit 
from the outset. The problem was how to reconcile the short-term 
objectives of MITI and the MAF with the MFA's longer-term conceptions 
of Japanese economic cooperation. As it turned out, the serious 
disagreements were not about relations between Japan and the developing 
countries but were determined largely by domestic factors, as some 
observers had predicted.^0 The time available for drafting was short 
and the protagonists were set in their aims. Debate was heated and the 
unsatisfactory compromises reached in the JICA bill were testimony to 
the confrontation between entrenched ministry positions.
Several issues stood out, namely the scope of agency 
business, administrative control, and the relations between the agency 
and the ministries, other agencies, and private enterprise. The broad 
structure of the agency had been decided at ministerial level, and 
technical cooperation managed by the former OTCA would be incorporated 
in the work of a number of departments, as would the functions of the 
JEMIS. The Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers was retained as a 
separate organisation as it was under the OTCA. Only those JODC 
operations relating to agriculture and mining and industry were included, 
and new departments were to be set up for them.
Dispute between ministries arose especially in regard to 
Article 21 of the bill dealing with "Scope of Business", particularly 
paragraph 1.3, which detailed the "new functions" of the agency - the 
provision of loans for overseas development projects.^ This new duty 
was a direct result of the original MAF and MITI plans for undertaking
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overseas resource projects, but all ministries wanted to use the article
to expand or defend their own jurisdiction in aid affairs. The final
wording of the article was confusing, imprecise and severely limiting 
67m  scope.
It was decided that the new agency would provide loans only
when the Eximbank or the OECF made loans to or investments in the
project and when finance could not be obtained from those bodies for
some components of the total project. These conditions were designed
to protect the interests of the Bank and the OECF and to prevent any
6 8restriction of their funding. JICA was limited specifically to 
financing "related facilities ... concomitant to development projects" 
and "experimental projects". This provision has since caused 
misunderstanding about which projects can be supported, a consequent 
scarcity of projects and slow disbursement of available JICA loan funds. 
JICA had to wait for OECF or Eximbank participation, but could still 
only finance the fringes of a project, the "related infrastructure", 
such as roads and bridges associated with large construction sites.
The Committee also opened the way for the agency to undertake 
feasibility studies by agreeing that it could carry out surveys and 
technical guidance necessary for JICA projects, but one of the main 
controversies concerned the sectors which these "related infrastructure" 
and "experimental projects" would include. Agriculture, forestry, 
mining and industry were the first and most obvious areas agreed upon, 
but the current JICA Law also included the objective of cooperation in 
"social development", that is, "culture, transportation, communication, 
health, living environments, useful for the promotion of the welfare of 
the inhabitants in developing areas" (Article 21.1.3 (a)). This, as
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we shall see, was the outcome of pressure from ministries not included 
in the Committee.
Another dispute within the Hirai Committee related to 
supervision of the agency and to consultation between ministers over 
jointly controlled functions. Each ministry was determined to exact 
maximum benefit from the discussions and, once again, the resulting 
compromise was a classic example of bureaucratic competition taking 
precedence over common sense. The Chairman had to take his efforts 
at coordination to vice-ministerial level before agreement could be 
reached.
69There was a long-standing conflict between the MAF and MITI 
about the extent of their existing authority and how this impinged on 
the agency's new financing provisions. MITI insisted that trade 
extended into the agricultural development aspects of JICA's work, but 
the MAF countered by claiming that it was the relationship of development 
to food policy rather than to import policy which was pertinent. The 
MFA was keen to extend its powers of supervision into all areas. This 
appeared in its desire to control the development survey work of the 
agency, although the MAF and MITI opposed this. The Committee realised 
that surveys carried out on a project basis would overlap the 
boundaries of all three ministries, and therefore surveys became a 
"joint jurisdiction" (kyokan). By 1976, there was a tangled series of 
procedures for budget approval and for implementation of surveys.
The Law (Articles 42-43) stipulated that the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs had to consult the Minister of Finance on all 
financial and accounting matters and the Ministers of International 
Trade and Industry and Agriculture and Forestry on all business connected 
with their respective functions. The latter two ministers had equal
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competence with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in respect of
development financing. Even where the Foreign Minister was the only
competent minister (as in ordinary technical cooperation), the system
of mandatory consultation enforced restrictions on him or on his
officials in making policy and set up a continuing cycle of claim and
70counter-claim in jurisdictional disputes.
Debate also occurred on what shape the executive structure of
the agency should take, for this had serious implications for ministry
influence regarding its daily administration. At first a chairman-
directors (kaicho-riji) format, similar to many existing statutory
corporations, was considered, but it made a balance of representation
difficult to achieve. The chairman would represent the controlling
71ministry (the MFA), while MITI and MAF interests would be given only 
directorships. To place both on an equal and elevated footing, the 
alternative of having a president and two vice-presidents emerged as 
the most appropriate and was incorporated in Article 8 of the bill. 
Settling on the number of directors, however, proved a more complicated 
problem. The large number of ministries and agencies which demanded a 
place meant that, instead of the usual three or four directorships for 
a statutory body, twelve were assigned to JICA.
Once these issues had been resolved within the Committee, the
LDP's PARC Deliberation Commission considered the bill for approval
72before it went to Cabinet. At this opportunity, however, other 
ministries and their supporters in the Party forced changes in the 
financing functions of the agency. There seems to have been a delay 
of a week over the timetable envisaged for the bill in late January. 
Nev/spapers on 27 January reported that the bill was drafted and would 
be approved by Cabinet on 8 February. While there was no mention of
105.
the "social development" aspects of JICA's work at this stage, however,
73by 7 February they had been included.
Ministries with minor economic cooperation programs, excluded
from the Hirai Committee - Construction, Transport, Posts and
Telegraphs, Welfare Ministries and the Science and Technology Agency -
wanted to participate in the work of the agency but had to wait until
this late period in drafting to put their view. Their arguments were
about the sectors which the agency could finance, and about the meaning
of "infrastructure" financing and the relation between it and lending
to actual industries or projects. The LDP Deliberation Commission
advanced the case, on behalf of the ministries, that "international
cooperation" meant much more than assistance to infrastructure projects
in agriculture, mining and industry. Consequently, the concept of
74"social development" was introduced in the body of the draft. There 
was insufficient time to resolve doubts about precise interpretation of 
the concept, or to make substantial changes to the wording of the bill 
(such as in articles referring to jurisdictions), so JICA's confused 
functions stemmed partly from this late interference in decision-making 
already hurried and tense.
The relationship between agency financing and investment by 
private enterprise was also raised. The Hirai Committee had determined 
that, in principle, the agency would not finance projects where private 
firms were in a position to make a profit, and that projects undertaken 
on a largely private basis should be financed by other institutions, 
such as the Eximbank. JICA was to support projects, or areas of 
projects, with an extensive public or "social capital" content. This 
was neither entirely what the MAF had wished for, nor what Tanaka had
envisaged.
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In respect of private firms, however, the Law remained
equivocal. The OECF and the EPA argued vigorously to ensure that
JICA was prevented from financing foreign governments directly, so
that the OECF was not cut out of implementing future government loans,
but no clause was placed in the bill to define who should receive
agency funds. It was left to inter-ministry memoranda to stipulate
75that only Japanese companies could receive JICA loans, and therefore,
while the aim of the original drafting committee was to avoid links
between JICA and private enterprise, the agency was restricted to
offering finance to Japanese companies or to persons engaged in
development projects overseas. Furthermore, no criteria were established
to measure the public benefit of such projects. JICA operations were
thus severely curtailed, in two ways. It could finance only "related
facilities" or "experimental projects" (and needed associated OECF or
Eximbank funding in the former) and had to depend on private enterprise
7 6investment decisions before it could become involved in either.
In all, MAF, MITI and MFA conceptions of economic cooperation 
were not reconciled in JICA, and the effectiveness of JICA as a 
financing agency rested primarily on the initiative of private businesses 
The scope of JICA operations was still unclear in 1976 and arguments 
between ministries over jurisdictions prevented the smooth implementation 
of agency programs, as we shall point out in detail in Chapter 5.
While, initially, political pressures forced a compromise in the 
budget context, further political interference in finalising the new 
agency's structure and responsibilities only complicated the agency's
tasks.
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The Diet Debates
After five weeks of Committee bargaining, Cabinet ratified 
the JICA bill on 15 February 1974. It was presented to the Diet on 
18 February, passed by the House of Representatives on 14 May after 
deliberations in the Foreign Affairs Committee, and by the House of 
Councillors on 27 May. It was promulgated as Law No. 62 of 31 May 
1974.
By the time the bill reached the Diet, basic organisational 
77questions had been settled. The capital of the agency was set by 
Article 4 at ¥4 billion and, with the funds of those agencies taken 
over (the OTCA, the JEMIS and part of the JODC) added, initial capital 
totalled ¥22.4 billion. The budget for 1974, consisting of operational 
expenses and capital transferred from the 1974 budgets of the absorbed 
agencies plus a new budget for the agency, amounted to ¥27.37 billion. 
Staff were to number 900-1000, including 500 from the OTCA, 420 from 
the JEMIS and about 100 to be recruited from ministries to work in the 
new financing and survey departments.
The Japan Socialist Party (JSP), Japan Communist Party (JCP) 
and Komeito all opposed the JICA bill, although their opposition never 
endangered its passage through the Diet. The objections were predictable: 
criticism of the overseas expansion of Japanese capital as represented 
by JICA and the neocolonialist nature of resources development projects. 
The Komeito differed slightly with its emphasis on human rights, which, 
it claimed, Japan's economic cooperation failed to protect. The 
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) supported the bill.
While the debate on the bill was one of the most comprehensive 
on foreign aid held by the Japanese Diet, it excited no passions.
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Nevertheless, some issues were discussed at length: the relationship
between the new agency and the bill for an economic cooperation
minister; the control of the agency; resources development and
development import; JICA and private firms; and the administration
of Japanese aid as a whole. Much of the criticism of the agency and of
the proposed minister was levelled at the increased powers which could
pass to the Prime Minister and arose from doubts about his personal 
78motives. An LDP member, Ishii Hajime, alleged that agency supervision
was too involved and that the new organisation would quickly lose its
79administrative efficiency. He considered that there were too many
areas of joint control, too many directors and too many officials
transferred from the ministries. One Komeito member, Watanabe Ichiro,
8 0even called JICA a "freak". Charges that employment conditions varied
between sections of the staff were pertinent, for there had not been
time for the drafting committee to sort out the details of combined
ministerial control of the agency, let alone inconsistent staff
81salaries and conditions.
The most extensive part of the debate was on the concept of
"development import" and on the degree of JICA involvement. The
discussion revealed differences between the MFA and the MAF concerning how
far development import should be pursued and about the relation of
development import to domestic food policy, and also some hasty
justification by Government witnesses for those JICA functions which
resembled development import. They were differences which had existed
since the MAF first requested an agency in 1972 and were evident in the
MAF emphasis on the work of JICA as an adjunct to agricultural and food
8 2policy centred primarily on increasing Japanese self-sufficiency. The 
development aspect of the agency's work was of secondary importance to
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the MAF, whereas it was a high priority for the MFA, even though it saw
no objection to development import accompanying bilateral economic
development cooperation. In the testimony of MFA officials, however, it
became clear that JICA would not be restricted to work in developing
countries but that Australia was, among others, a likely target for
development finance. This admission tended to support opposition claims
that JICA aimed above all to develop resources for Japan's benefit and
detracted from the MFA emphasis on the development impact of the new 
83agency.
Despite its length, the debate did not reveal familiarity of
Members with aid or with development arguments. Criticisms of Japanese
aid and aid administration repeated the well worn complaints of poor
84performance and lack of coordination and basic policy guidelines.
Some censure arose of the fact that loans were to be made to Japanese
companies, but it was not driven home with any conviction. Answers by
Government witnesses were bland and repetitive, composed from a
comprehensive set of questions and responses prepared by the MFA
85Economic Cooperation Bureau. There was no extended debate on control 
of agency business by the ministries or on the relationship between 
JICA and the OECF or the Eximbank.^
Questions by the Opposition parties were not penetrating and 
tended to be set-piece performances aimed at scoring parliamentary 
points rather than at producing a coordinated attempt to take the 
Government to task on its policies. The debate was dull and 
inconclusive and failed completely to solve any of the glaring problems 
within the JICA bill. The Diet was ineffective in the formation of
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Choosing Personnel
The choice of candidates for executive positions was settled 
unofficially in May, after the bill had been passed by the Diet. The 
Nikkei of 30 April commented that the MFA, MITI and the MAF were 
competing strongly for the available executive posts. It seemed that 
one directorship and one auditorship (kanji) would go to representatives 
of the MOF, but that the MFA was working hardest to secure positions in 
the agency. It needed to find jobs for the executives of the two 
organisations under its control which had been abolished (the OTCA and 
the JEMIS) and because traditionally the MFA had few posts available to 
offer its retiring senior officials. Naturally it wanted to increase 
these opportunities.
These were plausible reasons. The MFA did not have the scope 
which home-based ministries, such as the MOF, MITI or the MAF, had for 
placing retiring officers in semi-government or private organisations. 
Some had argued that the MFA saw JICA from the outset as a rich pasture 
for its "old boys", although as it transpired the balance achieved 
between ministry appointees was a very fine one and the MFA gained no 
particular advantage.
It was never certain during the drafting of the bill that the
position of president would go to an official, even one from the MFA.
Some politicians and businessmen wanted a non-government candidate, as
Nakayama Soppei, the former president of the OTCA, had been. It was
Nakayama himself, however, who opposed this idea, by stressing that
more than a figurehead was required. Officials agreed that a working
president was essential to the success of JICA and that an experienced
bureaucrat would be the best qualified. At this point, it appeared
8 8probable that the top post would go to an MFA choice.
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- 89Three men, Hogen Shinsaku, Asakai Koichiro and Mori Haruki,
seemed the most likely. Asakai and Mori were both well versed in aid.
The former was an adviser to the Foreign Minister and a director of
the Bank of Tokyo, while Mori was Ambassador to Great Britain with
extensive experience in economic cooperation, including a period as
Japan's first Ambassador to the OECD. Of the three, Hogen had the
90least experience in economic cooperation and aid, but he had been
forced to resign from the vice-ministership only a few months before
the JICA presidency became an issue. Before he left office, he had
discussed possible candidates for the JICA position with Mikanagi
Kiyohisa, Director of the Economic Cooperation Bureau, and with Katori
Yasue, Director of the Minister's Secretariat, but at that stage was
not in the running himself. In April, however, Katori suggested that
the recently dismissed Hogen be offered the job and both Ohira and
91Tanaka agreed to this by mid-May.
JICA executives were formally chosen on 31 July 1974. Hogen 
became President while the Vice-Presidents were Hisamune Takashi, Director 
of the Overseas Fisheries Cooperation Fund and a former Director of the 
MAF's Economic Affairs Bureau, and Inoue Takeshi, director of an 
engineering firm and a former Director of MITI's Economic Cooperation 
Department. This balance at the top of the executive structure was 
maintained throughout. The demands of the abolished agencies were met 
by the appointment of four former directors and auditors from the OTCA, 
four from the JEMIS and one from the JODC. Of the total of eleven 
directors and three auditors, six were former MFA officials or belonged 
to agencies under its control, one previously worked in the MOF, two in 
the MAF, two in MITI, one in the Ministry of Construction and one in the 
Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, while one was a former member of the
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92House of Councillors.
Staffing of the Agency was straightforward, but also reflected 
care in weighing ministry interests. OTCA, JEMIS and JODC staff were 
moved across and others were transferred from the MFA, the MAF and from 
MITI. Different departments of the new Agency came under the influence 
of their responsible ministries. While Emigration, Training and Medical 
Cooperation Departments took in staff from the JEMIS and the OTCA, the 
new departments had new personnel. The General Affairs Department was 
headed by a former official of the MFA, Personnel Department by an 
OTCA officer, Mining and Industry Departments by men from MITI, 
Agriculture Departments by officials from the MAF, and the Social 
Development Cooperation Department by a former officer of the Ministry 
of Transport. MOF influence in the Accounting Division was said to be 
strong, especially since it reported to a director who was a senior 
official of the International Finance Bureau before his appointment to
The New Agency
Public appraisal of the Agency was predictably generous, but
the problems thrown up by JICA's troubled birth could not be, and were
not, ignored. The new Foreign Minister, Kimura Toshio, saw JICA making
up for the "insufficiencies of the implementing machinery" and providing
94links between technical and capital cooperation, but Nakayama Soppei, 
immediate past President of the OTCA, was not as optimistic:
The merging of a number of aid agencies into one has no 
significance unless it results in better and more effective 
development assistance. I encountered difficulties arising 
from the Government's vertical division of responsibilities 
even when I was managing only one agency, the OTCA. Now that 
the new Agency's scope of activities has been broadened much 
beyond that of the OTCA, I think the difficulties are likely 
to be even more acute.95
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The new President, Hogen Shinsaku, was consistent in his 
desire to use the Agency to pursue the economic development and well­
being of the developing countries. At the same time, he appreciated 
the restrictions arising not only from within a new body but also from 
the environment of the aid bureaucracy as a whole. "It is necessary", 
he said, "to build unity within the new Agency as quickly as possible, 
but it is silly to think that this can be done immediately ... we must 
be patient"
Other commentators were less considerate. MAF officials 
remarked, both in print and in private, that the Agency once in operation 
was not what they had expected, because JICA's capacity to harness 
technical cooperation to development financing was not effectively 
exploited. In terms of bureaucratic influence, however, the MAF 
benefited from JICA's creation, since its share in the Agency's 
administration brought the MAF closer to the centre of Japan's aid 
bureaucracy. Although this did not lead to participation in the making 
of government loans policy, it was nevertheless a foothold in what was 
to become a far more active side of Japan's aid program.
The MFA also fared well, by securing majority control of
JICA, even though it had not set out to do so and had originally
opposed the very notion of another government aid organisation. MITI,
however, lost one of its subsidiary agencies (the JODC) and won little
97more influence over JICA than it had had over the OTCA. It had to
be content with new development financing facilities.
114.
Conclusion: JICA and Policy-Making
From several conflicting perceptions of the purpose of the 
agency there emerged a body which satisfied few, if any, of those 
original goals, for its final form was not a result of any considered 
decision-making process. In the end, haste typified the behaviour of 
politicians and officials alike and the style of decision-making helped 
determine the agency's character and structure. Once the rival MITI 
and MAF proposals became budgetary problems, debate between lower level 
officials - until then largely in terms of policy - took on political 
significance. The policies of other bodies, notably the AMA, became 
crucial to the final outcome and discussion centred on the merits of 
combinations of existing agencies rather than on the benefits of JICA 
as such.
Five characteristics of the decision-making process affected 
the kind of decision which was made:
(a) The pursuit of policy questions through the budget process 
was normal bureaucratic procedure, but one where rivalries 
went unchecked and resolution was impossible in policy terms.
(b) The resulting impasse was removed only by political pressure 
because it involved administrative reorganisation at a time 
of fiscal difficulties and because powerful ministries were 
ranged against one another. Two men in particular, Tanaka 
Kakuei and Minato Tetsuro, were influential, although they 
had opposing motives. The former was interested in immediate 
political and diplomatic gains, whereas the latter looked to 
the qualitative effects on Japan's aid policy.
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(c) Limited participation in the political decision and in
legislative drafting enabled a conclusion to be reached
swiftly and conflict to be contained. Compromise was easier
and the problems and options restricted. Only a few politicians
were actively interested and LDP factions were not involved,
except informally in the coalition of Fukuda, Hori and 
98Kuraishi. The relevance of high level committees to
99abnormal policy situations was clear. When participation 
widened, however, and the LDP and other ministries interfered, 
priorities became confused and the draft legislation suffered 
as a result.
(d) Timing had a marked effect on the outcome. Two years of 
preparation by the MAF ended in a political decision which 
took one week and in drafting which lasted one month, when 
completely new options were raised and adopted without 
detailed consideration. The deadline for the budget decision 
and for the presentation of the bill to the Diet left no 
opportunity for ironing out the conflicting interpretations 
of the functions of the agency.
(e) This was linked to the fact that perceptions of the policies 
and the issues in the whole JICA story never met. Decisions 
were made on temporary compromises between completely divergent 
sets of principles, bureaucratic interests and political 
purposes.
Some of the serious bureaucratic and political conflicts lay 
in interpreting the Law itself. The entire future of the JICA role in 
development financing depended on the meaning of "related facilities"
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and "experimental projects" in Article 21. The relations of JICA with 
the OECF and the Eximbank also depended on that interpretation. At the 
time, it was suggested that the exact meaning of "related facilities" 
could only emerge with the practical application of the idea to actual 
situations. A "case-by-case" approach would need to be adopted.1-0^
The six-weeks' effort of the Hirai Committee could not possibly have 
made the Law sufficiently precise and the history of the creation of 
JICA needed to be appreciated if the boundaries of JICA responsibilities 
were to be properly d e f i n e d . T h e  operational problems inherent in a 
structure like that of JICA were apparent from the outset and the 
Japanese aid system bore witness to that predicament.
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CHAPTER 4
AID AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS
Administrative structures for aid policy were in the late 
1970s a small, though scattered, part of the Japanese national 
government. There had been considerable growth in certain sectors of 
the aid bureaucracy, but this did not add up to massive growth. There 
was no separate aid agency as in other large donor countries (United 
States, Great Britain, West Germany) and in April 1977 eleven ministries 
five agencies and the Prime Minister's Office had authority over 
different aspects of the Japanese foreign aid program.1 There was no 
single minister responsible for aid, but three ministries and one 
agency, the MFA, the MOF, MITI and the EPA, dominated policy formulation 
It was these organisations and their implementing agencies, the Export- 
Import Bank of Japan (Eximbank), the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund 
(OECF) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which 
managed foreign aid.
This chapter will examine aid in the national government
context, to assess administrative and systemic definitions of aid
policy. It is possible that organisational processes provided a clear
picture of the interaction of aid with broader policy areas, although
ministry views of aid (seen in Chapter 1) and ministry rationales for
expanding aid administration (Chapter 2) expressed primarily a concern
for more generalised foreign economic policy. As Chapter 3 demonstrated
aid as a concept and as a policy was extremely vulnerable to the
vagaries of domestic politics. So varied were perceptions of aid
that the boundaries of aid policy seemed very broad indeed, and some
critics wondered if there were a definable policy for aid at all. 2
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Aid Within Government
John White, in his study of the politics of foreign aid,
concluded that the makings of an aid policy lie within "the rather
narrow institutional environment" in which aid institutions operate,
that people, rather than agencies or governments, determine the forces
3which allow policy to evolve, in a continuous and cumulative process.
While the aid administrator's immediate working environment 
may be narrow, the pressures on him are not. He is torn not only 
between the recipient's demands for aid on improved terms and the 
restrictions of available domestic resources, but also between the 
desire to serve the developmental objectives inherent in any aid policy 
and to accommodate aid with competing domestic policy interests. There 
is a constant tension about aid policy and a continual search for a new 
balance between aid and the other, often more pressing, duties of 
national government.
Administrative machinery for the management of a donor's aid 
policy usually rests uneasily in the national government structure, for 
several reasons:
(a) Aid is a curious and, in many ways, unique policy area. While
the indirect benefits to some segments of society (such as
exporters) may be considerable, the primary reason for the
existence of an aid policy lies outside the donor country and
the direct beneficiaries cannot normally participate in the 
4policy process. Nevertheless, although aid ostensibly caters 
first to an overseas clientele, domestic interests are well 
served and channels representing them are well defined. As 
later chapters will show, foreign aid can be cited as a prime
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example of a policy significantly affected by domestic 
structures.3
(b) Administrative structures for aid policy-making and 
implementation are never wholly independent. Their place in 
the national bureaucracy does not represent a position of 
strength, for their own raison d'etre is external to the 
system and their domestic power is set within constraints 
provided by other relevant ministries and agencies. They 
have no power base of their own and the more dispersed the 
aid administration, the more acutely obvious this becomes.^
(c) An aid agency, as John White puts it, "has no natural allies,
for whom the agency's activities are of vital concern, within
7the national political frameworks of the donor countries".
In addition, the allies it may attract at any time rarely 
combine or coordinate on behalf of the agency or its objectives. 
In Japan, in contrast to Great Britain, there was no "aid 
lobby", no group of committed aid advocates among the
Q
government and the general public. Support for foreign aid 
at home came more from perceptions of self-interest than from 
a sense of dedication to Third World development.
Aid and the Ministry Environment
Aid policy was, of course, a function of the Japanese
government. The aid administration lay within the national bureaucracy,
a system bound by tradition and popular myth and which was always active
9in social direction. In the 1947 Constitution, civil servants were 
deemed "servants of the people", in keeping with the democratic aims of
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civil service reforms, but this restructuring failed to affect many- 
informal operations of the government machinery.1 *^ The elitist 
sentiments expressed by and about bureaucrats exemplified the strength 
of convention. In this vein, a career in the MOF was regarded as the 
pinnacle of achievement, so much so that the image of the MOF in the 
popular mind was equated with supremacy in policy-making.^
Ideas of elitism, however, did not of themselves bring power 
in government. In foreign aid, the MOF was one among many, although 
its control of budgets often gave it principal leverage in inter­
ministry discussions. Likewise, the MFA's traditional exclusion from
12the domestic political round was not matched by the realities of the 
foreign aid policy field, where the MFA was often a leader in the 
domestic policy-making process.
The hierarchies of parliamentary democracy in Japan, where
executive power extended from the Prime Minister and his ministers to
the ministries and their attached agencies, applied equally to aid
as they did to other policies (see Chart 4-1). Official advice on aid
was provided by an advisory council answerable to the Prime Minister
and top level coordination was (until January 1977) attempted by the
Ministerial Committee on Overseas Economic Cooperation. In theory,
policy implementation bodies were distinct from ministries but, in
practice, the divisions were blurred. The relationships between
Cabinet, the ministries and their agencies were formalised in a series
of administrative laws and regulations, beginning with the National
Constitution and extending to the Cabinet Law, National Administrative
Structure Law and ministry establishment laws. No foreign aid
legislation defined Japan's aid objectives or methods, although such
13laws were introduced in the Diet on occasions.
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CHART 4-1
JAPANESE AID ADMINISTRATION: FORMAL OUTLINE
Prime Minister
Expor t-Import
Overseas Economic 
Cooperation Fund
Japan International 
Cooperation Agency
Ministry of 
Finance
Ministerial 
Committee
Prime Minister's 
Office
Advisory
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
Cabinet
Economic
Planning
Agency
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
and Forestry
Foreign Mission 
in Japan
Japanese Mission
Ministry of 
International 
Trade and 
Industry
Developing Country
Other Ministries
Note: The Ministerial Committee was abolished in January 1977. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's Economic Cooperation,
Japan, 1976, p. 23.
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The tasks of each ministry were defined in ministry 
organisational ordinances, although usually in vague and pro forma 
language. As can be seen from Chart 4-2, the MFA Economic Cooperation 
Bureau was the largest aid section of any of the ministries. It had 
seven divisions and dealt with most aspects of foreign aid policy: 
loans, grants, technical cooperation and multilateral aid. It also 
had a responsibility for general policy planning, although only as far 
as that was possible within the constraints of Japan's single-year 
budgeting. The power of the MFA in aid policy sprang from its broad 
authority, its ability to gain an overview of aid policy as formulated 
and implemented, and from its management of Japan's foreign relations, 
of which aid was a vital, and often the most telling, component. It 
was the official "window" for all Japanese aid business, a function 
which it jealously guarded.
Other ministries positioned aid divisions closer to their 
primary policy bureaus. Within MITI, the Economic Cooperation Department 
was part of the International Trade Policy Bureau and it was intimately 
associated with the regional and bilateral trade policy areas of the 
Bureau. The Department's two divisions were concerned with economic 
and technical cooperation respectively, as they affected trade, which 
meant that MITI's aid work overlapped that of the MFA in two domains, 
technical aid and loans. MITI's influence in aid policy remained strong 
because of the continued relevance of the past. For twenty years, aid 
and commercial policy had been closely interrelated, and MITI had 
become one of the largest and most powerful of the domestic ministries 
because of its direction of Japan's postwar industrial and trade growth.
14This system of "equal partnership" was a delicate
arrangement of checks and balances, where formal jurisdiction was not
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always matched by real authority, where the MFA relied on its expertise
in international affairs to offset the weaknesses in its domestic
power base, and where a Ministry of Trade was at the same time a
Ministry of Industry, using both sets of powers in domestic policy- 
15making. Likewise, the MOF's presence was double edged, being
concerned both with aid in the budget context and with aid as a tool of
international monetary policy.1  ^ The three Overseas Investment
Divisions in its International Finance Bureau had jurisdiction in
government loans, multilateral aid and private investment. The Budget
Bureau contained an Economic Cooperation and Foreign Affairs Desk which
assessed all budget requests for aid, while the Banking and Financial
17Bureaus were also involved in supervising Eximbank and OECF affairs.
Other powerful ministries, such as the MAF, had an increasing 
interest in aid policy, but the MAF's aid function remained restricted 
to technical aid rather than capital assistance. In 1976, the MAF 
was still excluded from formal participation in loans policy, despite 
its prestige in domestic politics. This was because aid, until the 
early 1970s, had been regarded as peripheral to the first objective of 
the Ministry - the promotion of domestic agriculture.
The EPA v/as a minor force in the bureaucracy, even though it 
formulated national economic plans. The EPA participated in the aid 
administration because of its responsibility for the OECF, and its 
Coordination Bureau included two Economic Cooperation Divisions. The 
main task of the Divisions was enormous, the "general coordination of 
aid policy", but few took their contribution seriously. The EPA had 
no "voice" (hatsugenryoku), no philosophy of aid or concrete 
resources (buki) for policy-making. Any attempts at coordination were
weakened by the ambiguous relationship between foreign aid and national
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priorities and by the confusion between the competing components of the
18aid policy package.
The weakness of the EPA was partly attributable to the control 
of its operations exercised by other ministries, especially by the MOF 
and MITI. This was the result of a long-standing system of transfer 
appointments (shukko) of ministry officers to select EPA positions: 
in the Coordination Bureau, for example, the Bureau Director usually 
came from MITI, the Counsellor (sanjikan) from the MOF and the 
Coordination Officer (choseikan) from MITI, while the Division Directors 
were MITI (in the First Economic Cooperation Division), MOF or native 
EPA officers. Transferred officers also occupied positions below the 
division director level, and were typically career officers from the 
larger ministries gaining outside experience as part of their career 
development.^
Aid Within Ministries
As aid policy was accorded fitful recognition by the national 
bureaucratic structure, so aid sections were regarded differently within 
each ministry. The standing of bureaus within any ministry changed with 
the fortunes of the duties which they administered, but the status of 
the Economic Cooperation Bureau in the MFA, for example, was never firm. 
General perceptions of the importance of the developing countries in 
foreign policy were transmitted to aid, but in the MFA the European and 
American spheres were still the popular diplomatic domains. While it 
was acknowledged that Bureau experience was helpful to an officer, the 
prestigious diplomatic postings, with the exception of Seoul and Jakarta, 
were not to developing countries and there seemed to be no conscious 
policy of posting Economic Cooperation Bureau officers to developing
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country embassies.
The Economic Cooperation Bureau was a backwater in the MFA in 
21the late 1970s. Although established in 1962, it was considered a
"new" bureau, not one of the traditional branches of MFA structure,
and it did not greatly impinge on power relations within the Ministry.
No Economic Cooperation Bureau Director had risen to the top of the 
22Ministry, although in the late 1960s, when Japanese aid began to grow
rapidly, some junior officers looked upon the Economic Cooperation
23Bureau as a useful base for rapid promotion. The Bureau was, however,
a functional one, to many merely for implementation rather than for
policy-making, and Ministry custom perpetuated generalist thinking
24towards careers in the regional policy bureaus. There were, as we 
shall see later, few aid specialists in the MFA and for certain 
structural reasons there was no explicit policy to develop an aid 
"service".
Aversion in the MFA to "on the ground" policy contrasted
with the situation in the EPA. There the Economic Cooperation
Divisions were close to the job (gemba), to the realities of policy,
while the Agency on the whole dealt with macro-economic issues. This
25dichotomy appeared often in Japanese administrative studies.
The importance of aid sections within MITI and the MOF was
defined in terms of administrative capability, perhaps in keeping with
the more practical orientation of those organisations. MITI's aid
divisions were called "special administrative units", possessing both
26strong intellectual and administrative resources. It was acknowledged 
that Division Directors in the Economic Cooperation Department were able 
men with bright careers ahead of them, and it was said that being in
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the Department was conducive to promotion. Strength was needed when
27the Department coordinated all aid related business in the Ministry.
Differences between bureaus within a ministry were more 
noticeable in the MOF, where the International Finance Bureau had long 
been poorly regarded. Being the international face of a closely knit 
and inward-looking Ministry, it was a "foreign cadre" which had always 
been considered somewhat special. Bureau consciousness was aggressive, 
despite regular movement of officials, and the Bureau was staffed with 
capable officers.^
The size and rate of growth of aid divisions also reflect
their administrative standing, although size alone does not suffice
as a measure of quality. Table 4-1 shows fixed numbers of employees
of the various bureaus for the period 1965 - 75 and actual numbers of
29employees in aid divisions within the ministries. In the ten-year 
period there was no real expansion in the aid staff of the main 
ministries. Actual numbers in MITI and the MOF showed no increase over 
the decade (in MITI they in fact fell) and fixed bureau numbers dropped 
in both cases. In contrast, the EPA aid numbers increased slightly and 
the creation of a new division in 1972 did not, as was common in such 
reorganisations, draw staff from the First Division.
MFA staff numbers were fixed, although by Ministry decision 
and not by law. Employees in divisions whose functions did not 
change (Policy, International, First Economic Cooperation) showed a 
slight increase over the period, as did the number of technical 
cooperation staff/ which benefited from a new division in 1972. Grant 
aid and reparations staff decreased as reparations were wound down and 
people transferred to other tasks. Bureau fixed numbers stayed almost
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the same, while regional bureaus and the Minister's Secretariat
substantially increased their personnel, especially after the
30reorganisation of 1969.
Apart from the low political interest in aid in Japan, one 
factor which accounted for the static numbers of aid staff was the 
clear cut policy of the Administrative Management Agency and National 
Personnel Authority to limit bureaucratic growth. This was maintained 
by regular across-the-board reductions of staff, and even of divisions. 
Every year each ministry had to "hand back" to the Administrative 
Management Agency 5 percent of its positions. While it could demand 
new positions and most of the 5 percent were reallocated, they had to 
be for nev; functions. This enabled regular ministry reviews of their
tasks and encouraged the transfer of old positions to new and emerging
n . 31policy areas.
Fixed numbers indicate those positions allowed within the 
budget framework but, as Table 4-2 reveals, there was considerable 
flexibility in staffing, for personnel in the MFA's Economic Cooperation 
Bureau in April 1976 totalled 134, 39 more than the number allocated 
in the budget. From the table we can see that the MFA's Economic 
Cooperation Bureau was not an isolated or "ethnocentric" bureau. Its 
fixed staff included 13 transferred from other ministries (Finance, 
Construction, Agriculture and Forestry, Home Affairs, Transport, Posts 
and Telegraphs), while officials were also seconded from ministries, 
banks and semi-government organisations. A number of these were 
technical specialists. The large discrepancy between fixed and actual
32staff numbers was regarded as a normal state of affairs in the bureau,
33although the gap was probably changing constantly. The dearth of aid 
specialists in the MFA may have been one reason for the considerable
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borrowing of staff.
Other ministries did not appear to have staff in excess of
the figures quoted in Table 4-1, but within the MFA's Economic
Cooperation Bureau, all divisions had outside personnel. Only the grant
aid division, however (the Second Economic Cooperation Division), had a
total lower than its fixed allocation (18 as against 19), a fact which
did not altogether tally with forbidding descriptions of the Division's
duties (see Chapter 5). The newly established Development Cooperation
Division was the best equipped, with 15 in comparison to a fixed
allocation of 8. This reflected the emphasis of policy on JICA and on
its feasibility survey work, the supervision of which the Division was
34established expressly to carry out. The Policy Division, the most 
important in the Bureau in respect of budgeting and the control of 
policy direction, had 22 staff members, but was matched by the 22 in the 
First Technical Cooperation Division which managed overseas technical 
assistance policy. Nowhere, however, was there a unit sufficiently 
large to attempt Bureau coordination, much less overall coordination 
of foreign aid. Neither were there sufficient personnel in the Policy 
Division to permit the development of country programs, a task to which 
the United States Agency for International Development, for example, 
devoted vast resources.^
Other ministries did not possess the administrative muscle
necessary for broadly based coordination. The EPA, which had a brief
for it, only had an aid staff of 16 in 1976. The Councillors' Office
of the Prime Minister's Office, which was suggested as an appropriate
coordinator of aid policy, was even smaller, with only 4 men on the
3 6Economic Cooperation Desk. The International Cooperation Division of
the MAF's International Department was very large, with 49 persons, but
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many of these were attached technical and other officers working on 
37non-aid matters. According to Table 4-1, aid related staff in the 
four major ministries totalled in 1975 only 183, whereas in 1965 they 
numbered 176. Even taking into account extra personnel recruited from 
outside, it is hard indeed to see how staff numbers over the decade 
after 1965 matched the increasing workloads represented by aid 
performance figures. The aid administration changed little in outward 
structure and secured only marginal additions to its staff resources.
Aid and Bureaucratic Behaviour
Aid did not exert a powerful bureaucratic influence in Japan; 
it was peripheral to the main purposes of many of the ministries which 
were part of the aid system. The daily operation of individual 
divisions, however, placed more immediate limitations on the aid 
program, since policy was managed by small, disparate groups of 
officials, between which the divisions were predominantly vertical.
Despite the traditional distinctions between bureaucracy and
the rest of society, which were intensified by administrative legalism
and by the entrenched social position of officials, Japanese bureaucracy
was extraordinarily open in its methods, in a way which many Western
systems were not. There was close and constant communication between
administrators and their clients and a correspondingly heavy movement
of officials and the public in and out of ministries every day. This
reflected a social dependence on bureaucracy, a need for official
38approval and licensing of much daily business, as well as certain
cultural values which emphasised formality, ranking and procedure in
39social contact and their expression in face-to-face communication.
These social norms contrasted with patterns in countries like France,
133.
where Crozier detected a preference for authority relationships and for 
systems in which impersonal inter-office memoranda replaced direct 
communication. For the highly decentralised foreign aid bureaucracy, 
the emphasis on face-to-face communication and personal ties assisted 
coordination; it helped people know what others were doing and 
thinking.40
The lowest unit of formal organisation and the centre of
routine policy-making, the division (ka) within a ministry, exhibited
these characteristics most clearly in the late 1970s. A division's
office layout rarely varied and structures of authority were indicated
41by the arrangement of desks. The accent on the unity of the 
division gave no concession to privacy and group consciousness 
predominated, consistent with patterns of Japanese social behaviour. 
Authority within the division was vested in the director (kacho), his 
deputy directors (kacho hosa) and in the various desk heads (kakaricho), 
but the division's size (usually 10-20) meant that the director himself 
could maintain constant contact with his officers.
Because the division was a close unit, effective management 
was necessary for the completion of tasks, and the personality of the 
director was decisive in the translation of authority into collective 
action. Communication between ranks within the division was easy, 
frank and constructive, because authority was not expressed, as Crozier 
discovered in France, in rigid strata isolation and the linking of 
separate ranks by regulations and orders, but rather in a creative aura 
which enveloped the group. The individual was part of a team which 
allowed him informal participation in decisions often outside the scope 
of his immediate responsibilities but which left him no room for 
independent action or initiative.
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Despite stable authority structures within the division, 
however, harmony and consensus were not the norm. The division was the 
focal point for several underlying tensions which cut across integrative 
patterns of authority. The career system was one such factor which, 
while providing goals for the individual, threatened the order of the 
division. In relation to foreign aid, for example, career patterns had 
a distinct impact on policy-making.
Entry to the Higher National Civil Service and advancement
within it were determined ordinarily by examination. The system of
upper, middle and lower categories of examination operated as a
streaming mechanism, channelling personnel into distinct career
structures, where there were fixed upper limits to promotion and
uniform rates of upward mobility. The numbers who passed the Higher
National Civil Service examinations and entered the "career" officer
ranks were very few, in 1973 only 639 out of 10,826 who passed
42examinations in all three categories.
Both career and non-career streams comprised generalist
administrators and technical officers. Only those who were successful
in the Higher National Civil Service or the Higher Foreign Service
Examinations were eligible to become the highest officials in the
national bureaucracy and so, in the ministries, senior officers
(division director and above) were almost always generalist career
43officers who had moved upward at a fixed and steady rate, with little
open competition for advancement between them until the number of
candidates began to outstrip available posts at the division director 
44level. Career officers were promoted much faster than were non-career 
officers and changed positions every two years or so; they moved from 
bureau to bureau and often to attached agencies or even to other
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ministries, gaining wide and varied training in administrative affairs. 
Non-career staff, however, advanced slowly and spent long years in 
the same job in the knowledge that they would never achieve positions 
of power in the ministry, but at the very most might expect to be 
given a directorship of a minor division after 20 or 30 years' service.
These distinctions created tensions in the workplace and 
frustration among non-career officers at being isolated from higher 
levels of policy, particularly when they acquired specialised knowledge 
of the policy area in which they worked. There was, in fact, a severe 
imbalance between career structures and the need for expertise. Career 
officers received a very general training and often relied on non­
career personnel for the knowledge of rules, precedents and internal
divisional guidelines which was essential to much of the work of the 
45bureaucracy. The small numbers of career officers in ministries 
exacerbated problems of generalism, because effective deployment of 
career officers became very difficult and resulted in their being spread 
thinly across a ministry. In the case of the MFA, Fukui has shown how
46this resulted in "single-issueism" and policy-making by improvisation.
Foreign aid policy was seriously affected by the lack of
specialist knowledge among senior officers. As Cunningham showed,
specialists had to be active in the central management branch of aid
47agencies if their skills were to be fully exploited. In Japan, 
however, technical experts were grafted uneasily onto the system and 
non-career officers, the most experienced lower level administrators 
in the ministries, were separated from policy decisions by inflexible 
barriers. The Japanese system did not cultivate aid specialists, and 
the one research officer (chosakan) appointed in 1975 to the MFA 
Economic Cooperation Bureau's Policy Division, was the first career
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officer in what was normally a non-career officer's final appointment.
MITI appointed a "specialist officer" (semmonkan) in 1976 but he was
non-career. Obviously the career system prevented the promotion of
48career aid officers to a high level in the ministries.
The openness of the bureaucracy and the informality of 
discussion in its daily work compensated in practice for the rigidity 
of organisation and formal regulations. In the case of the MOF and 
MITI, for example, jurisdiction was defined in great detail and was,
49for all ministries and their bureaus, a source of perennial argument. 
Informal and consensus oriented processes within the division also acted 
as a balance to the permanent divisions between officers caused by 
ascribed status rather than formal position.
More importantly for decision-making, the emphasis on the 
division as a group meant that the scope for initiative was limited to 
the extent which the group would allow. The division moved cautiously 
and reacted slowly to non-routine situations, especially when these 
demanded coordination with other divisions. The need to extract 
officers from the divisional environment to make up task forces to 
tackle crises or irregular situations, was well k n o w n . T h e  ease of 
vertical relationships within the division was offset by the problems 
of horizontal relationships between divisions. Jurisdictional 
argument notably began between divisions, because the unity of the 
division was derived from its group orientation and from its being the 
lowest organisational unit with legally defined existence and 
responsibility. Questions of territory were based both on organisational 
perceptions and on the psychological identification with the division.
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The division as a group needed very well defined goals to 
perform effectively. As a united group it was a competent action 
team but without goals clearly expressed through the director, this 
momentum would break down. In regard to foreign aid, where clients 
were overseas and demands therefore less explicit, the budget cycle 
provided an alternative reference point for a division's work because 
deadlines were firm and duties explicit, although energies were devoted 
to the maintenance of current group activities, and creativity in 
developing new policy was rare. In foreign aid, inputs from sources 
external to the bureaucracy were commonly the cause of changing 
objectives or priorities and the diffuse Japanese aid administration 
provided ample opportunity for this infusion.
Advisory Bodies
One possible source of such initiatives or guidance for inter- 
divisional tasks would be the public advisory body. As a vehicle for 
outside advice to governments, it was common in many countries, 
including Japan, and displayed functions which, according to Harari, 
were both instrumental and systemic. Its policy guidance, 
legitimisation of government action or inaction or its co-opting of 
interest groups into the policy-making process, were always 
characteristic of Japanese government. A number of aid donor countries 
established permanent advisory boards to advise their governments on 
aid and related subjects. In Australia, the Development Assistance 
Advisory Board was created in 1974 to advise the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, but ceased to exist in June 1977 when the Australian Development 
Assistance Agency was reconstituted as a bureau under the control of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs. Such bodies also existed in Austria,
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Belgium, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands and all had both 
government and outside membership except those in Denmark and the 
Netherlands, which were composed entirely of people from outside 
government.
The Japanese government advisory body on foreign aid was the
Advisory Council on Overseas Economic Cooperation (Taigai keizai kyoryoku
shingikai, hereafter "Council"), first established in 1960 and
restructured in 1969 to achieve a greater non-official membership and,
it was hoped, a livelier contribution to the national aid debate. A
group of ministers which never convened became a council with a top
ranking businessman (Nagano Shigeo, Chairman of the Japan Chamber of
Commerce) as Chairman and a leading academic and former bureaucrat
(Okita Saburo, then President of the Japan Economic Research Centre) as 
52Deputy Chairman. Its resurrection in 1969 followed a decision in
September 1969 by an Ad Hoc Ministerial Committee on Economic
Cooperation, formed in the previous May. The reasons for the Council’s
reorganisation were twofold: to achieve guidelines for Japan's aid
policies in the new international situation of the 1970s; and to
answer widespread criticism of the inadequacies of Japan's aid policies
and administration. The Ad Hoc Ministerial Committee was intended to
supplement the Council but in fact rarely met and, after recommendations
from the Council in May 1975 and pressure from within the LDP, it was
upgraded to an official Ministerial Committee on Overseas Economic
53Cooperation in July 1975.
The Council was an advisory body to the Prime Minister and one
of the 246 official advisory organs in existence in 1976. It was, in
most respects, typical of other advisory bodies and exhibited the same
54weaknesses and strengths which the literature has amply described.
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The Council was a small group, having only 20 members, but it represented
a cross-section of academic, business and semi-government organisations,
which was typical of advisory commissions in Japan. The number of
55present and former officials was large and tenure was for the usual
two years. Meetings were held regularly, about once a month, and
representatives from the ministries and, on occasion, officials from
implementing agencies, attended the meetings. Sub-committees were
established when necessary and drafting of reports was undertaken by a
drafting committee. Reports were presented to the responsible minister
56(in this case the Prime Minister) in the customary way.
While the structure and composition of the Council were
standard, the relationship between it and the policy area upon which it
was meant to advise, was unusual. It made recommendations to the Prime
Minister because it was always attached to the Prime Minister's Office
and because in 1960 there was no one minister predominant in aid
57policy whom it could more suitably advise. This was still the case 
in the late 1970s, so that while legally the Council was in a neutral 
bureaucratic position, it was also separated from direct contact with 
any one ministry involved with aid. This weakened the Council's 
influence over the fate of its reports, and meant that the Council had 
no "promoter". In the absence of a "promoter", the Council did not 
convene at all for the first six months of 1975 or 1976, not even to 
discuss policy for UNCTAD IV, which began in May 1976. The Prime 
Minister was concerned with aid policy on a high and abstract plane 
and could not be counted on to push for the adoption of Council 
recommendations unless he was personally committed. Both he and the 
Council were removed from the daily round of aid policy. Even 
though the Council's organisational position isolated it from the centre
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of policy development in ministries, however, its reports still had a
stimulatory effect and could be a source of new ideas for the
government. At the very least it could act as a sounding board for
59initiatives from the bureaucracy or government at large.
Most advisory councils were, to some extent, controlled by 
the officials of the ministry to which they were attached. This control 
could emasculate a potentially active council or, as was the case with 
MITI's Industrial Structure Council or with the EPA's Economic Council, 
it could add legitimacy to policies which originated in the ministry 
itself. The reports of the latter two Councils, for instance, were 
immediately adopted as policy and the Councils were correspondingly 
accorded the status and outward signs of power consistent with their 
role as legitimising agents.^0
The Advisory Council on Overseas Economic Cooperation performed 
a similar function, but it was weak and its status was low, due partly 
to long years of inactivity. Its rebirth in 1969 failed to pull it out 
of administrative limbo and no pattern of leadership emerged. The 
Council secretariat was the small Economic Cooperation Desk in the 
Councillors' Office of the Prime Minister's Office, and none of its 
staff were aid specialists. As a result, there was no possibility that 
the Desk could take on coordination of aid policy, unless it was 
enlarged and its powers expanded. The Council, in its own report of 
August 1975, recommended that study of the strengthening of the 
Council's secretariat be considered, although officials prevented a 
more positive wording in the draft of the report. Ministries did not 
want the secretariat's staff or its coordination ability upgraded and 
there were even half-hearted suggestions that the secretariat should
61be moved from the Prime Minister's Office to either the MFA or the EPA.
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Council deliberations were dominated by officials who were
present at both general and sub-committee meetings to give briefings
and to observe. They often outnumbered Councillors and sometimes
6 2assembled from 15 or 16 government ministries and agencies. The
format of the meeting, which was fairly formal and of only a few
hours' duration, constrained Councillors in freely discussing the
items on notice, so they relied on circulated papers to direct debate
and often reserved their comments for written submissions made outside
the Council meeting. The Economic Cooperation Desk in the Prime
Minister's Office was responsible for distributing papers and most of
the agenda was supported by ministry prepared documents. Many of these
position papers were so contradictory that some Councillors were moved
to suggest in sub-committee that ministries do more to coordinate their 
6 3drafting. Officials did not form any bloc in this respect.
Discussion at general meetings was often lively and members 
were free to raise topics other than those on the prepared agenda. 
Officials participated in debate, frequently before being asked of 
their opinion by the Chairman. They were, therefore, more than 
observers and did not hesitate to disagree with Councillors, who 
themselves displayed an extremely wide range of opinions about foreign 
aid and about the system of aid management. Regularly the discussion 
became a mere dialogue between officials and Councillors rather than 
an independent, constructive debate between Council members as such.
The efficacy of the Advisory Council can be measured best by 
the content, and impact, of its recommendations. These were prepared 
by a drafting committee and were based on sub-committee findings and 
on other documents arising from Council meetings. Drafting was 
concentrated in the Economic Cooperation Desk, for this office
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collected and edited opinions on drafts from Councillors and from 
ministries. The influence of bureaucrats on the final composition of 
drafts is not easy to gauge, but it depended very much on the chairman 
of the drafting committee. Influence was obviously a two-way process, 
although some critics of the Council accused it of a "scissors and
paste" exercise in combining different ministry papers to produce a
. 64 report.
Reports testified to the fact that the Council was not so 
much directed by ministries as overwhelmed by the intensity of their 
competition. Since the capacity of the Council to formulate its own 
independent papers was limited (no Councillors had time, for a start), 
it necessarily relied on ministry material for the bulk of any draft. 
Ministries vied to get their proposals to the drafting committee 
quickly and forcefully. The form of the draft and of the final report 
depended much on the ability of the drafting committee’s chairman to 
counter the generalities imposed on him by the conflict of bureaucratic 
interests. The Council had to tolerate generation of heat rather 
than light in this infighting and its overriding problem therefore was 
how to ensure that its recommendations were properly implemented. In 
this, however, it was dependent on the whim of officials, something 
which the isolation of the Council from the ministries only intensified.
One appraisal of the implementation of the September 1971
report on technical cooperation (which suggested reforms in practically
all areas of Japan's technical aid program) revealed that, in that
complex and highly specific field of policy, implementation was
6 7overseen by twelve ministries and agencies. This facilitated 
improvement of a few small, isolated programs (such as Ministry of 
Education scholarships to foreign students) and there was some effort
143.
in respect of medical and agricultural cooperation, the Japan Overseas 
Cooperation Volunteers and project survey work, although there were 
other factors in these last two which pushed programs along 
independently of Council advice.^ These successes constituted, 
however, a small proportion of total technical assistance and the 
important policy categories, where cross-ministry coordination was 
essential - such as the use of technical experts, training in Japan of 
LDC personnel, setting of policy guidelines and acceleration of the
69disbursement of technical assistance - met with little improvement.
In formal terms, the Council sat at the apex of the aid
administrative structure but in that position lay the reasons for its
impotence. Being alienated from the central aid machinery opened the
Council to attack from all corners of the aid bureaucracy and left
members with no sense of their own status. There was no concept of
power (rigai kankei) associated with the Council and it was difficult
to appreciate where aid stood in national policy priorities. Likewise,
the Council did not have a firm yardstick (kejime) for assessing
submissions or the details of aid policy presented to it. While charged
with the task of advising, the Council itself lacked a common standard 
70for its advice. The initiative in policy recommendations rested with
the officials, and the Council could not force its ideas upon anyone.
It was, ultimately, only an advisory body and the ministries translated 
those ideas into concrete policy as they wished.
In contrast, the Ministerial Committee (hereafter, "the 
Committee") was one of several groups of ministers set up by Cabinet
decision to discuss issues with which Cabinet as a whole could not
deal. Its creation was prompted, according to news reports, by the 
need to achieve greater unity and "hard" ministerial level coordination
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in aid policy and to rationalise private and official economic
cooperation programs. The Cabinet decision itself cited the need to
71draw up "basic policy". At the same time, pressure from within the 
LDP was instrumental in bringing the question of a committee to the 
attention of Cabinet. One report suggested that Deputy Prime Minister 
Fukuda first raised it in April 1975 in connection with attempts to 
increase aid to South Korea, negotiations about which had been 
suspended since the Korean Opposition leader, Kim Dae Jung, had been 
abducted from Tokyo in 1973.
If Fukuda did raise anything, however, it would have been
proposals by an LDP Member of the House of Representatives, Minato
Tetsuro, made in a paper in October 1974 where he suggested
reconstituting the Ad Hoc Ministerial Committee as a full ministerial
committee, to be a "control system" for aid policy. This idea
originated in talks Minato had had with the Prime Minister, Tanaka
Kakuei, in December 1973 on the establishment of the Japan International
72Cooperation Agency.. The Opposition parties, through the Diet, were 
also effective in focussing attention on aid in a way which reinforced 
Minato's good timing (see below, p. 150).
The Committee used as staff the Cabinet Councillors' Office, 
formally a separate body to the Councillors' Office of the Prime 
Minister's Office but in fact housed in the same room and administered 
by the same officers. Apart from the ministers, bureau directors and 
their assistants, the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Chairmen of the 
LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council and the Special Committee on 
Overseas Economic Cooperation, also attended Committee meetings. No 
regulations regarding the agenda of the Committee were laid down, but 
initiation of agenda items rested ultimately with ministry officials.
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The Committee met five times between September 1975 and July
1976 but not between December 1975 and June 1976. It did not confer on
73Japan's UNCTAD policy in April 1976. While it could assist in the 
coordination of all aid policies, its attention was occupied by only a 
few topics, especially by Japanese participation in large scale 
development projects overseas. A decision by Prime Minister Fukuda in 
January 1977 to abolish all ministerial committees put an end to its 
short life.
The Committee was never considered able to live up to its 
espoused aims. As a Cabinet sub-committee it was not a forum where 
the details of policy were discussed and ministers had to rely on 
briefings from their officials. It was for the raising of issues, not 
for making decisions, which was the prerogative of full Cabinet.
Problems would go up to the Committee from the ministries for discussion 
and resolution, but this meant that only subjects already enjoying 
substantial agreement at the ministry level became agenda items. They 
were "procedural", originating in the ministries, and ministers 
dutifully reflected the views of their officials, as briefed.
This inertia was inevitable, for in a fixed administrative
system such as that for foreign aid a Cabinet committee was powerless
to coordinate, or to provide new guidelines for, policy unless it had
a full independent staff, a situation which Cunningham found for various
74European donors also. For this reason, the Committee was referred to
as a "token gesture". Nevertheless, it did help to stimulate ideas
from within the bureaucracy for a short period and led to one
initiative, an insurance scheme for Japanese contractors posting bonds
on the construction of large scale projects. The Committee was
75effective, but not in terms of its original brief.
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The Council and the former Committee represented the only 
machinery for policy advice and high level policy coordination in the 
Japanese aid system, but their advisory and coordinating capacities 
were weak. Since they sat at the top of a diffuse and divided 
administration, their influence was negligible because of isolation 
from ministry power structures (in the case of the Council) and inability 
to focus on general trends in aid policy (in the case of the Committee). 
The only contribution of the Committee stemmed from hard political and 
commercial judgements. Ministries directed policy-making unless 
pressure from outside and above was sufficient to ensure that advisory 
body recommendations were put into practice.
Political Parties and the Diet
The aid bureaucracy was inadequate as a policy coordinator,
the efforts of the Advisory Council to set new directions proved
fruitless and the Ministerial Committee did not exist for long enough
to reconcile the diversity of official policy emphases. The National
Diet, however, as the legislative arm of government, was unable to
7 6provide a policy-making forum either. The concentration of aid 
policy-making machinery within the ministries remained unchallenged.
There are three main ways in which a legislature can control
an aid program: the authorisation of funds (both of overall volume
and the timing of expenditure); the general "watchdog" role carried
out as part of legislative scrutiny of the executive; and the passing
77of "charter" legislation for the aid program as a whole. In Japan, 
only the first of these powers was exercised over aid policy. The 
Diet did not possess a formal aid committee and showed little
inclination to scrutinise aid policy or to lay down controlling
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legislation. Diet committees discussed aid as part of other business,
but debate was restricted by the division of committee responsibilities
along ministry lines. Aid came within the purview of at least nine
78committees in each House.
Aid budgets were approved by the Diet in the course of the 
annual budgetary process and while there would be some debate in the 
Budget Committee on aid, there was no tradition of dissecting figures 
which were, in any case, buried in the mass of budget documents tabled. 
Extraction and analysis of figures were simply too onerous for Members 
to spend time over. As Chapter 6 will explain, Diet authorisation was 
necessary for grants (technical assistance, capital grants, multilateral 
assistance) and for some allocations for the loan agencies. The Diet 
also had to authorise the carry-over of undisbursed funds but again 
these figures were included among the detail of the budget papers.
There was no Diet control of loan commitments, as in some other DAC 
countries, although the passing of the Budget represented approval of 
certain grant commitments.
Aid was peripheral to the business of the Diet, because in
Japan aid was not a political issue. The public expressed little
awareness of aid and only one or two Members in the whole Diet
possessed any professional knowledge of the subject. Aid comprised
less than 1 percent of the Budget's General Account and Members gained
no votes and little kudos for championing a cause which did not
directly affect the vast majority of their electors. Ministries,
despite a latent feeling that some sort of legislative control might
79improve their international image as aid donors, did not wish to see 
any aid committees established in the Diet since they would only 
increase pressure on their own overtaxed staff.
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Nevertheless, aid and aid related topics arose frequently in
the Diet. The Foreign, Budget, Audit and Trade and Industry Committees
usually dealt with aid through legislation before the House which
involved aid indirectly (such as revisions of the Export-Import Bank
Law in the 65th Diet or the Export Insurance Law in the 63rd), through
scrutiny of past expenditure on aid in the Audit Committee or by
examination of certain bilateral relationships between Japan and
developing countries. Debate was not well informed or incisive, and
certainly did not approach the standard of foreign policy debates,
which occurred more regularly. Questions or comments on the
administration of aid arose periodically, as in the Audit Committee of
the 51st Diet, or in the Social Affairs-Labour Committee of the 63rd
Diet on the strike of OTCA employess. Government backbench and
Opposition Members themselves bemoaned their own unpreparedness, but
8 0aid did not advance their political reputations.
The political parties appreciated that aid was an element of
foreign economic policy, but the consciousness of aid among them varied
considerably. The LDP had the oldest aid committee, the Special
Committee on Overseas Economic Cooperation established in 1959. It
was one of the PARC's special investigation committees, membership of
which was voluntary, and although the lowest level of Party policy-
8 Xmaking, it acted as the focus of official LDP aid work.
The membership of the Committee stood at 70 in December 1976,
8 2the Chairman being Tanaka Tatsuo of the Fukuda faction. Other high
ranking LDP Diet Members were members of the Committee but only about
10 were constantly active. It was said to meet once or twice a week
on a range of problems, and its staff consisted of one elderly LDP 
8 3official. The Committee made few formal reports although papers and
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recommendations prepared by individual members or groups within the
84Committee were issued from time to time with its sanction.
The Committee did not produce by itself any Party policy. It 
was a minor section of the LDP organisation and had no real voice in 
Party affairs. What weight it could exert in policy resulted from 
individual members pursuing their own objectives. It was constantly 
referred to as a "support group" for aid, a back up organisation or 
"mood builder" for ministry policy.
The Committee's support did not extend to policy in a broad
sense, although it was a clearing house for ideas and arguments advanced
in its frequent meetings with ministry aid officials. Its energies, or
rather those of its members, were channelled more into particular
aspects of aid, especially loans projects or bilateral relationships.
This feature will be examined in later chapters, for it drew strong
criticism from Opposition politicians and from the public. LDP
members repeatedly became involved in the shadier sides of aid 
8 5relationships and the Special Committee provided an opportunity for 
these connections to be initiated. The interest of some individual 
members of the LDP Committee in large and expensive projects overseas 
to the exclusion of what were, to officials, more pressing issues, 
prompted many remarks about the pursuit of personal before national 
interests. In contrast, as will be shown in Chapter 6, the influence 
of the Committee in the budgetary process could be most helpful to the 
ministries. As in any policy process, the interaction between 
officials and politicians always flowed in two directions.
Opposition parties also maintained aid or economic cooperation 
committees, although none was as active or as informed as that of the LDP.
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The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) kept a watching brief over aid 
through its International Division and did so with some verve, in 
contrast to the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which presented a vague 
and disordered view of aid. None of the Opposition parties was fully 
aware of the organisational aspects of aid policy. All parties 
included statements on economic cooperation in their policy handbooks, 
but only the LDP and the DSP had a reasonably detailed treatment of the 
subject
The Opposition used its limited resources to good effect in
the Diet on occasion. A bill presented in January 1975 by the JSP
Diet Member, Den Hideo, drew the Government's attention to aid problems.
The bill provided for Diet approval of proposed Government aid programs
and for the cessation of aid to non-democratic governments, a provision
aimed specifically at South Korea. While it was never debated, the
bill did coincide with Minato's proposals for a ministerial aid
committee and with attempts by Fukuda to recommence aid talks with the
87South Korean Government.
Opposition members were diligent in attacking the Government
on foreign aid. The best known thrust concerned the alleged corruption
involving Indonesian reparations, first raised by Yanagida Hidekazu of
the JSP in 1959 in the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives,
but more recently Den Hideo, Yokomichi Takahiro and Narasaki Yanosuke
of the JSP pursued the controversy regarding Indonesian natural gas
(LNG) development, and Masamori Seiji of the JCP the South Korean
8 8subway construction scandal. On the other hand, some Opposition 
members did not follow their party's line so faithfully. A DSP leader, 
in particular, used his position to force a decision on government 
assistance to a Japanese private company's development project in
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Papua New Guinea, a case which will be looked at in more detail in 
Chapter 7. In any of these situations, however, it was the individual 
Opposition member, and not the party, who provided the initiative and 
the energy for Opposition contribution to the aid policy debate.
Conclusion: Organisation, Politics and Policy
The aid bureaucracy in Japan was well defined, although 
complex, and a limited sense of unity and community bound its scattered 
parts, because aid was quantifiable and cast normally in terms of 
specific amounts of money or services. Organisational factors, however, 
influenced the aid machinery's effect on aid policy:
(a) The imbalance between divisional resources (personnel, 
expertise) and workloads affected a division's ability to 
assess policy, as did career patterns and the rapidity of 
staff movements.
(b) The unequal importance accorded aid divisions in different 
ministries prevented the concerted articulation of aid 
policies throughout government, while the impotence of the 
Advisory Council and the former Ministerial Committee allowed 
debate between sections of the aid bureaucracy to continue 
without real purpose. Officials, not the advisers, defined 
the issues.
(c) The workplace environment encouraged dispute over policy at 
the lowest ranks, and jurisdiction became controversial from 
the bottom up, as argument about substance became argument 
about territory. Innovation and the pursuit of new policy 
themes did not often follow from this interchange.
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No coordination mechanism spanned ministerial boundaries or 
effectively drew together the strands of aid policy - grants, loans, 
technical and multilateral assistance - although one did function 
actively for loans policy, as we shall shortly explain. Patterns of 
communication at the working level assisted in forging cooperative 
horizontal links between officers but these were not institutional 
arrangements. Later chapters will examine whether this interaction 
served to clarify common interests or to foster coordinating exchange 
within the aid system.
Aid structures fitted most comfortably into government when 
closely integrated with other policy concerns of ministries and agencies. 
What constituted aid policy depended significantly on the changing 
fortunes of the aid sections within ministries, since politics did not 
support an expanded aid bureaucracy or back up an independent aid 
policy. Aid's limited political and organisational impact resulted in 
an aid bureaucracy which lacked energy. At the political level, 
perceptions of aid were confused; no sense of political directions 
for aid, let alone policy directions, was apparent. This left aid 
open to cross-cutting political pressures. Furthermore, the ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party took a less assertive role in aid at home than 
in many other policy areas. The explanation lay partly in the nature 
of aid itself, but also in the highly routinised procedures for aid 
management. We turn now to examine these procedures.
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CHAPTER 5
MINISTRIES AND THE POLICY PROCESS
The system of "equal partnership" in aid policy, outlined in 
Chapter 4, suggested a degree of equality between ministries. The 
formal outline of the aid administration excluded any overlapping of 
responsibility, and even interaction between the ministries on policy, 
but the practice of aid management was rather different. Aid policy 
was built up on bureaucratic decisions, ranging from determination of 
the total aid volume to the type of funds committed to recipients and 
the terms on which they were provided.^
The emphasis of this chapter is on how the ministries (and,
in particular, the "Big Four" of foreign aid, the MFA, the MOF, MITI 
2and the EPA) directly influenced aid policies. These ministries 
controlled much of Japan's aid program, but at the same time seriously 
frustrated each other's ability to perform their respective tasks. As 
a result of administrative decentralisation, different procedures 
governed each kind of aid, and affected the shape and content of 
policy. While the last chapter showed that independent policy advisory 
functions were weak, this chapter assesses to what extent inter­
ministry coordination was a feature of aid policy-making.
Chart 5-1 represents aid flows from the Japanese Government 
to the less developed countries and to multilateral agencies. The four 
main categories of aid - capital grants, technical assistance, 
multilateral aid and bilateral loans - were all separate, with distinct 
patterns of administrative control. The chart shows clearly how the 
implementing agencies channelled funds to multilateral and bilateral 
projects and how home ministries controlled aid operation. Consultants
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and private enterprise helped survey and finance projects, and the 
Japanese Embassy in recipient countries handled the flow of information 
between Japan, recipients and project management teams in the developing 
country. MITI, the MOF and the MFA were the ministries most actively 
involved in the aid process.
Bilateral Capital Grants
Bilateral capital grants, like bilateral loans, were intended
to promote the economic and social development of the developing
countries but, unlike loans, repayment was waived (that is, their
grant element was 100 percent). Grants were aimed at the social
infrastructure sectors which fell outside the scope of the financing
regulations of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) and the
Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), and therefore included housing,
3education, medical and research fields. In principle, capital grants 
were made mainly to the least developed countries (LLDCs), consistent 
with the practice of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), but 
the Japanese Government contributed capital grant aid even to 
relatively advanced LDCs where there was a demonstrated need for funds 
for social infrastructure development, and where loans would be 
inappropriate. These latter cases were treated on an individual 
basis.^
As Chart 5-1 reveals, the MFA implemented capital grants 
policy because, in contrast to loans or technical cooperation, there was 
no agency allotted that task. It was the responsibility of the 
Economic Cooperation Bureau's Second Economic Cooperation Division, in 
1976 a group of 18 officers. The onus on this section was heavy, as
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we shall explain, and because of a combination of circumstances 
surrounding grant aid, pressure on the Division was unlikely to be 
alleviated to allow capital grants to grow. These restrictions 
stemmed from:
(a) the effect of the budgeting process on grants decision­
making ;
(b) a general disinterest outside the ministries in grant aid, 
which was disbursed to projects small and inexpensive by 
comparison to loan-funded projects;
(c) the extent of desk work involved in both policy-making and 
in implementation borne by the Division, as compared to the 
corresponding divisions dealing with loans.
The difficulty in producing a consistent grants policy was a product 
and a cause of these problems.“*
Grant assistance was initiated by a request from the 
developing country, followed (if necessary) by a study of the 
feasibility of the project, an MFA request to the MOF for an allocation 
in the following year's budget, an exchange of notes with the government 
of the developing country and, finally, the arrangement of banking, 
settlement of contracts, issuance of export licences and payment of 
moneys from General Revenue into the recipient's account in an 
authorised foreign exchange bank. The process was unlike that for 
loans in several ways, but particularly in one respect: budget
allocation had to be secured before the exchange of notes between 
governments took place. Or, more formally, "in principle, implementation 
must follow the exchange of notes and be completed within the single-
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year budgeting framework". In one way, this gave the MFA the 
advantage of implementing grants after making a commitment, but it 
also implied that until all budget formalities were finalised, no 
commitment could be entered into by the Government.
Grant aid was subject to bureaucratic rivalries even when the 
potential recipient first approached the Japanese Government. There 
was no multi-ministry system of control of grants as there was of loans 
or technical cooperation. The decision on whether requests would be 
acceded to or not lay with the Second Economic Cooperation Division and 
with other sections of the MFA and also with the MOF Budget Bureau via 
the International Finance Bureau's Overseas Investment Division. Since 
commitments of grants depended on budget appropriation, it was 
important to have understandings with the MOF at an early stage, 
certainly before an official budget application was made.
The Economic Cooperation Bureau's Policy Division was the
first to judge requests for aid received by the Japanese Government.
It formed its own opinion about the type of aid most suitable (if
unspecified) and in passing the proposal along to the specialist
division, weighed the request in the light of Ministry policy and
precedent. The Second Economic Cooperation Division could refuse a
7request on its own initiative, which it sometimes did, although the 
final arbiter was the Bureau Director. The Division made an appraisal 
after wide consultation, but favoured requests
(a) which were "mature" and for projects likely to be completed,
(b) for projects which had priority in the LDC's own economic
plans
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(c) from those countries which could genuinely be assisted by 
Japanese grants,
(d) for projects which would not become associated with 
commercial profit, and
(e) for projects which had strong links with technical cooperation. 
These criteria did not necessarily match those of the MQF or of other
Q
sections of the MFA.
Regional bureaus in the MFA put their opinion about the
advisability of a grant to the country in question, based on their
assessment of its wealth, strategic position, relations with Japan and
so on. Some Economic Cooperation Bureau officials asserted that
regional officers did not consider need or feasibility but made purely
9political judgements, so there was a distinct divergence of approach, 
although in most instances it was not wide. Regional bureaus were 
involved less with grants than with loans, which had greater political 
and diplomatic relevance (because of their visibility and monetary 
value), and therefore these bureaus pursued grants policy less 
vigorously. The country distribution of Japan's grant aid, however, 
especially the bias towards South Vietnam, was obviously a result of 
political considerations beyond the Second Economic Cooperation 
Division's five guidelines.
Once a decision was made in the MFA Second Economic Cooperation 
Division about the advisability of the grant, budget funds had to be 
secured. A request was made, as part of the annual MFA budget 
application, for an amount expected to be agreed upon in exchanges of 
notes in the coming fiscal year. This amount could then be drawn on
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when needed for payment. Official discussions with the MOF took place 
both at the time of the original budget request and when the MOF 
examined the state of the project and the need for disbursement. Since 
the number of grants made each year was small, ^  the Budget Bureau had 
ample opportunity to scrutinise each one. The MOF was always wary of 
capital grants in Japan's aid effort for gratuitous aid was not, in its 
opinion, economically sound. MFA demands in 1975-76 for increased 
grant aid to balance the fall in reparations met with MOF insistence 
on more efficient use of grants, greater LDC efforts to help themselves 
and continued high visibility for grant projects. The MOF seemed to 
assume that visible grant projects somehow offset the financial burden
t  11on Japan.
This routine was cumbersome and staff shortages in the MFA
Second Economic Cooperation Division meant that it worked slowly once
budget approval was given. Negotiations with the recipient government
on the exchange of notes were time-consuming, for only when the budget
was passed could talks begin and the Second Economic Cooperation
Division therefore had to conduct them within a strict budget framework.
Any alterations to the budget for individual projects needed MOF
imprimatur. The requirement to negotiate and make commitments within
a precise budget limit removed all flexibility from a system already
under strain. The Second Economic Cooperation Division managed all
stages of implementation of the grant, closely supervising and verifying
the letting of tenders and contracts with Japanese suppliers by the
12recipient government. It coordinated payments and was intimately 
involved in the management of projects, in order to watch the disbursement 
of funds.
Such pressures on officials of the Division meant that grants
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often took years to complete. The low rate of disbursement of grant
budgets was evidence of the fact that grant funds were not easily spent
13in the same fiscal year in which they were allocated. The grant aid
administration was caught in a situation which prevented aid being
expanded to counter criticism of Japan’s lagging grant performance.
The MOF was in principle opposed to any large increase in grant aid
from the budget unless sound agreement on policy for grants could be
reached, but the nature of grant aid was such that only temporary
agreement between the MOF, the Second Economic Cooperation Division and
other sections of the MFA was likely. Grant aid was not the subject of
debate at a higher policy level in the Ministerial Committee or in the
LDP Special Committee. The Advisory Council did recommend the expansion 
14of grants, but could not enforce its proposals. While budgets
remained low, however, any setting of guidelines was impossible, for a
geographically and sectorally balanced array of projects could not be
planned. As officials stated, previous policy was maintained for want
of funds. If the budget were increased, though, manpower in the
implementing division could not handle the extra work and, as we have
15seen, MFA staff increases came slowly.
The problems of bilateral capital grant aid were threefold:
(a) The structural problems of the MFA grant administration 
restricted the size of the grant program which could be 
effectively managed; furthermore, in implementing grants, 
it could spare less resources for the task of formulating 
policy.
(b) The MFA Second Economic Cooperation Division was therefore 
susceptible to MFA regional bureau demands, and had to
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accommodate MOF requirements on budgets and project details.
(c) Both these factors led to a program slanted towards projects 
politically and economically acceptable to the MFA and to the 
MOF, and to strict Japanese Government control of grants given.
Multilateral Aid
There were two main flows of multilateral funds: grants from
the MFA (and from other ministries) to the United Nations and its 
related organisations; and loans and grants from the MOF to 
international financial institutions such as regional development banks 
and the World Bank group. They were two distinct policy areas managed 
by separate administrative units.^
The MOF was represented by the Overseas Investment Division 
of the International Finance Bureau and the MFA by the United Nations 
(UN) Bureau and by the International Organisations Division of the 
Economic Cooperation Bureau. Because contributions to multilateral 
organisations were generally governed by international treaty, their 
inclusion in the budget was automatic, but the extent of contribution 
was determined within the budget in consultation with the MOF's Budget 
Bureau. Debate on multilateral aid policy, therefore, was restricted 
to a narrow group of officials concerned with the disbursement of that 
assistance. The coordination of separate flows was effected mainly by 
budgeting, since no part of the aid administration had the jurisdiction 
to monitor all multilateral aid.
The conditions of Japan's membership of international 
financial institutions were set by the charters of those bodies and by 
domestic legislation enabling Japan to take part. The National Diet
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approved bills to alter any aspect of Japan's participation, and the
timing of Japan's contributions fell within a broad legislative
framework. Payment was commonly on a three-yearly basis, with annual
equal instalments, which meant that renegotiation with the Budget
Bureau came at three-yearly intervals instead of annually, although
yearly requests for instalments still had to be made by the International
Finance Bureau. Non-regular payments, such as those to the Asian
17Development Bank Special Fund, were requested when necessary.
There was no sustained interchange between the MOF and the MFA 
on multilateral aid budgets, although they did consult, especially on 
new requests. The International Finance Bureau was in a sensitive 
position as the MOF's "window" for aid, because it had to transmit an 
argument favouring aid to the Budget Bureau while at the same time 
tempering its independent view of aid to coincide with stricter MOF 
policy. Relations between the International Finance and Budget 
Bureaus were not easy, given the former's recognition of the importance 
of Japan's international standing to domestic economic prosperity, 
a perception which the Budget Bureau shared less fervently. Attitudes 
such as these fostered the International Finance Bureau's "foreign" 
image within the MOF, although its aid requests were not treated 
severely by the Budget Bureau, in whose catalogue of tests "fiscal 
soundness" was always uppermost. The possibility of overseas criticism 
of Japan's aid procedures was of lesser moment. The International 
Finance Bureau, as an MOF bureau, was also committed to the effective 
use of Japanese multilateral assistance and was not reluctant to 
express itself in this respect, as it did in 1976 in the argument
about replenishment of the International Development Association. 18
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The International Organisations Division of the Economic
Cooperation Bureau was the MFA's counterpart of the Overseas Investment
Division of the MOF's International Finance Bureau, and its brief
covered "international organisations and conferences", which made it
the contact for relations with the DAC. This was the International
Organisations Division's main duty, a part of its preserving MFA links
19with international financial institutions. The Division assisted in 
the development of Ministry policy on multilateral aid and many of its 
views corresponded to those of the International Finance Bureau of the 
MOF. Both saw a need for balance between bilateral and multilateral 
assistance (which implied support for the existing level of multilateral 
aid) and for continued emphasis on regional banks. The close liaison 
between the International Finance Bureau and the Asian Development Bank 
was one reason for the MOF favouring regional banks, but a desire first 
for the visibility of aid, and secondly for its efficient management, 
were also to the forefront of MOF thinking. These criteria were valued 
too by the MFA. The International Organisations Division acknowledged 
the trend to regional organisations but suggested at the same time that 
aid to the African Development Bank involved a loss of recognition of 
Japan in Africa, which did not occur, in contrast, with aid to the Asian 
Development Bank, a bank generally agreed to be under strong Japanese 
influence.^
The MFA International Organisations Division had only a small 
budget of its own to implement, most of which was paid to the Asian 
Productivity Organisation. Aid to United Nations organisations was the 
responsibility of the UN Bureau, and Economic Cooperation Bureau 
communications with that Bureau were supervised by the Policy Division. 
Assistance to United Nations programs was given either under multi-year
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or annual agreements, and the level of contribution was decided within
the budgeting process. The MOF, however, regarded United Nations aid
as "rather too political" and considered the international financial
institutions to be the "strongest" and, therefore, the most appropriate
channels for Japan's multilateral aid. In addition, the strained
relations between the UN Bureau and the Economic Affairs Bureau
complicated the development of policy towards United Nations aid
programs. Rather predictably, officials at the working level accused
each other of taking an unbalanced view of the United Nations and
21UNCTAD, and even of administrative incompetence.
The third aspect of multilateral aid policy was the
management of relations with the DAC. This was effected primarily
through the International Organisations Division of the MFA, and the
Japanese team which visited Paris for the annual Examination included
officials from this Division, the International Finance Bureau of the
22MOF and from the Economic Cooperation Department of MITI. Chapter 1
explained how Japan joined the DAG and then the DAC, and how at the
time she saw the opportunity as being of greater benefit to her
participation in the international economic community than to her aid
policy. There was little agreement between officials, however, on the
impact of the DAC on Japanese policy over the years. To some, the DAC
was an unknown quantity until 1970, when the High Level Meeting was
23first held in Tokyo. This meeting, at which agreement was reached on
24the removal of tying from aid, demonstrated to other ministries the 
DAC's force as a donor organisation. It helped raise consciousness of 
aid in Japan.
Membership was something of a status symbol for Japan in the 
1960s and the MFA took pride in even this limited recognition of Japan's
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aid role. The MFA attitude towards the DAC was far more positive than
the marginal interest of the MOF, although both took membership
seriously. They acknowledged that the DAC affected Japanese policy on
untying, terms, volumes and on sectoral aid programs, but MOF officials
were less inclined to agree that DAC influence extended to policy as
implemented, or to the details of policy. They noted what the DAC said
and accepted the need for a common aid effort but, in their opinion,
25procedures remained a domestic preserve. Certainly Japan made 
little improvement in the terms on which her aid was given, despite 
continuous DAC criticism for fifteen years.
Japan's influence within the DAC was restricted, mainly because
of her unyielding attitude on terms and, in contrast to the United
States, she was not at the centre of DAC policy-making or DAC promotion.
The MOF apparently preferred a low profile, wishing to defend Japan
against the incipient trend to a greater political role for the DAC in
the North-South debate. The DAC could not, however, be entirely
divorced from the domestic politics of aid. The MFA regarded the forum
as a useful adjunct to its own aid position, although it was selective
26in referring to DAC statements for support, and it sought to use DAC
censure of Japan's aid performance in its own power politics,
27particularly at budget time. It was also keen to expose other
ministries to criticisms of Japan raised in the DAC and to "work on"
the International Finance Bureau in a situation free of the domestic
28constraints of the Budget Bureau. International Finance Bureau
reports to its own Ministry on the DAC Examination were important in
this exercise. On the other hand, not all officials accepted MFA
arguments on aid and sometimes used the DAC session against the 
29diplomats.
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In preparation for the annual DAC Examination, the Government 
compiled in mid-year a memorandum on its aid work. Being responsible 
for relations with the DAC, the International Organisations Division of 
the MFA prepared the first draft, which was then circulated to other 
ministries for comment. Most response came from the International 
Finance Bureau, less from MITI and the EPA. ‘The MAF only replied on 
topics which directly implicated it, such as agricultural cooperation.
The preparation of the memorandum was not complicated,
although wording indicated subtle differences between ministry
30attitudes. While the MFA policy line dominated, MOF caution
tempered what its officers often regarded as overly optimistic or
31expansive statements. The MOF International Finance Bureau, however, 
experienced conflicts within its own Ministry, concerning the Bureau's 
position on the draft. The Overseas Investment Division had to consult 
with the Budget Bureau on the fiscal implications of the draft, and 
with the Overseas Public Investment Division. This Division was
concerned exclusively with management of government loans and tended to
32regard its neighbours as amateurs on bilateral loans, which took up a
large portion of the memorandum. Accordingly, it put its view forcefully
to the Overseas Investment Division, to check the latter's grasp of loan
details. The Overseas Public Investment Division's lack of confidence
in the ability of the Overseas Investment Division (the regular channel
of communication with the MFA on the DAC memorandum) to effectively
argue for the MOF on loans, led them as specialists to bypass regular
33procedures and talk directly with the MFA.
Multilateral assistance consisted, therefore, of more than 
the carrying out of obligations determined by international agreements.
It was true that the outlines of multilateral aid policy were set by the
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broad compass of Japan's participation in these organisations but 
translating that involvement into actual policy drew in a number of 
ministries and their divisions. Although jurisdictions in this field 
were well defined, ministry (and even divisional) interests took 
precedence, and policy became associated with, but not determined by, 
the budget process.
Technical Assistance
Technical assistance was the most diverse form of aid given
by Japan, and the administrative arrangements for the development and
management of policy were extremely complex. Chart 5-1 shows all
flows of technical assistance emanating from JICA, which was controlled
by the MFA in conjunction with the MAF, MITI and the MOF. These flows
included the movement of equipment, Japanese advisers and specialists,
Japan's intake of developing country trainees and the conducting of
feasibility surveys, often through Japanese and overseas consultant
34engineering firms.
For many years the DAC criticised Japanese technical aid
35efforts which, by comparison with other large donors, were meagre.
The performance gap was long recognised by Japanese officials but 
intractable problems of policy-making and implementation prevented real 
improvement. We saw how, for example, in response to the Advisory 
Council 1971 report on technical cooperation, some smaller programs 
were upgraded but the main components of aid policy were left much as 
before. Technical assistance, being another form of grant aid, was 
subject to Budget Bureau influence regarding the annual allocation, which 
was one reason for the poor showing of Japan in technical assistance.
Weak coordination, however, prolonged the struggle of sections of the
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technical aid administration to expand their programs.
Four ministries were involved in technical aid policy-making. 
The MFA's Economic Cooperation Bureau contained three divisions which 
carried the bulk of technical aid management, while MITI and the MAF 
had specialised technical aid divisions or desks. The MOF participated 
in its budgeting capacity but the EPA and the MOF International Finance 
Bureau had no jurisdiction. The system was of a different character to 
those we encountered in other areas of Japan's aid, not simply because 
the participants were different, but because here the ministries did 
not in principle implement policy as well as make it. JICA performed 
that function. While no permanent grouping of ministries existed to 
supervise technical aid, however, the dependence of JICA on the 
specialist ministries for staff to man its technical aid programs, 
threw much policy implementation onto the policy-making machinery. This, 
combined with different technical assistance programs carried out by a 
dozen or so government bodies, led to confusion and blocked effective 
coordination between the parts of the system.
The Economic Cooperation Bureau of the MFA boasted three 
technical cooperation divisions, relations between which made the 
management of JICA very unwieldy:
(a) The First Technical Cooperation Division handled technical 
assistance provided independently of projects, such as the 
despatch of individual experts in response to isolated 
requests. The burden of JICA supervision fell mainly to 
this Division, which also undertook technical aid planning.
(b) The Second Technical Cooperation Division was in charge of 
"project base" technical cooperation, or the supply of
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materials and personnel for technical aid to particular 
projects, especially training centres. The Second Division 
separated from the First in 1972 in response to increased 
budgets for technical assistance and the resulting pressure 
on the resources of the existing division. The demarcation 
made was not altogether successful, for it imposed a false 
barrier between roles which often overlapped. The break was, 
however, in keeping with the functional organisation of the 
bureau.37
(c) The Development Cooperation Division was established in 1975 
to assist the coordination of official and private technical 
cooperation, which specifically included the supervision of 
JICA development surveys.
The MFA divisions managed technical cooperation in all sectors 
except those relating to mining, industry and energy, which were under 
MITI's jurisdiction. The work of the Technical Cooperation Division of 
MITI's Economic Cooperation Department was divided into two main 
aspects, personnel and projects. The Division administered the 
training of developing country students, the despatch of specialists 
from Japan and the organisation of training centres in recipient 
countries. Project assistance involved the planning and surveying of 
potential development projects by the Mining and Industry Departments 
of JICA.
The MFA and MITI divisions stood aloof in technical 
cooperation, for there was little overlap of formal authority. The 
MFA presumed that it was dominant and some officials tended, rather 
unrealistically, to regard MITI as a subordinate appendage with little
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power over JICA. They saw no need for discussions with MITI about the
Agency. These attitudes were, however, products of a serious MFA
weakness - it could not provide any technical specialists of its own -
and reflected an aggressive defence of MFA authority in a policy area
where much informal influence rested not only with MITI, but also with
the MAF, Construction and other technically oriented ministries which
provided JICA with most of its specialist manpower. MFA attitudes
neglected the importance of mining and industry-related technical aid
to the Japanese program and the strong emphasis on the mining and
38industry portion of feasibility survey work.
The technical aid process supposedly began with a request for
assistance from the developing country government to the MFA through
the local Japanese Embassy, but requests were not necessarily inspired
by the LDC government, as later chapters will show. The stated policy
of the Japanese Government was a passive one, whereby aid could be
initiated only by a request but, as Cunningham shows, for Western donors
the balance of the active and reactive in a government's aid role could
39vary between donors and between parts of a donor administration.
While the Japanese did recognise the value of an active approach to 
aid giving, their faithfully maintaining the appearance of non­
intervention in recipient policies towards aid, often had ridiculous 
40consequences. For the LDCs, however, the result could also be 
extremely serious. The overriding Japanese concern to avoid any stigma 
associated with being an active donor was overcome only when they relied 
on the vigour of non-official participants in aid relations to 
compensate for opportunities lost through official caution. This 
encouraged the proliferation of technical missions which the LDC neither 
wanted nor could control - in the words of one official, "survey
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pollution" (chosa kogai).
Once a request was received by the MFA, a decision had to be 
made on whether to go ahead with the proposal. Several factors entered 
here, for while the MFA had the right to refuse, it often consulted 
with JICA and with other ministries on details. The extent of 
consultation was up to the MFA to determine. In principle it did not 
pass on information about every request to other ministries or even to 
JICA, to prevent unnecessary interference (especially by MITI), but 
the informal communications network operating through ministry 
representatives in overseas embassies or JICA offices ensured flows of 
information outside MFA channels. As one MITI official put it, "We 
would find out in any case, so there's no point in the MFA refusing a 
request without consulting us".
As the MFA had no monopoly on information, so its capacity
for technical appraisal was limited and it depended on MITI to assess
proposals in mining and industry sectors. MFA authority was exerted
over broader policy and political issues. Unacceptable requests were
usually obvious, particularly those which lacked sufficient detail or
those which would clearly breach Japanese policy if accepted, such as
41requests by South Korea for assistance with nuclear technology. On 
mining and industry requests, MITI decided whether to approve the aid 
or not, and the MFA could not force MITI to support a proposal which it 
considered impracticable or undesirable. There was, in a real sense, 
an informal balance of interests between the ministries, despite the 
nominal supremacy of the MFA in policy planning and JICA supervision.
The acceptance of requests did not necessarily imply the 
approval of aid requested although, except in the case of large and
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complex requests, it did suggest tacit commitment. Proposals had to be 
checked against the availability of funds and of personnel, and against 
the JICA budget limits which were fairly restricted. There also had to 
be an indication of whether or not specialists and/or equipment could 
be allocated. As with grant aid, the scope of Japan's technical 
assistance was defined mainly by the budget. Quantity was naturally 
affected, although this depended a great deal on the nature of ministry 
budget requests and on their appraisal by the MOF. On the other hand, 
regional distribution was more directly influenced by decisions made in 
the MFA and MITI, often as a result of exchanges with regional divisions 
but nevertheless still as a part of preparations for budget requests.
Certainly budget allocation was necessary in principle for 
the implementation of aid proposals, although budgets were not decided 
for each individually (in contrast to capital grants) but rather for 
total numbers of types of specialists or quantities of materials. There 
was considerable flexibility within the JICA budget and much discretion 
left with the MFA and MITI in the division of the total budget allocation 
into specific projects selected from the backlog of aid requests. Firm 
decisions about the actual aid to be undertaken during the financial year 
were made between December and March, using as a guide the list of 
possible projects on which the budget was requested. At that stage some 
exchange took place between the technical cooperation divisions and the 
Policy Division of the Economic Cooperation Bureau and between regional 
bureaus of the MFA. There were also unofficial approaches made to 
other ministries about the use of technical personnel for chosen 
projects.
While the budget was a strong constraint on decisions affecting 
the content of policy, other structural problems were more immediate,
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notably those relating to the supply of qualified personnel. This was
commonly cited as the chief barrier to improved technical cooperation,
42both by officials and by other observers. The system was based on 
applications from JICA to specialist ministries for personnel to be 
drawn from their own staff or from the pool in subsidiary organisations. 
Likewise, JICA asked ministries whether they could accept overseas 
trainees in their training programs. It was an ad hoc and unsystematic 
arrangement which could not ensure the long-term provision of adequate 
and suitable personnel.
Technical assistance policy depended on short-term factors and 
on the extent of cooperation between ministries for the use of staff.
No forward planning capacity was evident in the technical aid 
administration, since no division had sufficient control of resources 
to effect rationalisation beyond the single-year budget, although yearly 
plans for the regional and country distribution of technical assistance 
were drawn up to prepare budget requests (see Chapter 6). JICA was a 
large and composite agency whose scope for action independent of the 
ministries was extremely narrow. The compulsory discussions between 
ministries in relation to JICA became continual arguments on 
jurisdiction and led to hesitancy about coordinating at a very early 
stage in the assessment of requests, and about translating these into 
budget allocation.
Government Bilateral Loans
Yen loans were the core of Japanese foreign aid policy. They 
gave impetus to official aid for through them Japan was tied politically 
and commercially to the world's developing nations. It was out of 
political and commercial considerations that Japan assessed and acceded
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to requests for loans, for they were an essential element of the
43country's foreign and economic policies.
For this reason we shall deal only briefly with loans in this 
chapter. The roots of policy for this kind of aid did not lie in the 
budgeting process or in the inadequacies of the administrative system, 
but in the broad reaches of Japan's relations with the developing 
countries. Loans were not merely a problem for governments; they 
attracted the attention (and the finances) of Japan's leading private 
enterprises. Aid projects financed by loans were very much business 
ventures.
Government loans were given at better than commercial terms
and were aimed at assisting economic growth and welfare in the
developing countries by supplementing the domestic resources of LDCs.
The purpose of the loan varied according to the current level of
economic development, but on the whole it was economic and social
infrastructure projects which were financed. Commodity loans were 
44also given.
Loan procedures differed from those for grants, because there 
existed government implementing agencies (the OECF and the Eximbank) and 
a four-ministry committee to make decisions on loans policy. The 
standard pattern of request-assessment-decision-implementation was 
followed, but the stakes were higher than for grants, the participants 
different and the problems more diverse. No one ministry was pre-eminent 
and no one policy position predominated. Equal partnership came closest 
to realisation although policy was very much the sum of project-by-project
decisions.
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In loans, as in grants and technical assistance, requests
were, in principle, the first stage of the bureaucratic round.
Chapters 7 and 8 describe, however, how requests and project proposals
came towards the end of tangled and informal lobbying, the product of
ongoing bilateral relations. Procedures were inviolable nonetheless and
rules had at least to be seen to be satisfied, so a government-to-government
application was necessary. This applied even to political level aid
discussions, for requests often emerged from Prime Ministerial and other
contacts between Japan and the developing nations. These approaches
were always expected by the Japanese, but the Government required that
proposals should still be sent through official channels before the
45project could be properly assessed and approved.
46Requests (except those involving a donor's consortium) were
presented in the first instance to the Japanese Embassy in the potential
recipient country. Officers there studied the proposal, although as part
of their duties they were expected to have made prior representations to
the recipient government to outline Japanese policy. It was seen as
important to make it clear to LDC governments that the following ODA
loan proposals were unacceptable: those related to military activities
and provisioning, or to housing, education, research, shipping, aircraft
or consumer goods. Embassy officers were careful to give no
undertakings on behalf of the Japanese Government and their contribution
was restricted to forward intelligence and advisory functions.
47Decisions were the prerogative of the ministries at home.
Proposals were then forwarded to the MFA in Tokyo, where the 
Government had firstly to decide whether to accept the proposal, a 
decision based on MFA policy and on the result of inter-ministry 
discussions. There was scope for initial MFA rejection after informal
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contact with other ministries, but this was usually for reasons relating 
to general acceptability and such refusals were clear cut.
The MFA drew up its own policy on the actual project, in 
preparation for the four-ministry conference which the Economic 
Cooperation Bureau's First Economic Cooperation Division convened and 
chaired. In this respect, the Division was the nub of loans policy­
making, although its institutional position was not always matched by 
its influence. Development of MFA policy lay formally in the hands of 
this Division, but was restricted by the attitudes of regional bureaus 
and, to a lesser extent, the Economic Cooperation Bureau Policy 
Division. Likewise, the Treaties Bureau was consulted in the 
consideration of proposed loan agreements. In any loans situation, the 
political and diplomatic implications were always closely watched by 
officials. Regional bureau interests were therefore implicated, 
although more so in the case of leading loan recipients. The bureaus' 
resources did not allow them to survey the aid relationships with all 
the countries for which they had responsibility.
Doubts about the advisability of refusal v/ere resolved in 
inter-ministry discussions. The MFA First Economic Cooperation Division 
circulated to the MOF (Overseas Public Investment Division), MITI
(Economic Cooperation Division) and the EPA (First Economic Cooperation
48Division) details of the request and, if it had already undergone 
feasibility studies, the results of these. Inter-ministry committee 
meetings were held initially at deputy division director level and, if 
necessary, at division director level. About one third of cases were 
approved by the division directors after desk officer meetings had been 
held. Most others required a conference of division directors and 
sanction by more senior officers. Only a very few proposals, for large
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and important projects or for aid to recipient countries with which
49Japan had a special or sensitive relationship, demanded meetings of 
bureau directors. Division directors, therefore, were the officers 
with the strongest and most direct power over loan decisions.
At the first meeting the MFA representatives offered a 
position paper, outlining the request and its background and setting 
out the suggested amounts, terms and conditions of the loan. They 
presented arguments on the technical aspects of the proposed project 
and on the economic and political implications of the request. While 
early responses from other ministries, especially the MOF, were 
guarded, each had an opportunity to put its point of view at these 
early meetings. There were few surprises, however, for ministries had 
ample time to prepare their cases, particularly if feasibility studies 
were already completed. Prior informal talks between responsible desk 
officers ensured predictability in negotiations but agreement was never 
guaranteed.
All ministries weighed requests in terms of their own 
priorities but there were three common to all:
(a) Suitability of the requesting country as a recipient, which 
involved analysis of its level of economic development and 
of its present and future political and trade relations with 
Japan. Judgements were made on its development potential 
(based on per capita income), its regional influence, the 
extent of diplomatic (treaties, degree of cooperation in 
international bodies) and emigration ties with Japan, its 
importance as a source of raw materials and as a market and on
the state of its trade balance, international payments and
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debt burden.5^
(b) Appropriateness of the particular project, which required 
consideration of the extent to which the request fitted the 
loan conditions of the various agencies, its priority in 
LDC development plans, the contribution which Japanese 
assistance could make to the project and to general relations 
with the country, and of the prospects for the project's 
proper completion.
(c) Project details: feasibility report, project content, cost,
plans for materials' procurement, etc. were at issue and 
were not determined until after the feasibility study was 
finished.
The MOF point of view was a telling factor in policy towards 
a request. This was because both the MOF International Finance Bureau 
and Budget Bureau helped prepare the MOF position and the often 
favourable attitude of the former could be restrained by the fiscal 
worries of the latter. The International Finance Bureau's Overseas 
Public Investment Division was the official channel to the Budget 
Bureau, which studied carefully the financial conditions of the loan, 
such as quantity, terms, repayment period, Japan's balance of payments 
and currency reserves and the future impact of the loan on OECF 
budgets. It was possible for the MFA to make informal representations 
directly to the Budget Bureau, although the International Finance 
Bureau did not look kindly on being bypassed. As it was placed between 
the opposite poles of the MFA and the Budget Bureau, its mediation was 
easily undermined by unofficial negotiations. The "constructive 
competition" between ministries (one official's phrase), was easily
jeopardised.
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The OECF was also involved at an informal level. Its officers 
attended initial desk officer meetings as observers, but were not 
present at higher discussions. Their opinions about the technicalities 
of projects and requests were frank and forthcoming, but did not 
extend to advice about types of projects or recipients. These were 
policy questions outside an implementing agency's brief but, informally, 
officers of the Fund and the ministries mixed easily at a professional 
and social level, especially because many senior Fund personnel were 
originally from the ministries. Continual changes in ministry aid 
division staffs also gave OECF officers the edge in experience and 
judgement on projects or on details of loans policy.
Requests needing feasibility studies were re-routed to
technical assistance divisions for incorporation in their priority
lists, if considered appropriate. While Chapter 8 will detail the
important place of surveys in the aid process, it is necessary to point
out here that a decision to go ahead with a project loan was contingent
on completion of a feasibility study and on LDC government approval of
the feasibility report. Only on highly political requests could a
51loan be committed before a feasibility study was made.
Once ministerial agreement was reached, the MFA began 
talks with the recipient government, leading up to an official exchange 
of notes, which signified a Japanese Government commitment. The 
Japanese note was drafted in the F*> st Economic Cooperation Division, 
checked in the Treaties Bureau and shown to other ministries. 
Negotiations were undertaken in the recipient country by the Japanese 
Embassy. Cabinet approval of the exchange of notes followed, after 
which a loan agreement was concluded between the recipient government 
and the OECF. Payment of the loan was carried out in accordance with
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the provisions of the agreement.
The contribution of all ministries to decisions meant that
bureaucratic initiative in loans policy was restricted. Responsibility
rested with a committee, not with any one division. Loans policy was
hard to quantify, built up on a case-by-case basis. There was no
planning for loans policy as occurred, in a minor way, for grants or
for technical assistance, except in that ODA disbursement targets
required certain levels of commitment and implementation. Guidelines
were very broad, even amorphous, and loans performance was hampered by
delays at project sites, cost overrun and by the capacity of the OECF
53to implement efficiently. The officials, as later chapters will 
show, only came in towards the end of a long series of steps to begin 
a loan project, and their decisions were swayed by their own perceptions 
of the proposed project. Even at this point there was little consensus 
between ministries, for each had its own interests to guard and 
objectives to pursue.
Conclusion: Aid Policy Coordination
Aid policy was piecemeal. Procedures plainly worked against 
the development of consistent and mutually reinforcing policy for the 
different kinds of aid. Each had its own group of officials and, more 
significantly, its own schedule and momentum, but the directions of 
loans, grants and technical aid were not necessarily in harmony, for 
there was no means of consciously producing policy acceptable to all 
officials.
Policy revolved around jurisdiction and coordination, 
although each separate aid process was subject to those problems to
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varying degrees. Multilateral assistance was divided by jealousies 
and conflicts within and between ministries and the size of flows was 
determined in the budget context. Simple administrative patterns, 
reinforced by a widespread disinterest in grants as a policy option, 
isolated grants from conflicts concerning authority and grant 
administrators depended on budgeting for coordination. There still 
remained, however, the dilemma, posed for grants by its minor 
administrative and policy standing, of how it could expand in an aid 
program dominated by bilateral loans.
In areas where policy-makers were distinct from policy- 
implementers - loans and technical assistance - arguments about 
responsibility and the best policy course were loudest. This was 
because, in aid policy, the fate of aid contributions and the success 
of implementation affected the size, quality and direction of future 
aid flows. Aid policy did not end with payment; in one sense, it was 
only beginning at that point. Where implementation was removed from 
the direct control of ministries, problems of jurisdiction were 
heightened as officials competed to achieve as great an influence as 
possible over the original decisions. Technical aid policy was rife 
with issues of competence, and loans policy-making was structured on 
the premise that differences between ministries could not be resolved.
Coordination was not placed above other ministry priorities. 
Emphasis on procedures concentrated attention on the separate stages of 
the policy process and on participants, but not on goals. Officials 
relied heavily on budgeting to draw elements of aid policy together, 
although Chapter 6 will demonstrate that this was not effective. Even 
aid subject to attempts at planning, such as technical aid, could not 
be extracted from the short-sighted constraints of budgeting. Loans
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policy, which aimed at quantity rather than content, was isolated from 
coordination with other forms of aid.
The nature of aid policy as one encroaching on significant 
areas of government - tariffs, trade, industrial structure, for 
example - and, in Japan, a policy with no fixed bureaucratic "home" 
and no steady political support, meant that fundamental changes in aid 
policy depended on the extent to which coordination could be effected
(a) between aid and other national policies;
(b) between the kinds of aid to a particular country; and
(c) between different parts of the entire aid program.
This coordination could not come easily, nor quickly, for in all of
these categories there was a prior need for a government statement of 
objectives in aid policy, some set of principles to underpin ministry 
programs.
(a) Initially, an attempt had to be made to rationalise the 
relations between aid and other national policies, not to supplant 
them but to find an appropriate marriage of the policy interests of 
the main ministries. Accommodation between ministries, however, was 
premissed on consistency within ministries and we saw how difficult 
this proved. Coordination at the national level required some 
compromise between the positions of the MFA, the MOF and MITI, but 
here the MFA was at a disadvantage, for it had no domestic power base, 
was unskilled at domestic bureaucratic infighting and had few weapons 
to use in budget negotiations.
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(b) If high level political support were not forthcoming,
did a "softer" form of coordination take place lower down in the
bureaucracy, to assist aid policies towards individual countries?
Coordination, in the words of Heclo and Wildavsky, was "knowing what
other people ... are saying and doing ... fostered by a functional
redundancy, as it were, of overlapping, criss-crossing and repetitive
54channels of communication". Precise information about countries, 
projects and possibilities was vital if aid requests were to be assessed 
quickly and objectively, but most officials admitted that, while there 
was much constructive informal contact between aid officials throughout 
government (especially because of the frequency of the informal meeting 
in daily work patterns), there was insufficient exchange of substantive 
information about each other’s ideas and tasks. Survey reports, for 
example, were not circulated widely enough to prevent feasibility 
studies being duplicated and policy decisions about requests being 
delayed. The extent to which policy-making for any form of aid was 
monopolised by one ministry determined the access other ministries had 
to information. Furthermore, distinctions between the aid needs of 
small and large recipients were blurred. The inflexibility of 
procedures (and the absence of aid specialists) hindered officials in 
creating programs suitable for minor recipients and in establishing new 
directions for policy, by forcing the aid program as a whole to follow 
standards laid down for major recipients. This will be explored further 
in Chapters 7 and 8.
(c) Coordination between different types of aid was based on 
(i) general policy priorities,
(ii) the patterns of aid to large recipients, and
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(iii) the extent to which bureaucratic controls (budgets, 
inter-ministry committees etc.) offset the rigidity 
imposed by the spread of functions.
Such measures had not worked well in the past and budgeting was often 
harmful in prolonging decisions between ministries when aid budgets 
were involved, and building into the system - by allowing incrementally 
increasing aid budgets - barriers to the matching of ministry functions 
(as the next chapter will demonstrate). Budget requests could only be 
harmonised if the administration were centralised to some degree. Calls 
for the creation of a central aid agency became fewer, however, and 
while inter-ministerial committees were used, they tended to ensure 
representation of ministry views in the formulation of loans policy 
rather than to assimilate diverse ministry programs. High level 
committees certainly did not prevent loans policy being made on other 
than an ad hoc basis, achieving the lowest common denominator of
agreement.
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CHAPTER 6
BUDGETING FOR FOREIGN AID
In its 1969 Aid Review, the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) pointed to some of the important policy issues facing developed
countries which gave aid to the developing nations. It recognised that
aid agencies continued to work under severe constraints, including
(a) the lack of systematic long-term planning of programs, (b) the
battle for adequate and sustained budgetary appropriations, and (c) the
need to accept political realities in aid policy-making. The DAC
report also emphasised that recognition of the long-term character of
development assistance had to be translated into suitable arrangements
for the financing, planning and administration of assistance programs.
In particular, aid had to be protected from short-term economic and
budgetary difficulties by the use of budgetary planning for aid 
1programs.
These constraints meant that annual budgeting was a feature
of aid policy-making in most donor countries. All DAC members set aside
yearly a portion of their central government's budget for development
assistance, the share of these allocations within the total budget
ranging from less than 1 percent to over 3 percent. Most Western
donors provided nearly all of their aid in this way, but some lessened
their reliance on budgetary funds by using other sources. Likewise,
there were procedures which affected the flexibility of appropriations,
althoughfcommonly, specified disbursements were voted yearly. In many
countries there existed provisions for the carry-over of unspent funds,
for forward budgeting in the form of advance commitments which could be
2charged to future budgets, or for indicative medium-term plans. These 
practices were usually the result of several conditions, including
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tradition and the significance of aid in government policies.
"Expenditure is policy; policy is expenditure", Heclo and 
3Wildavsky tell us. The power of the purse over policy was entrenched
in Japan and, as Campbell explained in his study of Japanese budgeting,
"the budgetary mode of decision-making occupied more 'space' in the
total government decision-making system in Japan than is true in the 
4United States". In other words, more policy decisions were left to 
"budgeters". This was encouraged, Campbell held, by systemic factors, 
including political stability and the tendency for the rules of
5budgetary compilation to substitute for the rules of decision-making. 
Previous chapters of this thesis described the uneasy relationship which 
existed between aid and the national government in Japan, the active 
participation of the MOF in the aid administration and the influence of 
annual budgeting on sections of the Japanese aid program. While many 
aspects of foreign aid in Japan were intimately related to expenditure 
and budget compilation, this chapter will show that aid policy-making 
was not entirely dependent on MOF budget officials. Budgeting affected 
aid policy but did not determine it.
Aid Flows and the Budget
Government finances provided over half of total Japanese aid 
(see Table 6-1), and the authorisation of expenditure took place when 
the Diet passed the Government Budget bill in March each year for the 
financial year which began on 1 April.^ The voting of funds represented 
official legislative control of both the volume of expenditure and its 
timing, for any carry-over of moneys needed Diet sanction. The 
legislative power, however, did not extend to all government aid and, 
in practice, the passiveness of the Diet in budgeting meant that
190
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de facto authorisation occurred during the actual preparation of the 
budget some months before.
Aid was voted through different budget sections (see Chart 
6-1 and, for 1965-75 figures, Table 6-3). Bilateral and multilateral 
grants and government capital subscriptions to the Overseas Economic 
Cooperation Fund (OECF) were all defrayed from the General Account 
(ippan kaikei). They were listed under the "Economic Cooperation" 
subsection of the General Account in the MOF's compilation. The Export- 
Import Bank (Eximbank) received capital from the Industrial Investment 
Special Account. Both the OECF and the Bank were able to borrow from
7the Trust Fund up to limits specified in the budget each year. While 
the single-year budgeting principle (budgets had to be spent within the 
one fiscal year) was a firm tradition of the MOF, some aid categories 
were provided for by allocation to special accounts for disbursement 
over several years. Reparations were transferred from the "Economic 
Cooperation" subsection to the Special Account for Reparations and other 
Special Foreign Obligations (Baisho nado tokushu saimu shori tokubetsu 
kaikei), while bonds for subscriptions to multilateral financial 
institutions were managed through the National Debt Consolidation Fund 
Special Account (Kokusai seiri kikin tokubetsu kaikei). Both these
Q
accounts allowed multi-year disbursement. There were also provisions
for the carry-over of some unspent funds which, in the case of capital
9grants, was often a considerable proportion of the year's allocation.
The Industrial Investment Special Account and the Trust Fund 
were part of the annual Investment and Loan Program which was compiled 
by the Financial Bureau of the MOF. As Tables 6-2 and especially 6-3 
show, the proportion of the official economic cooperation budget which 
was derived from the Investment and Loan Program and from the General
1 9 2 .
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Account was evenly balanced over the period 1965-75 at approximately 
3:1, since increased capital for the OECF from the Trust Fund was 
offset by a fall in outlays to the Eximbank from the Industrial 
Investment Special Account. This reflected an enlarged responsibility 
for the OECF in government loan operations and, at the same time, an 
increased percentage of total aid given as bilateral loans. 
Correspondingly, the share of official funds devoted to capital grants 
declined as reparations tapered off. The continued balance also 
represented a desire by the MOF to ensure that the drain on the General 
Account budget caused by economic cooperation did not increase in 
proportion to Japan's expanding aid effort. Over the ten-year period, 
the use of loans from the Trust Fund rose in gross terms (Table 6-2) 
and as a percentage of the total aid budget (Table 6-3), by more than 
General Account subscriptions to the OECF.^ This policy was also 
applied to the Eximbank, the Industrial Investment Special Account 
capital of which was itself originally transferred from the General 
Account. Over the period 1965-74, loans from the Trust Fund to both 
agencies rose nearly sevenfold (6.82 times), higher than increases in 
the total General Account, and the Trust Fund was favoured in each half 
of that decade. Industrial Investment Special Account disbursements 
only just doubled (2.07) over the period (Table 6-4).
The low political priority of foreign aid (compared with other 
budget categories) encouraged the MOF to soften the expanding aid 
program's impact on the General Account by shifting the burden of 
financing bilateral loans onto the Trust Fund. This in itself was 
politically important, because the annual Investment and Loan Program 
(of which the Trust Fund was the main component) was not subject to 
Diet approval. Table 6-5 shows the shares of the General Account held
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by main policy categories, and their annual growth.11 It is evident
from the table that "Trade Promotion and Economic Cooperation" was a
very small percentage of the General Account when compared with other
categories, although over the ten-year period 1965-74 it rose from 0.4
percent to 1.0 percent. Growth was not steady, however, and since 1969,
when "Economic Cooperation and Trade Promotion" reached a high of 1.2
percent, its share declined regularly to the point where it was only
120.74 percent in 1977. Indeed, between 1965 and 1969 it grew by 640.3 
percent, but dropped to 73.8 percent between 1969 and 1974. The 
declining share of economic cooperation in the General Account contrasted 
with the increasing share of social security expenditures over the 
period, a stable proportion for education and a high, but slightly 
falling, allocation to public works. It was clear, therefore, that 
foreign aid in that period was losing in the competition for public 
funds.11
The economic cooperation budget grew after 1965 in a way
completely different from the total General Account. The annual
increase of the economic cooperation vote was erratic, compared to the
increase in the General Account and in its other categories. This
suggested that the weak domestic impact of economic cooperation weighed
heavily on MOF thinking, and that problems such as the balance of
payments and foreign exchange reserves influenced economic cooperation
more directly than they did other areas of the budget. Certainly these
factors were prominent in reviewing particular aid relationships and
accordingly came into play in budget compilation. Successive government
14budget explanations always emphasised them, but the politics of
budgeting for aid took officials well beyond the rational assessment of
15the main economic indicators, as Harrell pointed out.
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TABLE 6-4
INCREASES IN BUDGET CATEGORIES FOR OFFICIAL FLOWS, 1965-1974
(fiscal year)
1969-1965 1974-1970 1974-1965
1. Bilateral Grants: 1.70 1.57 2.63
Grants 2.70 1.57 4.00
Technical assistance 2.85 2.76 9.46
Reparations 0.74 0.86 0.57
Food aid - 0.92 1.83
2. Multilateral:
Grants 1.61 3.16 6.07
Subscriptions 3.46 1.96 7.90
3. Bilateral Loans: OECF 22.40 2.24 65.00
Eximbank 2.19 0.79 2.07
4. Total 2.45 1.48 4.15
5. Trust Fund: OECF 27.60 2.48 77.00
Eximbank 3.07 2.03 6.06
6. Grand Total 2.96 1.85 5.71
(General Account Total) 2.66 1.92 5.67
(Trust Fund Total) 3.33 2.08 6.82
Source: Same as for Table 6-2.
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The growth of the economic cooperation budget was affected by 
its size within the total budget. Economic cooperation as a category 
was always a minimal part of the General Account and increases in the 
late 1960s did not influence the broader dimensions of the budget, 
although MOF officials were ever cautious about the possibility of 
rapidly expanded aid. Japan became a large aid donor while herself 
striving to achieve high economic growth and improved standards of 
living, which demanded priority in the budget. Even as these pressures 
eased towards the end of the 1960s, however, there was no steady 
increase in total aid budgets and certainly no improvement in aid's 
policy standing represented by its share of the General Account.
Because of the close links between budgeting and the continuing 
implementation of aid, growth in aid budgets was tied to growth in some 
individual programs. This was the case in the late 1960s, for example, 
when aid budgets expanded quickly. The 1966 Budget included a new item 
for subscription to the Asian Development Bank and enlarged funds for 
the OECF. In 1967, there were new outlays for technical aid and in 
1969, food aid, capital grants and increased OECF subscriptions more 
than doubled the economic cooperation budget. In the seventies, however, 
the large fluctuations in the economic cooperation budget flattened out 
and increases were derived mainly, but not entirely, from incremental 
additions to the majority of budget items and from across-the-board rises 
in ministry shares. Aid allocations from the General Account were in 
1976 divided among fourteen ministries and agencies, each of which made 
its own budget request and disbursed those funds, although some of the 
MFA and MITI budgets were passed on to JICA, and some MOF requests (such 
as reparations) were actually managed by the MFA. Table 6-6 shows those 
ministries which received the largest aid budgets between 1965 and 1975.
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The table reveals no obvious pattern in the annual percentage increases 
for the three main recipient ministries (the MFA, the MOF and MITI), 
because of the irregular rise and fall of allocations to large programs. 
The Asian Development Bank subscription swelled the MOF budget in 1966 
as did food aid in 1968, the MFA received a substantial initial amount 
for capital grants in 1969 and the MITI budget was boosted by assistance 
for LDC market development in 1971.
While growth was uneven, the balance between ministries was 
maintained, especially after 1970 as shares stabilised and share changes 
were regularised. With new ministries beginning aid programs in the 
seventies, shares diverged and the monopoly of the MFA, the MOF and 
MITI began to weaken. The most apparent change was between the MFA 
and the MOF, with much larger annual increases in the former's budget, 
principally because of dwindling reparations payments which had always 
been attached to the MOF budget. While expenditure by the MFA was 
consolidated, however, the total aid budget was spread further across 
other ministries, whose programs grew steadily, although from a small 
base. This represented both a strength and a weakness for the MOF: 
with more participants needing year-round attention, its coordinating 
and organising of the aid effort were bolstered, but its influence on 
decisions affecting aid commitment was dissipated.
Budget Requests
The power of the Budget Bureau was exercised not only in the 
one-to-one (Budget Bureau-ministry) relationship of the budget request 
but also in a pattern occurring throughout the year, which reached a 
peak at budget compilation as the extent of aid disbursement in the 
fiscal year became apparent. The MOF, including its Budget Bureau, was
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involved in constant monitoring of commitments of loans and grants and 
of the disbursement of grants. Budget requests for bilateral capital 
grants were for a fixed amount expected to be committed in the following 
financial year, whereas requests for multilateral grants and technical 
assistance (for JICA) included expected disbursements plus an allowance 
for further commitments. Requests for loan moneys (for the OECF and 
the Eximbank) were for anticipated disbursements (the MOF having 
previously assented to Government loan commitments formalised in an 
official exchange of notes) and for small amounts for prospective 
commitments. Through the compiling of the budget in September-December 
each year, the scope for the MOF to affect aid commitments was limited 
mainly to capital grants, and its ability to influence the committal of 
loans was exercised chiefly in the ongoing four-ministry loans committee.
Ministry aid budgeting followed the usual budget timetable. The 
Japanese fiscal year runs from 1 April each year to 31 March of the 
following calendar year, and ministries began formulating the next year's 
requests soon after the fiscal year commenced. During the summer, 
ministries developed new policies requiring budget allocation and bureau 
and divisional requests were arranged as the official ministry application 
This was presented to the MOF by the end of August, normally after brief 
discussions with divisions of the Liberal Democratic Party's Policy 
Affairs Research Council (PARC).
In September there were ministry explanations (setsumei) of 
requests to the Budget Bureau, which in turn compiled draft allocations 
for each ministry over October and November. In December, the MOF 
Budget Conference ratified the Draft Budget, which was released about 
mid-December. This was followed by a week or so of "appeals (or 
revival) negotiations" between ministries, the LDP and the MOF - the
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final step in budget discussions. Cabinet then approved the Draft 
Budget, which was sent to the Diet as the "Government Draft".
Preparation of budget requests drew on the resources of all
16divisions associated with economic cooperation. In the case of the 
MFA, the Policy Division of the Economic Cooperation Bureau coordinated 
the demands of divisions within the budget limits laid down by the 
Ministry's Accounting Division and by the MOF. Negotiation was carried 
on in an atmosphere of earnest intent, the emphasis being on fairness 
and direct dealing, in a wider context of budgeting strategy. The rules 
were known, understood and obeyed; mutual trust and confidence led to 
a certain predictability in approach and response.
Early talks between ministries and the Budget Bureau took 
place in May-June, before Government policy on the budget requests was 
decided and before ministries had settled on their own priorities. This 
allowed both sides the benefit of prior calculation of needs and of the 
extent of flexibility in the eventual position each would take. The 
Budget Bureau could generally gauge the size of economic cooperation 
requests even at this initial stage, as a result of discussions at two 
levels.
On the one hand, official talks were held between the Bureau
and the Accounting Divisions of the respective ministries and, on the
other, between the Budget Bureau and its client economic cooperation
divisions, often in the course of routine implementation briefings.
The Economic Cooperation Bureau, for example, would frequently press
17for greater planning in aid budgeting. In May 1976, it put to the 
Budget Bureau a scheme premised on growth in Japanese ODA to a 
conservative level of 0.33 percent of GNP, a target set by the 1976
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Government Economic Plan, and on substantial improvements in the
18disbursement rate of Japanese aid committed. Its proposal involved 
an increase of the share of economic cooperation in the General Account 
of the Budget from 0.82 percent in 1977 to 0.97 percent in 1980, a 
demand which the Budget Bureau indicated it was not prepared to meet. 
"There are limits", said one Examiner, "to how far it can go".
This early manoeuvring, in which the MFA often tried to secure 
acceptance in principle of forward targeting for aid budgets, worked 
two ways, for the same documents could be drawn upon by both parties.
One example was a World Bank report cited as being too negative by the 
MFA in its 1976 paper on budget planning: the report projected Japanese
ODA as 0.18 percent of GNP by 1980, a figure which prompted a DAC 
response that Japan's 1980 ODA would be 0.36 percent of GNP. The MOF, 
however, regarded the World Bank analysis as "appropriate" and was 
careful to remind the MFA that the report implied slower-growing aid 
budgets.
Such arguments represented tactical positioning rather than
desperate Budget Bureau attempts to cut back on expected requests or
MFA moves to weaken the Budget Bureau stance. Both ministries knew
the content of the World Bank and DAC reports in question, and the
tenuous assumptions about future GNP growth on which each was based.
The effective budgeting tools were the compiling of the intra-ministry
19budget request and the preparation of MOF budget policy for the year.
Accounting Divisions could sense the ceilings within which the MOF
expected them to operate. While the 1977 Budget compilation policy was
not approved by Cabinet until 30 July 1976, when it imposed a limit on
201977 Budget requests of 115 percent of 1976 allocations, one ministry 
Accounting Division Director, in early July, already assumed that
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Budget Bureau attitudes and the prevailing economic climate gave little 
hope of more than the 115 percent imposed for the 1976 Budget. Of 
course, it was left to the discretion of this officer, the main budgeting 
official in ministries, to fit the various components of the ministry 
application into the request ceiling* The economic cooperation budget 
request, according to one Director, would obviously go above 115 percent 
but this could be balanced out within the total ministry figure.
Ministry requests originated in each division and in the 
implementing agencies but, as was pointed out in the previous chapter, 
the requests of different divisions depended on the aid they administered 
and the effect of the budget on its commitment and disbursement. The 
pressures of past budgets, ongoing policy and projects, and the interests 
of participants determined the size of the request from the division.
(a) The grant aid budget covered projects to be committed and 
budgeting itself was important in policy-making, in setting limits to 
new projects and policy directions. Since, however, both the MOF and 
the MFA each requested some grant aid, there had to be discussion 
between them. Food aid budgets were stable and the MFA took into 
account their impact on its own staff resources (for the MFA implemented 
food aid) while at the same time trying to increase its project grant 
aid allotment. The MFA had still to be sensitive to its capabilities, 
both in manpower and in the size of its budget. Thus grant aid to 
Mongolia of ¥5,000 million, which was originally proposed by an MFA 
regional bureau, was incorporated in the MOF budget request, not only 
because it was quasi-reparations but also because the Economic 
Cooperation Bureau feared that the large amount for this aid would 
upset the balance within the total MFA budget. This arrangement also
permitted the Second Economic Cooperation Division to claim the projects
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it originally desired, free from the imposition of that type of 
politically motivated policy item. According to officials of the 
Division, its budget was small enough without having to be defended 
against inroads by other MFA bureaus.
(b) The direct policy impact of the budget was strong also
for multilateral aid, although it affected United Nations aid more
than aid to international financial institutions, which was always
given multi-year disbursement in the MOF budget. Multilateral aid
brought in another bureau to MFA budgeting, the United Nations Bureau,
which requested and implemented United Nations assistance budgets.
Because of their size, large subscriptions to international agencies
21were often not finalised until late in the budget timetable.
(c) Technical cooperation budgets were designed mainly to
meet JICA needs, and here the MFA had to discuss its own requests with
divisions of other ministries. The JICA Law required consultation (kyogi)
22between MITI, the MAF, the MOF and the MFA concerning the JICA budget 
but, in fact, MITI and the MFA operated fairly independently. JICA 
drafted requests in June which were based on forecasts of the following 
year's disbursement by JICA agreed on in meetings between the relevant 
MFA/MITI/MAF divisions and corresponding JICA departments. The MFA 
Economic Cooperation Bureau's Policy Division had the power to express 
an opinion on the JICA budget, but mostly the responsible MFA division 
directed JICA. MITI and the MFA constructed plans for regional and 
country distribution of technical assistance and used these to prepare 
budget requests for technical aid programs. JICA was able to discuss 
with ministries the practicality of these plans and its view was 
respected, provided that Agency officials did not press too hard; MFA 
officers never hesitated to point out their officially subordinate
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Status.23
In respect of agricultural aid, the MFA had to consult with
the MAF, both directly (in the case of JICA loan funds) and indirectly
through the JICA agricultural cooperation departments (for ordinary
technical assistance). Since the MFA actually requested the agricultural
portion of the JICA budget (which was not so for the mining and industry
portion requested by MITI), the MFA was able to assert its influence
over agricultural development policy. It was careful, however, to
secure MAF agreement on budgets, for the MAF in the end provided the
main technical staff for agricultural projects and controlled the
agricultural departments of JICA. MAF officials emphasised that their
opinion predominated if problems arose about the content of requests,
and while they could be "direct and positive" in their approach, they
were not always effective in forcing adjustments since, ultimately, the
MFA made the request. Future cooperation demanded MAF support, however,
and the Economic Cooperation Bureau was mindful of its own political
weaknesses. On the other hand, it was ready to play off the MAF
against MITI in any three-cornered argument, which often developed about
24the size of the budget for JICA loan finance.
This haphazard and rather tense process of MFA-MAF
coordination was not followed for the JICA mining and industry-related
budget, almost all of which was derived from MITI commissioned funds
(itakuhi). It was requested independently of other ministries' aid
budgets by MITI's Economic Cooperation Department, after talks in mid-
to late June with the Economic Cooperation Bureau of the MFA on levels
of request. There was no exchange of details. The Technical
Cooperation Division of MITI drew up mining and industry technical
25cooperation policy and, after reviewing this with JICA, incorporated
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the amount in its own budget application.
Budget requests themselves were highly specific. Those for
feasibility studies to be undertaken by JICA departments, for example,
cited proposed projects by name, although these lists could be altered
once the budget was finalised, provided no increase in expenditure was
necessary. Likewise, intended project-base technical cooperation had
to be clearly designated, but budgets for trainees and specialists
26had only to indicate proposed numbers of persons.
The JICA request was then included in the technical cooperation
section of the Economic Cooperation Bureau's budget request, which
usually totalled about 130 percent of the previous year's allocation.
The First Technical Cooperation Division and Policy Division fitted it,
after amendments, into the Bureau budget, which received its first
test at meetings between the Accounting Division and Directors of
the Policy and General Affairs Divisions of the MFA bureaus in early
July. The Accounting Division next attempted to organise the requests
as the Ministry budget application. This, again, was a task involving
individual programs and expenditures weighed by directors whose
influence was, of course, as dependent on their own personality and
negotiating strength as on the intrinsic importance of their bureau's
budget. These adjustments were also shaped by Ministry budget policy
drawn up, in the case of the MFA in 1976, by the Director-General and
General Affairs Counsellor of the Minister's Secretariat and the
Accounting Division Director, and issued in mid-July. Economic
cooperation always featured in MFA budget policy because it occupied
about 47 percent of the whole Ministry budget. In contrast, aid was
only a minor element of MITI's expansive budgetary priorities. 27
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(d) Preparation of the budget for government loans involved
an altogether different set of participants, principally the OECF,
the Eximbank, the EPA and bureaus of the MOF. Similarities existed,
of course, and the relationship between the agencies and their
supervising ministries was close but by no means one-sided. Loan
budgets were given for moneys to be disbursed in the following year and
for some uncommitted disbursements (such as commodity aid); the actual
budget preparations were largely divorced from commitments (and
therefore from policy) in a way which grant aid was not. Loans
budgeting was not entirely confined to the ministries as with other aid,
mainly because funds for the OECF were not allocated to a ministry and
then to an implementing body - as the JICA appropriation was - but were
placed nominally in the MOF aid budget and drawn on directly by the 
28OECF. In formal terms, therefore, MITI and the MFA could not 
participate in loans budgeting. They were, however, members of the 
four-ministry committee which approved government loans commitments and 
affected levels of future disbursement and, consequently, budgetary 
allocation. They were also informally involved in low level discussions 
between junior ministry officers and OECF/Eximbank loans departments 
about individual projects and their effect on the budget.
The OECF presented its official request to the EPA, its 
supervising body, which passed it on to the MOF. The size of the 
request was based on: the results of early EPA discussions with the
MOF on budget possibilities and EPA advice to the OECF on a suitable 
request limit; the level of commitments on new projects and expected 
commitments; and, more importantly, the progress of disbursement to 
ongoing projects. This last was the main information on which the 
Budget Bureau assessed OECF requests, for substantial undisbursed funds
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implied blockages in implementing which new budgets would not remove. 
Indeed, only the OECF was really aware of its exact cash flow, and it 
provided a monthly statement to the MOF via the EPA in order to draw on 
General Revenue. Continuing loan commitments prevented the MOF, or even 
the EPA, from detailing the progress of disbursement.
Once the OECF and the EPA agreed on the request size, the 
OECF divided that sum into the amount to be drawn from General Account 
and the borrowing limit it wanted from the Trust Fund, ensuring that 
the cumulative balance of each remained in a ratio of 1:1. Requests 
were sent to the Budget Bureau and to the Financial Bureau respectively 
and the final balance was left to these two bureaus to settle, although 
disagreements were common. Conflict between the two about the 
proportion of amounts from General Account and the Trust Fund to be 
budgeted to the OECF appeared also in respect of the Eximbank budget.
The MOF was not one ministry, it seemed, but many.
Differences were not permanent, however, as relations between 
the Budget Bureau and the International Finance Bureau concerning the 
OECF budget allocation demonstrated. Before making a request, the 
OECF discussed with the International Finance Bureau's Overseas Public 
Investment Division the structure and size of the request and the 
condition of projects included in it. It did this to provide the 
Ministry, through its specialist division, with knowledge of the details 
of the application, and advice from the Division assisted the Budget 
Bureau when deciding on a final allocation. The International Finance 
Bureau thus advised both parties, acting as mediator. On occasions, 
however, the Division appeared to have a split, rather than an 
integrated personality, on the one hand advocating the OECF view to 
the Budget Bureau and, on the other, modifying the OECF request by
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arguments for restraint.
Before formal budget requests were made by the end of August, 
ministry submissions were discussed with appropriate committees of the 
LDP's PARC. These talks took place both before and after the official 
Ministry Budget Conference (yosan shogi) which ratified the request. 
Officers met with the Special Committee on Overseas Economic Cooperation 
and with the Foreign Affairs Committee (for the MFA), the Commerce 
and Industry Committee (for MITI), and so on. In the case of the MFA, 
briefings were officially undertaken through the General Affairs 
Division of the Minister's Secretariat, not through the Accounting 
Division, and were said to be general explanations which altered few 
items. The earlier talks, however, which bureau directors attended, 
were an opportunity for the Ministry to put its budget submission to 
the politicians, to seek their support and to allay complaints. As one 
former Accounting Division Director explained, it was necessary that 
Diet Members' support be assured, their wishes catered for but their 
zeal often restrained. This was revealing about the limits within which 
ministry officials had to work and about the intricate relationships 
built up between ministries and Diet Members.
The focal point for this budgetary politics was the Director
of the ministry's Accounting Division, and the last two holders of the
position in the MFA were officers with considerable experience in the
Economic Cooperation Bureau. Campbell likened finance officers to
their American counterparts, hard-working, sincere men, but cunning
and sensitive also, as Keclo and Wildavsky pointed out in relation to 
29Britain. The skill of the Principal Finance Officer there, they 
observed, lay in balancing internal demands with external conditions, 
understanding the market in budget politics. He had therefore to be
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something of the lion and the fox, to possess a double character. In
Japan, it was said, his skill was that of haragei, or "belly talk",
the politician's style of negotiation. It was his duty to know, despite
his formal isolation from the political process, what politicians
wanted and how far they could be manipulated or accommodated. While
relationships of trust were vital, these had to be interpreted in the
context of the demand for budgets. The finance officer had to act as
the "Budget Bureau" in his own ministry, and put his ministry's case
firmly enough to Diet Members to garner their support when required,
but not so strongly that the trust built up between him and the MOF 
30was jeopardised. The formal complexities of personal relations in 
Japan, however, meant that duty, obligation and honour had to be seen 
to be fulfilled, although in a policy area such as aid, the demands of 
politicians on ministry budget officers were less onerous than on 
officers dealing with domestic issues.
Request and Response
Requests for economic cooperation budgets were made 
independently by the ministries, to the Foreign Affairs-Economic 
Cooperation Desk of the MOF's Budget Bureau. Some of the ministries 
with small aid budgets requested directly to the Examiner responsible 
for their own ministry, whereupon the aid portion was re-routed to the 
Economic Cooperation Desk.
The request was compiled with the MOF directive on request 
limits in mind and a ministry Accounting Division chopped and changed 
bureau requests to fit the broad ministry budget. Table 6-7 reveals 
that total ministry requests for fiscal years 1975-77 kept very near 
the limits imposed by the MOF, but that their economic cooperation
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request usually exceeded them by a wide margin. This indicates not 
that economic cooperation budgets were excluded from these guidelines 
but rather that ministries, especially those with aid budgets which were 
a minor portion of the total ministry budget (such as the EPA and 
Ministries of Education, Welfare, Transport, Labour, and Construction), 
absorbed the increases in the overall request. In the MFA, where 
economic cooperation took about half of the Ministry budget, restraint 
in requests for other programs was strictly enforced. Furthermore, 
there was no regularity between the size of ministry aid requests, 
which reinforces the evidence that officers in charge of aid budgeting 
in the ministries did not communicate with each other about their 
requests, except in a perfunctory way where it was legally required.
The fluctuation in the amount requested by most ministries
was also an indication that single programs could determine the
eventual scale of that request, especially when a ministry had only
a few aid budget items. This is borne out by Table 6-8, which shows,
for fiscal years 1975 and 1976, the size of ministry requests and
allocations, and the increase in annual allocation in both bilateral
31and multilateral grants. It can be seen there that increases in 
economic cooperation requests varied greatly between ministries, 
although some levelling was apparent for 1976 in bilateral grants. 
Likewise, MOF response to requests (allocation/request) reflected their 
size, but there was no simple relationship between a large request and 
a proportionately small allocation. Substantial requests (such as 
those from the Welfare or Labour Ministries for 1975) brought different 
percentage allocations (77.5 percent to 56.8 percent respectively) and 
therefore increases of allocation in 1975 over 1974 diverged greatly 
(140.9 percent to 103.2 percent respectively). These phenomena were
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more apparent for multilateral grants because fixed, non-budgetary 
allocations (such as reparations or subscriptions to multilateral 
financial institutions) were either rising or falling, and Budget 
Bureau officials, although mindful of the need for restrained 
incremental growth, examined individual programs on their own merits. 
Increases or decreases approved were large enough to give rise to the 
patterns in Tables 6-7 and 6-8.
Tables 6-9 and 6-10 support this conclusion, for they 
demonstrate that when those items determined by non-budgetary factors 
were eliminated (by neglecting the MOF aid budget, which comprised 
reparations and contributions to international financing agencies) 
most allocations in 1975 and 1976 remained within the range 
representing incremental increase (100-129 percent of the previous 
year's allocation). A high proportion of items still lay outside this 
30 percent band, however. While the previous year's allocation was 
an important determinant of new allocations (although 20 multilateral 
grant items received no increase), the MOF scrutinised individual 
programs, both in the small and in the large aid budgets, and approved 
increases where warranted. The outcome of the tussle over programs is 
one indication of the seat of power in the aid bureaucracy, but adequate 
data is, unfortunately, not available to test correlations between 
requests, size of single programs, allocations and size of total 
ministry budget. The most that can be said on the evidence of Tables 
6-8 and 6-10 is that success in budget requests was variable and could 
not be a reliable measure of generalised power in aid policy. For 
example the MFA's relative success in 1975 (87.7 percent of request 
being approved and 29 of 100 items requested receiving an allocation of 
130 percent or more) was not matched in 1976 (88.9 percent approval but
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all other ministries (except one) increasing their approval rate, and 
only 15 items receiving 130 percent or more and 32 items in fact 
falling below 100 percent). Approval of MITI items showed a similar 
trend in the two years.
If the economic cooperation budget were subject to mostly 
incremental increases, despite irregularity in some programs, the MOF 
Budget Bureau probably considered ministry requests and explanations in 
much the same way as it did domestic budget programs. Most observers 
stated that the Budget Bureau was wary of the potential drain on 
budgetary reserves by aid budgets. The appeal by ministries for balance 
and fair treatment, their attempts to initiate planning, or reference 
by them to international aid trends and the dire implications of a 
stagnant foreign aid effort (perhaps the most common weapon in the 
aid officer's budget strategy), could be countered by an astute Budget 
Examiner. The expansionary effect of the built-in "contract" aspect 
of loans budgeting, for example, whereby advance commitments preceded 
budget allocation, was to some extent dampened by the implementation 
difficulties pointed to by the Budget Bureau. The same applied to 
requests for capital grants, the disbursement rate of which was 
normally low. The Budget Bureau's tendency to keep the discussion at 
the general level, avoiding details and individual projects (in 
loans at least), inhibited negotiation on policy and strengthened the 
Bureau's superiority in the broader issues of budgeting. Thus 
arguments against the OECF's request often concerned levels of 
disbursement and the proposed scope of new commitments and their 
fiscal impact. Ministry supplicants admitted, however, that the 
Budget Bureau recognised the need to increase aid budgets but only in 
balance with other categories. As ministry budget officials indicated,
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TABLE 6-9
ECONOMIC COOPERATION BUDGET FY1975 AND FY1976: 
ALLOCATION DIVIDED BY PREVIOUS YEAR'S ALLOCATION
Allocation/ 
Previous Year's 
Allocation (%)
FY 1975 FY 1976
Items % Items %
under 80 4 2.3 16 8.4
80 - 89 2 1.2 28 14.7
90 - 99 2 1.2 27 14.1
100 - 109 68 39.5 61 32.0
110 - 119 24 13.9 25 13.1
120 - 129 24 13.9 13 6.8
130 - 139 13 7.6 3 1.6
140 - 149 8 4.7 4 2.1
150 - 159 2 1.2 6 3.1
160 - 169 2 1.2 1 0.5
170 - 179 3 1.7 2 1.0
180 - 249 8 4.7 3 1.6
250 & over 12 6.9 2 1.0
Total 172 100.0 191 100.0
Notes: 1. Excludes reparations and contributions to multilateral
financial institutions (part of the MOF budget), but 
includes aid budget items for MFA, MITI, MAF, Education, 
EPA, Construction, Labour, Transport, Welfare, Justice and 
the Administrative Management Agency.
2. Budget requests were classified as headings, sub-headings, 
programs and sub-programs. Items counted included sub­
programs, programs without sub-programs, sub-headings 
without programs, etc., budgeted in 1974, 1975 and 1976 
and those budgeted in just 1975 and 1976, making 172 items 
in 1975 and 191 items in 1976.
Source: MFA budget documents.
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then, there were many MOF approaches to aid budget requests: balance,
the restrictions of broad ministry fiscal and budget policy and the
implications of those for individual expenditures, and especially the
skill of each Budget Examiner in understanding the nature of aid
32programs and their effect on the Budget.
The need for a Budget Examiner to be familiar with aid was
upset by the tendency for career officers (which the Examiner
(shukeikan) and his Investigators (shusa) always were) to move from
33post to post within the Ministry every two years or so. Other 
ministries complained that by the time an Investigator began to 
understand aid, he was due to be transferred. Their complaints were 
all the more pertinent because the Examiner and his staff exhibited the 
"double character" of ministry Finance Officers. It was the 
Investigators who had to argue for economic cooperation at the Budget 
Bureau Conference (kyokugi) on each ministry's budget in late October 
or early November. On the other hand, claimed the MOF, regular 
movement of officers imbued examining staff with the "amateur's eye" 
necessary for a common sense assessment of aid and, in a wider context, 
ensured that officers remained uncommitted to any one policy area.
Budget Bureau examinations were undertaken with the Examiners 
adopting a strict MOF approach to foreign aid. That approach was 
based above all on domestic considerations: the effects of aid policy
on the home economy and on the benefits accruing to the Japanese people, 
in other words the "cooperative" aspects of economic cooperation. For 
this reason, it was said that the people had to endorse aid giving, 
and that the MOF's self-appointed task was to ensure that aid was 
economically sound and was kept within the limits imposed by fiscal 
restraint. Not only should aid be justified in sound economic terms,
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but it had also to be used efficiently. This austere attitude was 
essentially no different from those standards applied to other public 
funds, but the diffuse aid administration allowed the MOF view to 
prevail when the "market in budget politics" might otherwise have 
prevented it.
Furthermore, this attitude was expressed strongly and 
frequently in inter-ministry negotiations throughout the year on budget 
implementation and on pending projects, and during extensive pre-budget 
informal discussions. Both ministries and the Budget Bureau agreed 
that the outlines of requests and opposing positions were well known 
before the requests were actually made. Constant communication fostered 
expectations of incremental change.
Despite the reasoned treatment of requests, the final 
meetings in the Budget Bureau to settle ministry allocations were, in 
the words of one Investigator, "a fight for the spoils" (bundori 
gassen). Investigators had to know their subject and how far they 
could push for a fair share within the whole budget. The Investigator 
therefore was one of the few individuals substantially to affect the 
size of the aid budget.
Mood Building
Success in achieving increased aid budgets was often dependent 
on the ministries' ability to build a climate within the Government 
favourable to aid. In this vein, for example, overseas criticism of 
Japan's aid effort had a telling effect on aid budgeting. A severely 
critical response at the DAC annual Examination of Japan in 1976 brought
newspaper calls for a thorough restructuring of Japan's aid, including
34budgeting. It also prompted agreement by the MFA and the MOF that
2 2 2 .
every effort would be made to hold Japan’s ODA at 0.24 percent of GNP
35in 1977 by increasing grant and multilateral aid budgets. In
addition, the Policy Division of the MFA Economic Cooperation Bureau
would try to direct pressures onto the MOF to improve the chances for
favourable allocations to foreign aid. From its own intelligence work
the Policy Division could build up a complete picture of the aid
requests of the ministries and from that it could judge where and how
best to lobby. The Policy Division Director himself often made the
difference between a successful and an unsuccessful campaign, since he
was the Bureau contact with the political and business world most aware
of trends in policy. He cooperated with those politicians interested
in more progressive aid policies, one of whom was Minato Tetsuro.
Indeed, a paper written and published in Minato's name in a respected
development journal, which argued strongly for the implementation of a
long-term budget framework for aid, was in fact originally drafted by
3 6the Policy Division. The need for a public relations campaign to
37raise public awareness of aid was also catered to by the MFA.
While the MFA was not over-concerned with the effect of its
aid budget on domestic client groups, preparatory informal negotiation
and "mood building" (nemawashi) were not neglected. In 1976, its Policy
Division seemed pleased with its tactics in this respect. Not only had
it encouraged September statements by the Advisory Council and the
Keidanren on the need for a more positive government response to aid 
38policy, but also it worked with reporters from the Nihon keizai
shimbun and Asahi shimbun attached to the MFA to publicise Japan's low
aid commitment and loan disbursement, in an effort to prevent the MOF
39using these figures as a pretext for cutting budgets. The resulting
articles brought a sharp informal reaction from the MOF and an official
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response in a counter-article.
Other ministries mobilised domestic client support, or rather
used the momentum initiated by clients, to promote budget requests
despite MOF reservations. One clear example was the approval in the
1977 Budget of a scheme for bond insurance, part of a MITI campaign to
step up exports of Japanese plant and equipment. The MITI budget
41request for 1977 was built around the need to increase exports,
although MOF policy was slanted towards public works expenditure and
away from export drives which it saw as causing adverse reaction 
42overseas. This policy included restrictions on the growth of
43allocations to the Export-Import Bank. The bond insurance scheme
was first proposed in 1975 because of Japanese failures to secure
contracts on large scale projects. It was heavily backed by large
construction companies (notably Kashima, which was able to go ahead
with studies of the Nigerian rapid transit railway once the scheme was 
44approved), overseas trading companies and consultants, the Aid 
Advisory Council, Keidanren and by numerous politicians. It was finally 
agreed to in appeals talks between the Minister of International Trade 
and Industry, Tanaka Tatsuo, and the Minister of Finance, Bo Hideo, 
on 19 January 1977.^
Before the appeals negotiations, the LDP was also active, at
all three levels which Campbell describes: rank and file members,
unofficial groups and official party organs. After hearings with
ministries before requests, little happened over the summer. Informal
talks by ministries and agencies with LDP aid-related members, such as
the Chairman of the Special Committee on Overseas Economic Cooperation
46(in 1976, Tanaka Tatsuo), were held before and after requests, but it 
was not until the Diet reconvened in September that the Party became
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fully occupied with the budget. There was a chance for individual
47members to use the Diet forum for their contribution to the aid debate, 
but total Party participation did not eventuate until after the MOF 
Draft was completed. The LDP's Compilation Program, released shortly 
before the MOF Draft, was a vague and, in relation to economic
48cooperation, quite useless document in any policy or budgeting sense.
The Final Phase
The MOF Draft was shown (naiji) to the ministries in December 
or early January, after which about ten days of renegotiations took 
place. The 1977 budget naiji occurred on January 13 and the Government 
Budget Draft was ratified by Cabinet on January 20. The publication in 
the newspapers of the MOF Draft was the first occasion on which the 
economic cooperation budget became publicly known as a single policy 
expenditure, since no one ministry requested all or most of the aid 
budget.
Between 1965 and 1975, the economic cooperation budget was 
always increased during appeals negotiations. Whereas rises in other 
budget categories were consistently small (with only Public Works 
allocations being raised by over 5 percent at any time), economic 
cooperation was allowed wide increases, although the variations 
flattened out towards the end of the period (see Table 6-11). These 
extreme changes during the appeals negotiations suggested that attention 
was directed towards specific programs within the economic cooperation 
budget since, as the economic cooperation budget increased in gross 
terms and as a percentage of the General Account (see Table 6-5), so 
changes due to appeals negotiations stabilised.
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Campbell sees appeals negotiations to be essential to the 
Japanese budget process, allowing broad participation in bargaining,
MOF ascertainment of ministry priorities and the allocation of policy 
expenditures. Some officials referred to them as an operation stage- 
managed (furitsuke) by the MOF to assess real ministry wishes. The 
division of appeals into four stages, involving division directors, 
bureau directors, vice-ministers and then ministers in separate talks, 
allowed the MOF to manage negotiations. As appeals went higher, 
available options became clearer and ministerial stances more or less 
obvious, while preserving "face" and "playing to the galleries" 
occupied more time. Most allocations were solved before vice-ministers 
were called upon and problems which then advanced to the ministerial 
talks were those in which considerable political investment had been 
made.
As far as economic cooperation was concerned, the same items 
appeared regularly. Capital allocations to the OECF, Export-Import 
Bank and to the OTCA (now JICA) were settled before or at the vice- 
ministerial discussions, but the OECF amount was often not approved 
until ministerial negotiations. Table 6-12 shows that appeals 
negotiations increases for the OECF and the Bank were always made from 
both the Trust Fund and General Account/Industrial Investment Account. 
Additions were frequently made to the MFA grant or technical assistance 
budget, or to emergency aid. That loan allocations came up each year, 
however, suggested that, while vital to aid expenditures, the OECF 
budget was very political, and perhaps beyond the authority of the MOF 
to control. The MOF could only seek to restrain the expectations of 
ministries and politicians and , as Table 6-12 reveals, it may 
have been successful in this. Appeals increases for both sources of
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OECF funds were not large.
Campbell's conclusion about the appeals negotiations - it
was "the [budget] period in which the influence of the Liberal
Democratic Party is brought to bear most obviously and directly" -
held for economic cooperation, although as a rule the articulation of
political interests concerning aid was less noticeable in budgeting
than at other points in the lengthy development of aid policies. The
Party participated formally when ministries lobbied the LDP Special
Economic Cooperation Committee, and the PARC Divisions, for increases in
programs and items. These approaches were incorporated in Party
representations to the MOF, depending on the Party's own priorities
and on the likelihood of settlement early in appeals. The personal
interests of politicians were sometimes involved, for example in the
creation of the bond insurance scheme or in the representations made
by individual Diet Members in the course of pursuing private political 
49ends. The Prime Minister himself, or senior ministers, could urge 
general increases in the aid budget, which occurred in early 1977 when 
economic cooperation was taken to the final Party-Government talks as 
Prime Minister Fukuda unsuccessfully tried to'achieve an aid budget 
which represented a future commitment to 0.30 percent of GNP.
Conclusion: Did Aid Equal Budgeting?
The structure of the Japanese aid system affected budgeting 
in two distinct ways:
(a) Because there was no central aid agency or ministry in Japan, 
the MOF, especially its Budget Bureau, scrutinised ministry 
programs and, because of the lack of comprehensive forward
229.
planning for aid, provided the only overall coordination. 
Differences between ministries regarding their own needs 
and poor coordination between their individual programs 
meant that there was no advance determination of the total 
size of the annual aid appropriation. Aid items were spread 
throughout the budget under different votes and the original 
negotiations about these were carried out separately with the 
Budget Bureau by fourteen agencies and ministries. The total 
aid budget was not known publicly until the MOF released its 
Draft Budget in December.
MOF control of a ministry's participation in aid imposed 
severe constraints on that ministry in determining its own 
aid priorities. The gross amount of aid commitments was 
decided on budgetary considerations, and annual budgeting 
tied levels of aid committed to levels of past commitments. 
While the budget allowed opportunities for the growth and 
development of aid, they were restricted, and incremental 
expansion of many ministry aid budgets was, in the long term, 
harder to control and harmful to policy coordination. Aid 
policy as a budget category was assessed more as a collection 
of individual programs than in macro-budgeting terms and, 
because there were no specific country policies, bilateral aid 
relationships could not be separated from domestic Japanese 
fiscal problems.
(b) The dispersion of the aid system and the predominance of
loan allocations within the aid budget weakened Budget Bureau 
and MOF control of the eventual size of the aid budget.
Request compilation by ministries illustrated how budget
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deadlines concentrated ministry thinking and forced decisions 
at low levels of aid decision-making, balancing the strong 
influence of the Budget Bureau on the broader outlines of 
policy. The resources of the Budget Bureau were not large 
enough to provide coordination of all aid flows, even if it 
so desired. While the Budget Bureau surveyed the whole span 
of aid policy, it was a fleeting and limited view, in contrast 
to the detailed scrutiny of separate sections of MFA programs 
required when the MFA Economic Cooperation Bureau prepared 
its request. The MOF shared in decision-making on loans 
within the four-ministry committee system, and budgeting 
became a segment of loans policy-making and a link in the 
continuing cycle of bilateral aid relationships. There was 
increased scope for politics to enter into budgeting, and 
political constraints on the MOF in aid budgeting multiplied. 
The wider participation of the MOF in decisions on the 
allocation of aid (compared to systems with an 
independent aid agency) was countermanded by greater 
politicisation of aid policy.
The nature of aid financing, predominantly commitments to 
long-running projects, encouraged incrementalism in aid budgeting. The 
small size of the total aid budget, however, enhanced the impact of 
individual programs on it, contributing to instability in budget 
increases, fluctuations in the shares of ministries and to changes in 
the share of aid in the General Account. Budget inertia restricted aid 
to some extent, for the natural stability in budgeting practices 
reinforced traditional MOF suspicion of foreign aid as a worthwhile
government pursuit.
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Being unable to extract aid from the single-year budgeting 
framework constituted a fundamental barrier to a more flexible aid policy 
and one in which forward planning and commitments could benefit 
recipient countries. This inflexibility contributed to the quantitative 
growth of the aid program rather than to improvement in its content. 
Ministries were played off against the MOF and against each other and, 
as a result, debate centred not so much on policy per se but on the 
merits of one program against others. Individual programs and projects 
were emphasised and ministries confronted the MOF on that basis. While 
budgeting provided a salutory pressure for ministries to review and 
justify their own programs, it could not, by its very nature, coordinate 
different levels of aid to produce a cohesive and forward-looking policy. 
Budgeting looked to the past to order its short-term future.
232.
CHAPTER 7
BILATERAL AID RELATIONSHIPS
Budgets and procedures were imperative in determining the 
directions, quantities and terms of Japanese aid flows, but were not, 
however, the only factors: also important was the way in which a
demand for aid arose and was turned into a request for assistance. It 
was a request from a potential recipient which first set officials 
working on an aid problem and initiated the series of decisions which 
we described in the previous two chapters.
This and the following chapter will examine how bilateral 
relationships influenced policy-making by providing the external 
stimulus which the bureaucracy lacked. We show that while requests 
were treated on a case-by-case basis, the background of each request 
and the total bilateral relationship involved in each circumscribed the 
freedom of choice which officials enjoyed in policy. Selected recipients 
were favoured in special relationships which came to dominate the swelling 
"cycle" of aid flows.
Bilateral Loans and Aid Policy
Japanese aid policy-making displayed five characteristics, 
which led to the preoccupation of officials with bilateral loans to 
Asian nations above all other aspects of the program:
. (a) a donor oriented emphasis on "economic cooperation" rather 
than on "aid", this being the easiest way of constructing a 
program identified with the view of no single ministry;
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(b) a preference for government loans, fostered by MITl’s stress 
in aid management on the linkage between trade and aid, a 
desire by the MOF to minimise the economic burden on Japan's 
finances, and by political objectives pursued by the MFA's 
regional bureaus in assessing aid requests;
(c) career structures which hindered the growth of special 
expertise;
(d) a tendency to focus on the details of the aid program, on 
individual projects and cases, rather than on the general 
picture. This micro-approach resulted from the absence of 
policy guidelines, the importance of budgeting in all areas 
of policy and the diversity of unrelated procedures for 
deciding on and managing aid;
(e) the low political relevance of aid and, correspondingly, the 
switching of political interest to types of aid profitable to 
contractors and pressure groups.
The effect of these biases showed clearly in the functional 
distribution of Japanese aid. Bilateral loans formed 33.1 percent of 
total Japanese ODA in 1960, rose to 54.7 percent in 1970 and dropped 
slightly to 51.4 percent in 1976. Between 1970 and 1976, loans never 
fell below 50 percent of ODA (see Table 1-1). According to Table 1-2, 
furthermore, official aid flowed in the main to Asia, especially to 
Southeast Asia. Table 7-1 shows how slowly the range of recipients of 
government loans expanded: in the late 1960s new Asian recipients
increased but it was only after 1973 that the number of recipients in 
regions other than Asia grew rapidly and, by 1975, 15 countries in
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TABLE 7-1
NUMBER OF NEW RECIPIENTS OF GOVERNMENT BILATERAL LOANS, 1957-1975
(fiscal year)
Year NewRecipients Asia
Middle
East Africa
Central 
& South 
America
Other CumulativeTotal
1957 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
1958 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1959 2 1 0 0 1 0 3
1960 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
1961 2 1 0 0 1 0 5
1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
1963 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
1964 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
1965 6 3 1 0 2 0 11
1966 7 2 0 4 0 1 18
1967 1 1 0 0 0 0 19
1968 4 4 0 0 0 0 23
1969 1 1 0 0 0 0 24
1970 1 1 0 0 0 0 25
1971 2 0 1 0 1 0 27
1972 3 1 0 2 0 0 30
1973 6 0 0 4 2 0 36
1974 7 1 2 3 1 0 43
1975 4 0 0 2 2 0 47
Total 47 17 4 15 10 1 47
Source: Computed from Tsusho sangyosho, Keizai kyoryoku no genjo to
mondaiten (Ministry of International Trade and Industry,
Economic cooperation: present situation and problems), 1976,
Appendix, Table 16.
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Africa had received direct loans, rivalling the 17 in Asia. In value 
(Table 7-2), however, the African share (7.3 percent) paled beside that 
of Asian countries (83.6 percent).
A startling 85 percent of all loans made by the Overseas
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) until the end of 1975 went to Asia,
78.1 percent going to 6 countries alone (Indonesia, South Korea, the
Philippines, Thailand, Burma and Malaysia).1 The 10 main recipients
of Japanese (OECF and Export-Import Bank) loans were, in order,
Indonesia, India, South Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand,
Malaysia, Iraq, Bangladesh and Egypt, all but two being Asian nations
(see Table 7-3). Indeed, Tables 7-4 and 7-5 show what little change
there was between 1965 and 1974 in the pattern of recipient regions
and nations. The accumulated value of yen loans as distributed
geographically was concentrated in South Asia up to 1960 but by 1965
the Southeast Asian tally nearly matched this. After 1965, Southeast
Asia was well ahead as the leading recipient region and the Middle East
and Africa only became prominent in the first half of the 1970s. The
top recipient nations have seldom varied, with India, South Korea,
Pakistan and, after 1965, Indonesia always being the leading four.
Minor placings show Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and
Burma consolidating their positions over the latter half of the 1960s
and into the 1970s, while others entered the list with occasional loans,
such as Nigeria, Brazil and Iraq in 1965. Those countries whose place
as important recipients resulted from the gradual accumulation of loan
commitments from Japan were all Asian, and Indonesia's rise was perhaps
2the most remarkable.
The strength of Japan's ties with a few countries was 
confirmed by her ranking as a donor in their total aid receipts. In
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TABLE 7-2
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF ACCUMULATED VALUE OF 
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT LOANS COMMITTED UP TO NOVEMBER 1976
Region Value(yen 100 million) %
Southeast Asia 14663.7 58.1
South and West Asia 6446.7 25.5
Central and South America 821.0 3. 3
Middle East/Europe 1453.5 5.8
Africa 1836.3 7. 3
Total 25221.2 100.0
"Europe" was included because of loans to Yugoslavia 
in 1966 and 1972.
Keizai kyoryoku no genjo to mondaiten, 1976, Table 1-8, _____
Note: 
Source:
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1975, according to MITI, Japan was the largest contributor of aid to
Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Peru and
ranked first with the United States in aiding South Korea. Japan's
position as a supplier of aid was high in Asian countries but low in
Africa, where French and British aid predominated. In some South
American countries (such as Brazil) Japan's aid performance improved 
3in the mid-1970s. As Table 7-6 reveals, in fact, those countries to 
which Japan's aid was directed in greatest quantities often depended 
on Japan as the largest source of their foreign aid receipts. This 
interdependence served to strengthen bilateral aid relationships.
The distribution of government loans suggested an
inflexibility of bilateral flows and negative attitudes to an active
4donor role by Japanese officials. The unswerving Japanese demand for 
government-to-government requests to initiate aid was indicative of 
cautious conservatism and of a strong desire to avoid accusations of 
intervention in LDC domestic affairs. Initiative in policy was 
inhibited by this, and by the reluctance to give a greater proportion 
of aid as multilateral assistance, a demand that aid given be visible, 
the lack of budget and country planning and by Japanese Government 
acceptance of the "international division of aid labour" concept, 
whereby her own comparative advantage was seen to lie in assisting Asian
5development. The corollary implied that aid relations with nations 
in Africa, the Middle East or Latin America, except in special
gcircumstances, should be restrained.
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TABLE 7-6
GROSS RECEIPTS OF ODA BY, AND JAPAN'S RANKING AS A DONOR TO, 
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1969-1972 
(US$ million, gross disbursements, annual average)
Country Total DAC Bilateral Japan
Donor
Ranking
Japan as 
% of Total
Philippines 87. 7 50.4 1 57.5
Burma 31. 7 20.8 1 65.6
Taiwan 16.6 14.5 1 87. 3
South Korea 322.3 111.4 2 34.6
Indonesia 482.2 110.2 2 22.9
Thailand 63.4 15. 7 2 24.8
Malaysia 38.1 10.0 2 26. 2
Singapore 24.7 4.9 2 19.8
Sri Lanka 50.7 7.0 3 13. 8
Iran 28.7 4.8 4 16.7
Bangladesh 52.0 4.4 4 8. 5
Peru 35.9 2.5 4 7.0
Nigeria 90.2 3.2 6 3. 5
Source: OECD, Development Cooperation: Efforts and Policies of the
Members of the Development Assistance Committee, 1974 Review, 
Paris, 1974, Table 73, pp.272-5.
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Viewing Bilateral Relationships
David Wall concluded in his book, The Charity of Nations, that
"there are no objective criteria which can be used to determine the
allocation of aid". It is necessary, he added, for some people to "be
selected and called on to exercise their subjective judgement in
determining how much (if any) should be made available, who should get
7it, in what forms, for what purposes and on what terms". In Japan, 
however, these people still had to operate within a fixed institutional 
environment. It was not simply a matter of balancing political, 
diplomatic or economic factors in favour of one policy course or decision, 
for influences were often quite erratic or operated in a way which 
confirmed identifiable objectives.
(a) International Effort and Aid Giving
gJapan was party to 20 separate aid consortia in 1976. These
groups did not necessarily determine future levels of aid from donors
but attempted to coordinate the policies of aid givers with the
9domestic economic policies of the recipient government. On the other 
hand, as the Indian example revealed, consortia were not always able 
to maintain the flow of aid at levels which the recipient desired, nor 
even to assure donor concurrence with a recipient government's 
economic priorities. ^  Donor priorities could even dominate. From the 
donor's point of view, consortia regularised assessment of recipient 
needs and the willingness to give aid in the light of international 
effort, and isolated bilateral aid relationships from political 
criticism in both donor and recipient countries.
Japan was a member of the Inter-Governmental Group on 
Indonesia (IGGI) from its inception in 1967 and always bore one of the
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largest donor burdens. "The IGGI arrangement", wrote Viviani, "has
been of crucial importance for the reconstruction of the Indonesian
economy";11 it was also essential to the development of Japanese-
Indonesian aid relations and of Japan's aid policy itself. It was the
most influential aid consortium of which Japan was a member, and
Indonesia was the only recipient of Japanese aid which received a
total volume commitment before the specific purposes of loans were
agreed upon. The arrangement reflected a secure and self-satisfied
approach to the bilateral relationship by donor and recipient and a
structured bureaucratic response in Japan to the thorny problems of aid
12to a country both close and unknown. International and domestic 
pressures upon aid relations with Indonesia removed much management 
responsibility from officials, whose control of aid flows was weakened 
by the dependence of the IGGI system on adequate preparation of projects 
and requests for financing approvals.
Meetings of the IGGI were held annually in Amsterdam about
the middle of each year. The Japanese team comprised officials of
the MFA, the MOF and MITI and an OECF observer and was headed by senior
13officers of the MFA's Economic Cooperation Bureau. While there
were bilateral talks preceding the IGGI conference until 1974, the
only annual official bilateral contact after 1974 consisted of a visit
by top Indonesian officials or ministers to Japan immediately before the
Amsterdam conference. The former system involved Indonesian requests
for total volume of aid, followed up by an OECF "identification
14mission" whose report guided decisions on project selection.
Under the system operating in 1976 projects were not selected 
until after the Japanese Government had fixed on its total commitment to
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the year's IGGI assistance and after this was pledged at the IGGI
meeting. Projects were, however, never very far from the minds of
member government officials. The Indonesians favoured certain projects,
as did Japanese ministries (even those not involved in loans decisions)
and, as a Government, Japan intended its pledge to be used to finance
projects which it regarded as the most suitable (according to the
criteria outlined in Chapter 5). Before IGGI convened, Japanese
officials ranked candidate projects according to two documents: the
World Bank report on Indonesian economic conditions, and the listing
by Bappenas (the Indonesian planning authority) of 200-300 projects
15both being undertaken and yet to begin.
The Japanese Government fixed on a level of commitment shortly 
before the IGGI meeting, after loans consultations between the four 
ministries on the loans committee. According to officials, this 
decision was easy to reach, since the general parameters had already 
been established by the previous year's commitments, Indonesian demands, 
expected pledges from other donors and by the likelihood of Japan's 
supporting particular projects. The IGGI conference included discussions 
of Indonesia's economic outlook and projects by themselves were not an 
agenda item.
Official bilateral discussions between Indonesian and Japanese 
officials were held several months after the IGGI met. Before these 
talks, at which the projects for the year were settled, Japanese 
missions visited Indonesia to discuss possibilities and Indonesia, like 
any other recipient, sent an official request for projects through 
diplomatic channels to the Japanese Government.
Requests from Jakarta reflected clear Indonesian Government
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policies on project development. As a general principle, according to 
Tokyo Embassy officials, Indonesia preferred the same donor which had 
financed feasibility studies on a project to take up any project loan.
The detailed implications of this are examined in Chapter 8, but this 
policy helped strengthen bilateral ties and the links between techncial 
aid for surveys and project loan aid. When projects were undertaken 
from start to finish by Japan, it lessened the uncertainties in the 
bilateral relationship, and made these aid flows self-generating and 
self-reinforcing.
Bilateral meetings were devoted to the technical details and
relative feasibility of projects, and at this conference-table venue
the final shape of Japan's loan program to Indonesia was determined.
The options were greatly narrowed by this time, and although differences
between Japanese and Indonesian representatives still appeared regarding
16methods of financing projects, the two governments agreed substantially 
on the functions of the IGGI and on the kinds of project to be funded 
through it.^
Japan was well served by the IGGI, for most of her bilateral
aid to Indonesia, indeed a large slice of her total government aid, was
thus ostensibly removed from overt political pressure and benefited from
the legitimacy it derived from an internationally coordinated aid
program. Criticism of non-IGGI Japanese aid to Indonesia, which had
continued since the 1958-59 scandals surrounding reparations 
18agreements, did not flow on to IGGI aid, except insofar as the total 
share of Indonesia in Japan's development assistance was seen to be too
i 19large.
The bilateral relationship was affected by methods of project
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selection necessary for financing under commitment through the IGGI.
Japanese Government criteria for loans projects were not abrogated in
the choice of suitable projects for Japan's IGGI aid, and the assumptions
on which this was made indicated that the objectives of donor and
recipient overlapped considerably. Project choice, without doubt,
demonstrated the usefulness of the IGGI, defined by Posthumus as "the
extent to which the development objectives of donor governments and
organisations can be adapted to or fitted into Indonesia's development 
20objectives", to both Governments.
The fact that aid pledged at the IGGI was managed through 
formalised procedures was important, for the following reasons:
(i) promoters of Indonesian projects were guaranteed regular 
opportunities for the exposure of their proposals to an 
international forum and to the world's largest aid donors 
(an assurance not given for other recipients to nearly the 
same extent);
(ii) Japanese officials knew that, because of commercial interest 
in using IGGI-base aid to finance development schemes, their 
responsibility for identifying and promoting feasible projects 
would be lighter than for other recipient nations, especially 
those outside Asia.
In this sense, the accumulation within the Japanese Government of 
information about Indonesian economic conditions was partly automatic, 
and continually expanding, with less effort needed from officials.
Officials, however, should not be underestimated. The OECF, 
even though it was an implementing agency, had great influence with
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regard to Indonesia in domestic loans policy-making, because of its 
expertise and the extent of personal rapport built up over the years 
between itself and the Indonesian Government, especially with officials 
of Bappenas. While career officials in the ministries changed posts 
regularly, OECF staffing was more stable but, more importantly, systems 
and procedures for aiding Indonesia were soundly institutionalised, and 
the OECF fitted easily into the structure of loans management as a 
specialist loans agency.
(b) Broader Policy Perspectives
The stability of the IGGI arrangement typified Japanese 
attitudes to its largest aid recipient and as an aid policy mechanism, 
the IGGI was very efficient.
In comparison, therefore, it is worth examining the Japan-
South Korea Ministerial Meetings, which formed the apex of an aid
relationship which was always special. The Ministerial Meetings
occurred annually and incorporated discussions of topics other than
aid, but projected levels of Japanese commitment were announced to
coincide with them. Japanese aid to South Korea was affected by the
vicissitudes of the political relationship in a way unique among Japan's 
21aid recipients. The inter-relationship of their history, geography
and culture helped forge close links between Japanese aid administrators
and South Korean officials, and some Japanese even claimed that only
22the South Koreans truly understood the Japanese aid system.
The South Korean ability to use the Japanese administration 
effectively was a telling weapon in the bilateral aid dialogue. It was 
a clear example of (i) the closest working relations between Japanese 
and any recipient government officials, and (ii) the subordination of
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aid policy to a political relationship. The South Koreans alone enjoyed 
a linguistic heritage similar to the Japanese and were able to build 
upon an economic base formed by lengthy Japanese occupation. We shall 
not attempt here to analyse the politics of the Japanese-South Korean 
aid relationship, but it is worth noting that Indonesia was not the 
only country for which aid relations were continuously governed by 
institutionalised contacts between senior bureaucrats and ministers.
The Indonesian and South Korean aid relationships with Japan
were "special relationships", where economic feasibility was easily
23subordinated to political necessity. Aid for "special" recipients
was managed more carefully and often by higher officials than aid to
other developing countries. The imprimatur of a bureau director of
vice-minister came to be required, and both the IGGI and South Korean
commitments automatically required approval from bureau directors or
ministers. Large projects in these countries were also ratified at
this level, especially because ministers sometimes had a personal
24interest in the loans in question.
Many pressures made some aid relationships "special". Simple
political and economic necessity, for example, meant that Japan's aid
25relations with the Middle East became very "special" after 1973.
Whatever the cause, an elite group of recipients emerged, outside the 
normal classification of LDCs by per capita income. This, in turn, 
reinforced existing biases in Japan's aid administration (the emphasis 
on bilateral project loans) or created new ones, such as preferences for 
joint government-private financing of massive resource projects.
Because, however, not all sections of the donor administration looked on 
special relationships as warranted, inconsistencies could develop in 
donor policy. As a case in point, the MOF regarded aid to Indonesia as
249.
having been too freely spent and tried unsuccessfully to hold down IGGI 
commitments.
Special relationships persisted, nevertheless. Not even the
26MOF foresaw in 1976 any change in the status of Indonesia as a recipient 
or a lessening of the aid flow to that country. The view that Indonesia 
occupied a strategic place in Southeast Asia was not confined to the 
MFA. Indonesia as a source of raw materials and as a suitable target 
for Japanese direct investment figured prominently in the minds of 
MITI and MOF officials. The size of Japanese loans to Indonesia for 
oil and natural gas development testified to the strength of these 
views and of political and business articulation of similar ideas. The 
Asahan project, for which an initial government loan was made in August 
1976, was an excellent example of how private initiative and leadership 
encouraged government assistance necessary for overseas private 
investment.
Plans to develop the Asahan region in Northern Sumatra and
27to tap the waters of Lake Toba had a long history. The Dutch first 
made studies of the water resources in the area in 1908 and plans for a 
hydro-electricity scheme were being considered at the outbreak of World 
War II. During the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia a survey of Northern 
Sumatra resources was partially completed by a team led by Kubota Yutaka, 
head of the Yalu River Hydro-Electric Power Company, and the idea of 
using hydro-electric power to operate an aluminium refinery was 
rekindled. After the war, Kubota (as President of Nippon Koei, Japan's 
first firm of consultant civil engineers) tried unsuccessfully to 
interest both the Indonesian and Japanese Governments in Asahan as a 
possible reparations project, and other leading industrialists, including 
Iwata Yoshio, Matsunaga Anzaemon and Ayukawa Gisuke, attempted to
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28initiate the scheme, but its cost proved prohibitive.
It was not until 1967 that Kubota again raised the question
of the Asahan project with the Indonesians, and with the backing of a
Japanese Government loan, a full-scale survey was made between 1970
and 1972. Four years of negotiations followed, involving the Indonesian
and Japanese Governments and Japanese business, and an agreement was
concluded in 1975 in which five Japanese aluminium companies and the
trading firms agreed to undertake Asahan development using Japanese
29Government finance. The "Asahan formula", for supporting large 
projects underlined the complex ties existing in such schemes even when 
political and economic interests were in harmony. The question of donor 
leadership was important and Asahan negotiations were, until the final 
stages, directed by the group of aluminium companies chaired by Sumitomo 
Metal.
The companies originally disagreed with the Government when
tenders were first called in 1972. Officials were not keen to support
a costly dam-plus-refinery package, and the MOF was doubtful of granting
a concessional loan (eventually 3.5 percent over 28 years with 7 years'
grace) for private investment, while the MFA was worried about the
imbalances which could arise between IGGI donors. Despite these
reservations, it seems that high policy - industrial relocation, support
for Indonesia's political and industrial decentralisation, establishment
of a Japanese presence in the Malacca Straits area - prevailed in both
countries. Only when the Japanese Cabinet agreed on 4 July 1975 to
designate Asahan a "national project" (one given full Government support
because of its acknowledged importance in Japan's own policies) was
Government assistance assured. MITI officials coordinated efforts to
30secure Government financing and the "Asahan method" was deemed a model
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of effective Government-business cooperation in overseas development.
Japanese Government support for other private business 
activity in Indonesia also arose directly from pursuit of official policy 
objectives. One result of the enthusiasm which appeared in Japan in 
the late 1960s for overseas development of agricultural commodities, 
especially foodgrains, was the Mitsugoro project in the Lampung region 
of Southern Sumatra, a joint venture between Mitsui Bussan and Kosgoro,
one of the business organisations of the Indonesian Veterans' Association.
32OECF financing for the project continued for seven years and originally 
resulted from: (i) Mitsui eagerness to push ahead with the first
project in overseas maize development, coupled with strong backing from 
its Indonesian counterparts and from the Indonesian Government; (ii) 
support from Japanese officials (especially the MAF) offered out of 
considerations of development import and the need to diversify import 
sources; and (iii) a hurried, incomplete survey of the proposed site 
and of the future of the project.
The plan was far more attractive on paper than in reality. A 
catalogue of the misfortunes which befell the Mitsugoro project prompted 
speculation on why finance was first approved and why it was continued 
even when the joint venture was losing about US$400,000 per year in 
1976-77. Officials explained it as simple enthusiasm for development 
import policy, and as confidence in Mitsui's ability to complete the 
project successfully. While that confidence was to some extent misplaced, 
the project was of such symbolic value to the bilateral relationship, as 
the pioneer agricultural development project, that the OECF continued 
its funding.
The primacy of official and private policies in aid
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relationships also appeared in Japanese ties with Brazil. This
relationship was similar in many ways to that with Indonesia, and
both were, to the Japanese, close and friendly partners in a "special
relationship". Japanese Government capital assistance to Brazil
stretched back to an early yen loan in 1961 under consortium
arrangements. Up to November 1976, Japan lent a total of ¥22,839
million to Brazil, slightly less than the ¥24,500 million to the other
large Latin American recipient, Peru. Total technical cooperation
between 1954 and 1975 was ¥1,454 million, which surpassed that to any
nation in South America although it was well below the leading Asian 
33recipients. In September 1976, a far reaching aid agreement between
the two countries was signed, opening the way for greatly increased
34Japanese participation in Brazilian economic development.
The agreement was an overt response to purely political and
economic considerations, promoted by politicians and influential 
35bureaucrats, since complementarity of the Japanese and Brazilian
36economies (especially in respect of resources) was well understood, 
as was the desire of private enterprise to move ahead with government 
assisted investment. The same government-business cooperative pattern 
which emerged in the Asahan case was followed in an aluminum smelter- 
refinery project at Belem.
Other issues underlay the politics of the relationship. As
with Mitsugoro, the MAF argued strongly for the overseas development of
primary products, which culminated in JICA loans to maize development at
Serad. This project was pushed by MAF International Cooperation Division
officials, but was supported also by widespread bureaucratic pressure to
activate JICA financing and, possibly, to test the JICA legislation 
37itself. These were temporary phenomena but they certainly had an
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effect in translating perceived economic potential into policy. Another 
longer-term factor was the impact of emigration policy on Japan-Brazil 
relations. Of 69,933 government assisted emigrants who left Japan
og
between 1952 and 1974, 51,267 (80.2 percent) went to Brazil. The
contribution of Japanese emigration policy to Brazilian development was
acknowledged in the joint communique between Prime Minister Miki and
39President Geisel in September 1976. The link between Japan and
Brazil created by emigration directly affected the policy-making process,
it seems, for Japanese officials claimed an affinity with their Brazilian
counterparts not expressed except in other special relationships with
Indonesia or South Korea. It was asserted that official negotiations
were easier when certain cultural understandings could be taken for
40granted by both sides.
This argument was a serious one and demonstrated a perhaps
unconscious rationalisation of an aid relationship strongly criticised 
41within Japan. The "cultural alliance" thesis was, however, a handy 
exception to the common Japanese theme of geographical proximity as a 
determinant of aid flows, or to the international division of aid 
labour concept.
(c) The Minor Politics of Aid
In addition to the "high politics" described above, bilateral 
aid relationships were subject to lesser influences. "Special 
relationships" did not constitute the whole of Japan's foreign aid 
policy; the pawns as well as the knights of the aid process profoundly 
affected the outcomes in bilateral relationships and policy-makers 
accommodated the interests of many politicians, businessmen and 
"hangers-on". Policy was not simply the result of rational calculation
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of the economic options.
The minor politics of aid was most evident in the preparatory 
stages of ordinary requests, but Chapter 8 will describe in detail why 
this was so. There were few predictable patterns, but desk officers in 
the ministries to whom came requests from LDC governments were the first 
targets of pressure which was directed upwards if necessary. For a 
country in which aid had low political relevance, Japan had an active 
aid business lobby, although aid bureaucrats assiduously denied the 
influence, even the presence, of interest groups. Decisions, they 
claimed, were organisational and rational.
It is true that aid officials made the decisions, although only 
from the options which they perceived. Budget officers, as we have seen, 
were more realistic since they expected and accepted pressures and were 
able to balance them with the constraints of MOF policy. Aid officials, 
however, were reluctant to acknowledge the LDP's Special Committee on 
Overseas Economic Cooperation, but admitted nevertheless that they 
frequently attended its meetings and provided it with whatever 
information it required. At budgeting time also they sought its support 
and tried to temper its demands. This was indicative of at least some 
latent power which could be exercised by the Committee and our evidence 
has already shown the influence of the Committee in the establishment of 
JICA and in the creation of the bond insurance scheme.
Individual members of the Committee were active in aid 
relationships which personally interested them, as occurred in the 
Japan-Brazil Agricultural Development Cooperation Committee which 
lobbied for aid to Brazil. Minato Tetsuro, who has been cited 
throughout the thesis, was a man publicly committed to the development
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of Japan's aid program, but even he had his political career to 
consider. Minato happened to be born in the same prefecture as Noguchi 
Hideo, one of Japan's most.revered scientists, who discovered the cause 
of yellow fever and eventually died of the disease in Accra on the Gold 
Coast (now Ghana) in 1928. Minato represented the Second Fukushima 
constituency, the one in which Noguchi's birthplace was situated, from 
1963. The centenary of Noguchi's birth in 1976 led Minato to try and 
secure Japanese Government funding of a Noguchi Memorial Research Centre 
in Accra.
This incident showed how a minor aid relationship expanded for
reasons unrelated to normal development criteria. Ghana received a
small amount of Japanese aid, mainly technical assistance, although some
debt rescheduling was made through the Ghana Aid consortium in 1968 and
1975 and Kennedy Round food aid was donated in 1975. In that year Ghana
received the fourth largest share of Japan's technical assistance in
Africa after Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia, and over one third (39.2
42percent) of this was medical aid. Assistance began in 1968 after the
visit of a mission to the country in 1966 under Shirahama Nikichi, an
LDP Member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of the Medical
Aid Sub-committee of the Party's Special Committee on Overseas Economic 
43Cooperation. Until 1974, 29 experts had spent time in Ghana and 17 
study missions had visited the country. The Fukushima Prefectural 
Medical University acted as the sponsoring organisation in Japan and 
Honda Kenji, Professor at the University, led the first project survey 
mission to Ghana in June 1968.
The concept of the Noguchi Centre originated at this time. 
Minato was said to have discussed the idea first with Honda; it 
certainly did not originate with the Ghanaian Government. It was
256.
Minato, university authorities and the Noguchi Hideo Centenary
Remembrance Action Committee who lobbied the MFA, the MOF and the
Ministry of Education over a period of years. Talks took place between
officials of the two governments in May 1976 and a joint statement on
2 November 1976 announced the plan and the proposed construction. The
MFA requested ¥1,000 million for the project as part of its grant aid
request for the 1977 Budget. The MOF attitude was cool but it had
little room to refuse in the light of Noguchi's place in Japanese
cultural history and on the occasion of his centenary. The proposal
was well timed, well planned and matched the MOF's criteria for grant
44aid: it was both feasible and visible. Whether it coincided with
Ghana's own priorities for aid projects was less certain.
Smooth and efficient lobbying by Minato and those associated 
with the Fukushima group contrasted with the aid activities of another 
Diet Member in regard also to a minor recipient of Japan's aid. This 
incident demonstrated how easily bilateral aid relationships were 
jeopardised, because of bureaucratic susceptibility to political 
pressures, inadequate procedures, or the perceptions in recipient 
countries of the working relationships between business and government 
in Japan and of the way they affected aid policy decisions.
The country involved was Papua New Guinea (PNG), then 
peripheral to the central interests of Japanese aid policy-makers, even 
though Japan was regarded as a potentially important aid donor by PNG. 
Aid to PNG up to 1976 was mainly given as technical assistance, although 
a ¥660 million grant was made in November 1975 for the construction of a 
fisheries college, the first Japanese grant made to a South Pacific 
nation. A bilateral agreement in December 1977 for loans on extremely 
favourable terms was evidence of a positive Japanese response to the
257.
45articulation of consistent recipient aid policies. A feasibility
study of the Purari hydro-electricity scheme was financed by JICA from
MITI funds and in 1976 was' the most expensive survey then being
46undertaken by JICA's Mining and Industry Department. Japanese private 
investment in PNG in 1975 totalled US$8.20 million, well above the 
US$5.43 million of 1974 but only one third of the US$24.87 million 
invested in 1973.^
The present example concerns Japanese Government support,
through the OECF's "general projects" assistance scheme (the same
funding provided for the Mitsugoro project in Indonesia) for Japanese
private investment in PNG. Financing "general projects" (ippan anken)
was the original work of the OECF before it began to make direct
government loans in 1965, but in 1975 financing (yushi) and capitalisation
(shusshi) of private Japanese companies' overseas development projects
48made up only 16.9 percent of total OECF overseas funding, and budgets
for ippan anken generally took about 10 percent of the total OECF 
49allocation. The loan in this instance came under guidelines laid down
in 1961, when an agreement with the Export-Import Bank determined that
the OECF would finance projects in agriculture, forestry and marine
sectors but would not be involved in plant export financing (a further
agreement in July 1975, which gave the Export-Import Bank the
responsibility for all funding to private enterprise, still left the
x 50"experimental stages" of projects to the OECF).
When assessing applications from companies for funds, the
OECF used four main criteria to eliminate the numerous unsatisfactory 
51requests: (i) the company and its experience in the kind of project
proposed; (ii) the likely benefits to the LDC deriving from the 
project (based on the country's own stated priorities, if any); (iii)
258.
the MOF attitude (although except in large or special applications,
approvals for overseas investment were given automatically by the
52Bank of Japan on behalf of the Finance Minister); and (iv) the 
MFA attitude. The regional bureaus of the MFA were naturally watchful 
of the potential political implications of such financing, particularly 
if projects were on a wide scale or made up a significant proportion of 
the flow of funds to the country in question. The OECF had a stronger 
voice in decisions concerning these company loans than it did on direct 
government loans (see Chapter 5), provided that the proposal did not 
breach MOF or MFA guidelines on direct investment.
In spite of the OECF's authority, it was still susceptible
to external pressure, as in the case of a loan to a company named
Tokai rebera kogyo, an engineering firm based in Nagoya with capital of
¥50 million. It was founded in 1959 by its President, Matsumoto 
- 53Saburo. The company received a loan of ¥800 million from the OECF in
early 1972 to develop oil palm on the island of New Britain in PNG,
which was the company's first ever overseas development work and certainly
its first oil palm venture. A joint agreement was entered into with the
PNG Government in March 1972, but a dispute arose in 1975 over the
design and manufacture of the oil palm mill (among other things).
Despite mediation, settlement could not be reached. After precipitate
intervention by the Japanese MFA, which demanded a reconsideration of
PNG's position, the PNG Government introduced legislation in August 1976
54to nullify the joint venture agreement and expropriated the company's 
assets. An independent assessor was called upon to draw up a settlement 
and compensation was made to the company by the PNG Government.
While the incident revealed problems on both sides, there 
were serious weaknesses in Japanese decision-making. OECF officials
259.
admitted that, in retrospect, it was a mistake to have approved a 
substantial loan to a company totally inexperienced in oil palm 
development and undertaking its first overseas project on a large scale 
in a remote part of a country relatively unknown to the Japanese. In 
addition, Japanese companies had done little oil palm development and 
the fact that the OECF loan was tied to procurement in Japan meant that 
similar problems of inexperience may have arisen even with other 
Japanese investors. Intensive study of the proposal had been necessary, 
but approval was forced by the intervention of a Member of the Japanese 
Diet. The company was registered in his electorate and he was said to 
maintain a financial interest in its operations, and to have wartime 
associations with the New Britain area. This politician was not, 
however, a Member of the Liberal Democratic Party but the Secretary of 
the opposition Democratic Socialist Party, Tsukamoto Saburo.
It was at Tsukamoto's insistence that the loan was originally
approved and with his support that Tokai rebera pursued its case in
Japan when compromise could not be reached in 1976. Tsukamoto asked a
question of Prime Minister Miki in the House of Representatives on 1
October 1976 concerning the Government attitude to what he saw as a
high handed reaction by the PNG Government. This brought a response
from his own Party, since the statement bore no relation to Party policy
55and was made, it considered, purely out of personal interest.
Tsukamoto's involvement (and the MFA's early aggressive stance) hindered 
officials in the OECF and MITI in their attempts to arrange agreement 
between the company and PNG in late 1976.
Although for a short time the continuance of economic 
cooperation between Japan and PNG was brought into question, the OECF 
considered the affair to be instructive. Japanese officials were made
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more aware of the frailty of some government financed operations, 
particularly where normal decision-making processes were replaced by 
pressures which diverted attention from established procedure. In PNG, 
the need to ensure that foreign investors clearly understood and 
followed investment guidelines became obvious.
(d) The Information Gap
What each of these bilateral relationships had in common was
a problem of information or intelligence. All were isolated examples,
but each was in some way affected by the state of information available,
56information being one of the basic resources of policy-makers. The 
difference between these cases, and the variations in bilateral relations 
represented by them, resulted from an "information gap", which 
constituted an overall problem for Japan's foreign aid administration.
The essence of the "special relationships" between Japan and 
some recipients lay in familiarity. Indonesia, South Korea and Brazil 
(among others) enjoyed favourable treatment in policy terms, because of 
the cumulative weight on policy-makers of flows of financial, human and 
informational resources between Japan and those countries. The realising 
of Japan's economic and political aspirations and the coincidence of 
recipient governments' development priorities with Japan's desire for 
secure and visible projects, were possible because of the ease with which 
"proximate policy-makers" conversed. In regard to Indonesia, the 
existence of formal aid giving structures was helpful, but even before 
the IGGI began there were intimate ties between Japanese and Indonesian 
elites.
The other cases we examined - Asahan, Mitsugoro, the Noguchi 
Hospital and PNG oil palm development - can also be discussed in terms
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of knowledge of local conditions, history or culture. Relationships 
founded on precise information were likely to be beneficial to donor 
and to recipient. Japanese private enterprises, especially engineering 
consultants whose own future depended on their success in promoting 
economic cooperation, acted as middle-men, often compensating for the 
inability of the Japanese Government to appreciate local situations.
Problems of information were related directly to attitudes to 
aid giving and their effect on the distribution of aid flows. We 
mentioned above the concept of an "international division of aid labour" 
and how it was entrenched in the Japanese official mind. While the 
Japanese were not alone in holding such a view,~*^ it helped reinforce 
other influences on the dispersion of aid:
(1) The desire that aid should be visible (perhaps a natural
donor response) was zealously expressed in Japanese policy. The kudos
attributed to a donor was regarded by Japanese aid officials as a
justification necessary to the aid process, and from this sprang the
perception of aid as an exchange, or as "cooperation". There may have
been cultural roots to this tendency, for Japanese social custom
stressed ninjo, or compassion, an essential element of relationships
between two people which developed together with bonds of obligation in a
tight fabric of emotional accounting. This led to an overriding concern
to foster a few close relationships at the expense of many others. There
was a demand for compensation for favours and the avoidance of relations
in which exchange was absent. One writer suggested that the weak
Japanese understanding of noblesse oblige was a result of these social
customs. That they were one influence on aid policy was confirmed by the
59stated relevance of ninjo to bilateral aid.
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Such attitudes affected aid relations with and limited 
Japanese understanding of Africa in particular. The African continent 
received, until the mid-1970s, only a minute portion of Japanese 
official assistance (see Table 1-2). The first government loan was 
made to Uganda in 1966, followed by credits to Tanzania, Kenya and 
Nigeria in the same year. The country which received the greatest 
amount of Japanese loans was Egypt and, of Black African nations,
Zaire.^ A sudden increase in the number of African recipients was not 
apparent until after 1973, coinciding with the visit of the Japanese 
Foreign Minister, Kimura Takeo, to Black Africa in late 1974 and with 
heightened Japanese diplomatic interest in the region.
The policy that second loans were not approved to a new
recipient African country before a period of five years elapsed was
rigidly adhered to, except in the case of Egypt, and then only because
of a loan given in 1975 to help reopen the Suez Canal. Of other African
recipients, only Kenya and Nigeria received two or more loans up to
1975, Kenya in 1966 and 1972, Nigeria in 1966, 1972 and 1973. Clearly,
concern about the ability of these nations to use loan aid effectively
influenced request assessment. Of the 17 countries to which capital
grants were given until November 1976, only one (Tanzania) was African,
despite the policy of giving to least-developed countries (LLDCs) and
to most seriously affected countries (MSACs) and the greater concentration
61of these nations in Africa. The total value of Japanese technical 
assistance to African countries between 1954 and 1975 was ¥8,741.5 
million, 12.3 percent of total Japanese technical assistance. ¥1,432.6 
million of this consisted of medical aid, 21.2 percent of total Japanese 
medical assistance. Japanese Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) 
were active in Africa also, 21.5 percent (¥1,969.3 million) of total JOCV
263.
6 2aid between 1965 and 1974 going to the continent.
Africa was regarded by aid officials in Japan as distant and
difficult to deal with. They complained, rightly or wrongly, that
Africans thought differently from Southeast Asians and that aid
negotiations were correspondingly more protracted. They predicted that
these difficulties would not soon diminish, despite growing aid flows
to the region. Japanese knew little about Africa and about the
conditions unon which aid requests were made, and loan officials cited
this as one reason why decisions on aid to Africa took much longer than
6 3on similar requests from Asian countries. At a more materialistic
level, they perceived that trading benefits to Japan from aid to Africa
were insufficient to warrant a shift in priorities. Africa was regarded
as something like the "dark continent" into which Japanese aid disappeared
with no acknowledgement of its origins. Even multilateral aid officials
saw the African Development Bank as unsatisfactory, for it offered
Japanese multilateral assistance far less visibility than did, for
64example, the Asian Development Bank.
In short, prevailing attitudes towards countries in Africa 
as recipients only strengthened the bias in favour of Asia and the 
established decision-making and information gathering procedures.
Patterns of aid proved hard to redirect.
(2) Structural factors also influenced the flow of information.
We have discussed previously the lack of professional aid officers and
65of regional aid specialists in government service, but there was no 
"intellectual infrastructure" in the Japanese aid bureaucracy which gave 
officers a background broader than their immediate desk responsibilities. 
Concern for career obviated the need to develop expertise in aid, least
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of all towards minor recipients. There was no country programming, 
except for some planning of directions of technical aid for budgeting.
As a result, the official policy emphasis on a broader distribution of 
aid flows was not subjected to consistent internal appraisal, nor was 
the concentration of aid on a few special relationships countered by a 
bureaucratic presence, in the form of specialist officers or programs, 
representing small aid recipients.
(3) This was the result not only of biases in attitudes and 
information gathering but also of poor information systems in Japan.
The Administrative Management Agency report on economic cooperation of 
1974 identified the following problems:
(i) poor preparation for pre-feasibility surveys in LDCs, 
unsatisfactory surveys and resulting inappropriate assistance;
(ii) insufficient collecting of information in overseas embassies 
and poor communication with home ministries, leading to the 
despatch of the wrong specialists and equipment and to delays 
in surveys;
(iii) lack of proper information systems in Japan, to link 
ministries, agencies and research institutions;
(iv) misuse of specialists' reports and surveys.
The report recommended the establishment of information storage 
and retrieval within the aid bureaucracy to enable technical reports to 
be fully utilised, improved embassy reporting of conditions and requests 
and of recipient government priorities, and reform of the method of 
preparing official surveys overseas. It also suggested better use of 
project finding and project identification surveys and the creation of
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6 6the means of professional assessment of aid completed and in progress.
Ministry responses to the report were vague and non-committal.
There was in 1976 no central information bank for the reference of aid-
related sections, nor any systematic exchange of information, except of
embassy derived material. Ministries continued to collect their own
sources and the functional distinction between the MFA and MITI, for
example, was exacerbated. There was no clearing house for survey
reports, access to which was said to be difficult even on an informal
basis. Both JICA's annual report in 1974 and a senior official of the
Agency, Tanaka Tsuneo, recommended improvement of the survey process,
especially in regard to applying reports to national planning of the 
67survey program.
In 1976, there were two development research centres in Japan
associated with the aid bureaucracy, but neither organisation effectively
aided the distribution of information, and work done on commission was
in theory for the commissioning agent alone. The Institute for
Developing Economies (Ajia keizai kenkyujo, or Ajiaken) was set up under
legislation in 1960 and was responsible to the Minister for International
6 8Trade and Industry, while the International Development Centre (IDC) 
was founded in 1971 with support from government, private and academic 
circles. About 90 percent of the Ajiaken1s budget was provided from the 
MITI budget, while IDC's working capital was made up of contributions 
from seven different ministries, mainly for specified development 
surveys.
(4) Japanese embassies were at the forefront of the bilateral 
aid relationship. Aid requests were channelled through them and embassy 
officers handled much of the negotiation leading up to an exchange of
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notes between governments. The Administrative Management Agency, however,
regarded the reporting functions of embassies as inadequately fulfilled,
and other writers have observed notable intelligence failures on the
69part of the MFA, which had serious diplomatic consequences.
The embassy in any foreign service is the nucleus for
intelligence gathering networks, even though its direct effect on
policy-making may be limited. Officers posted overseas by the Japanese
MFA were closest to events in recipient countries and desk officers in
Tokyo relied on them for initial assessments of aid proposals (see
Chapter 5). As Fukui states in his study of the MFA, however, there was
a fine line between policy formulation and the gathering and processing 
70of information. Certainly in foreign aid, the latter continually 
defined options in the former.
The embassy's participation in aid policy was restricted but
still necessary. William Wallace, echoing the 1969 Duncan report on
Overseas Representation, considered the "buffer" function of British
overseas missions to have remained valuable. "The role of the embassy",
he wrote, "has become much more one of establishing and maintaining
contacts with the ministers and officials of foreign governments ... of
providing 'the essential "door-opening" function' for ‘experts flown
over from London for short meetings', of providing an element of 
71continuity". In the Japanese situation, where embassies did not house 
the specialist staff of a central aid agency as British missions did, 
this function was even more valuable. Maintenance of smooth relations 
with recipient governments by senior and junior embassy officers partly 
offset the lack of aid expertise within the embassy. Negotiations 
carried out on orders from Tokyo were more manageable.
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The status of the embassy as seen from Tokyo was low. It was 
allowed little initiative in aid and its staff responded to their own 
bureaus or ministries. MITI and MFA officers were often at odds in 
their attitude to relations between Japan and the particular LDC and 
a sense of competition regarding aid proposals was frequently present.
The functions of the embassy reaffirmed the tendency of the aid 
administration to favour domestic, not LDC, priorities. The embassy was 
not in a position demonstrably to affect the flow of aid other than in 
exceptional circumstances. The foreign mission reinforced prevailing 
patterns in aid policy-making.
72OECF or JICA offices in developing countries often took 
much of the load of economic and aid reporting and their staff acted as 
unofficial aid attaches. One former OECF representative in Indonesia 
certainly conceived his post in such a light, although embassy officers 
stressed that only they had any official authority. In contrast to their 
useful reporting, however, the local presence of agency officials 
strengthened flows of information and magnified, rather than mitigated, 
the bureaucratic inclination to favour those recipient countries.
The career management policies of the MFA did not lead to
officers from economic cooperation desks being sent to the corresponding
overseas mission. There were examples of senior officials moving from
the level of counsellor in the Economic Cooperation Bureau to senior
positions in the Japanese Embassy in Indonesia, but on the whole between
1965 and 1975 there was no distinct pattern of movement of officers in
the Embassy in Jakarta to or from positions related to Indonesian
73economic cooperation. A period of service in the Economic Cooperation 
Bureau usually entailed a few years in a developing country embassy 
afterwards, but this did not seem to be carried through in any consistent
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way. Indeed, the generalist traditions of the Japanese MFA worked 
against that, and officials in 1976 noticed no divergence from this 
principle.
The MFA saw no need to alter established practice. Policy 
was still directed from home and the overseas despatch of Tokyo-based 
officers on aid business as it arose was a regular feature of policy­
making. The need to staff small embassies in minor recipient capitals 
did not warrant changes in career policies. Periodic visits from 
headquarters officials associated with policy developments in the 
ministries were seen as more effective than the posting of officers 
with aid experience. Even though the information gathering functions of 
the overseas mission could not be fulfilled by Tokyo officials
(especially because of the poor communication between ministries and the
74representatives of most LDC embassies in Tokyo), its duties were 
limited both by tradition and by the manoeuvrability of ministry 
personnel.
Conclusion: Aid Allocation and the Aid Cycle
David Wall's conclusion about aid relationships - that no 
rational criteria are used in the problem of aid allocation - can be 
applied equally to Japanese foreign aid. In Japan, many policy questions 
concerning distribution and geographical and sectoral emphasis, were 
answered by inbuilt structural characteristics and by the "information 
gap". A "cycle" of aid to selected recipients was apparent, one which 
built up some individual aid flows as policy continued to be slanted to 
a few countries. This cycle was effective not only in increasing the 
quantity and diversity of aid to those countries, but also in lessening 
the opportunities for the adequate assessment of aid to alternative
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recipients.
The "aid cycle" had several implications for policy-making:
(a) "Special" relationships were not very susceptible to 
bureaucratic politics or to the influence of officials on 
the size and scope of aid flows. Officials were responsible 
for the details of policy implementation. As the following 
chapter will explain, however, the options for diversifying 
policy were significantly narrowed by the mechanisms of 
project management.
(b) Bilateral aid policy-making was open to non-bureaucratic 
pressures because of the multiplicity of leverage points in 
a dispersed aid system. In some instances these pressures 
worked to severely limit the options for loans (IGGI, South 
Korean and Brazilian aid, for example), while in others 
pressure was brought to bear directly on officials in 
responsible policy positions (Mitsugoro, Noguchi Centre,
PNG oil palm development, for instance), or acted to reinforce 
trends in policy (Asahan).
(c) Minor aid relations were particularly sensitive to the 
availability of precise and adequate information; the lack 
of such information opened aid to outside pressures so that 
decisions, and policy, became bound up with unstable forces. 
This reflected the need for strong data collection and 
management, or for a greater LDC input into Japanese policy­
making, since the Japanese bureaucracy was only able to act 
with initiative and independence when supplied with the 
information on recipients adequate for their procedures. This
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was an important link in the "aid cycle", and one in which 
the chief recipients maintained their clear advantage.
(d) Bilateral pressures reinforced the tendency for policy to 
fragment further under the absence of accepted policy 
guidelines and threw responsibility onto officials to control 
aid relationships at the working level.
At this level lay the system's plodding strength. Procedures 
were necessary: they ensured the implementation of aid policies and
helped counteract the unpredictability of bilateral relationships; they 
were resilient, even though predictable. Their inflexibility, however, 
in the early stages of the "aid cycle" - project identification and 
assessment - left it largely to those outside the bureaucracy to initiate 
aid relationships. The way this was done, however, only supported the 
bilateral aid policies described above.
271.
CHAPTER 8
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND CONSULTANTS
This chapter completes the analysis of bilateral relationships 
and patterns of allocation of Japanese aid, by examining the development 
survey as an element of policy-making. We take up the "aid cycle" 
concept to discuss how surveys, and engineering consultants, were 
instrumental in tying aid to future allocations. We discuss to what 
extent this
(a) constituted a pre-selection of options for later allocation 
of aid;
(b) replaced conscious choices by officials;
(c) was a form of information collection and use; and
(d) had a cumulative effect in expanding the larger bilateral 
aid flows.
Surveys for Projects
Projects were the "building blocks" of Japanese aid policy. 
They gave aid administrators a fixed standard to guide procedures and 
a visible result for their efforts. The pursuit of project aid served 
to bind the donor country to a routine of project identification, 
appraisal, design, approval, implementation and evaluation,^ although 
this was only an ideal representation of the domestic policy-making 
process. While the aid bureaucracy endeavoured to follow projects 
through to completion in this manner, it was unable to do so because 
of its own structural deficiencies (lack of specialists for total 
project appraisal and evaluation, competing ministry viewpoints etc.)
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and because of wider political forces, as outlined in the previous 
chapter.
Assessment and selection of projects were not the grounds for 
decisions on aid giving by virtue of rational economic criteria alone.
The nature of aid requests and their associated projects were dependent 
on the entire bilateral aid relationship, and the very way in which 
projects were brought into the policy-making process was in itself a 
restriction of options. Project identification and feasibility studies 
(or development surveys) were the usual method by which projects were 
made ready for official decision on loans or grants.
The development survey was the most common form of project
assessment. The Japanese Government required project proposals from
prospective recipients to be accompanied by a completed feasibility
study, and preparation to that point was regarded as the recipient's 
2responsibility, although the Japanese Government still assisted by 
financing feasibility studies within its technical assistance program.
This work was carried out under the supervision of the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA). It could involve teams of officials, or 
companies contracted to do the work, spending weeks or months (even years 
if the project were a big one) in the field, often under extremely 
difficult conditions.
The aid program incorporated many kinds of official surveys, 
in the three main categories of project finding and identification, 
feasibility study, and project design. Funds for this technical aid 
were drawn from the MFA and MITI budgets and most were passed on to 
JICA for implementation (see Chapters 5-6). Table 8-1 shows the 
budgets allocated for survey work by the Overseas Technical Cooperation
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Agency (OTCA) (1962-73) and by JICA (1974). The massive rise over the 
period (from ¥174 million to ¥3,734 million), however, was not matched by 
increases in the number of’ survey teams actually sent (from 19 to only 
66, Table 8-2). Groups which received government subsidy for commissioned 
surveys included the International Development Centre (IDC), Institute 
for Developing Economies (Ajia keizai kenkyujo), Japan Consulting 
Institute (Nihon puranto kyokai) and the Engineering Consulting Firms 
Association (ECFA), among others.
The geographical distribution of surveys carried out (Table 
8-3) reflected the spread of Japanese aid itself. Of the total number 
of 417 teams sent between 1962 and 1974, 263 (or 63.1 percent) went to 
Asian countries, with an even balance of the remainder between South 
America and Middle East/Africa. The weight of the latter two regions 
in surveys increased later in the period, although it was not until 
after 1973 that it broke above one third of the total. Similar patterns 
showed in the spread of funds for surveys (Table 8-4), although the 
emphasis was slightly more biased to the Asian region until 1973. Overall, 
however, the distributions were the same, for 63.1 percent of survey 
teams and 64.1 percent of total survey funds (Items 1 and 2, Table 8-4) 
went to Asian countries.
In 1973, JICA carried out 67 surveys in the following 
categories: master plan 16, mapping 4, project finding 11, feasibility
19, capital assistance-related 6, design 3, resources development 7, 
and after-care 1. 42 surveys were made in Asian countries, 12 in the
Middle East and Africa, and 11 in Central and South America. 1974 
witnessed a similar program, although geographical distribution was 
slightly less Asian-oriented, with only 38 being for that region. 17
were undertaken in the Middle East and Africa in 1974, 14 in Central and
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3South America, 2 in Papua New Guinea and 3 elsewhere.
As general aid flows favoured certain recipient countries, so 
did development surveys. Indonesia received the most surveys, 62 between 
1962 and 1974, followed by Thailand (34) and the Philippines (28).^
There was, however, no direct link between surveys completed and aid 
approved, for the decision time lag could be substantial and while 
feasibility was a necessary condition for Japanese Government approval 
of a request for project aid, it was not a sufficient condition. 
Nevertheless, the concentration of project aid on a few recipients - 
especially Indonesia - was matched by the concentration of surveys. One 
was impossible without the other and each "fed off the other".
Because different surveys were needed at successive stages to 
complete a project, the implementation of one project could require 
three or four surveys. Even though the identification and conception of 
projects could be informal, the survey could help formalise and organise 
the project and enable it to be more readily assessed. Surveys 
themselves could provide a vital link in the "aid cycle" beyond the 
emergence and completion of individual projects. By their nature, 
surveys involved the analysis of conditions outside the immediate 
project site; they laid the foundation not only for later aid to the 
project, but also to other projects. Surveys, and those who carried 
them out, were a motive force in the "aid cycle".
JICA and Surveys
Official funds for surveys were incorporated in the JICA 
budget after the MFA and MITI budget requests. In 1976, the 
development survey vote was ¥4,081 million and, from MITI, ¥2,658 million
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for overseas development planning surveys. The total of ¥6,739 million
5represented 16.7 percent of the whole JICA budget for 1976. In 1977,
however, this figure rose -to ¥8,710 million, 29.2 percent above the 1976
allocation. Development surveys were a growing area of JICA's work,
particularly with new allowances for surveys of large scale projects and
increased government assistance to private organisations undertaking 
6surveys.
JICA's development survey functions were coordinated by four
of its departments, each (except for the Planning and Coordination
Department) concerned only with its specified tasks and supervised by a
different ministry. The Technical Cooperation and Development
Cooperation Divisions of the MFA's Economic Cooperation Bureau set
guidelines in their coordination of technical aid budgeting, but the
translation of these into concrete programs was left to the operating
departments of JICA. The Mining and Industry Planning and Survey
Department came under the indirect control of MITI's Technical
Cooperation Division and, to a lesser extent, the Resources and Energy
Agency, from which it received commissions of resources development 
7surveys. The Agricultural and Forestry Planning and Survey Department 
worked in close cooperation with the International Cooperation Division 
of the MAF's International Department, although formally contact was 
made via the MFA's Economic Cooperation Bureau. The Social Development 
Cooperation Department administered development work in other sectors, 
such as construction, transport, welfare and so on. While the Department 
was responsible to the MFA, other ministries (Construction, Welfare, 
Transport, Posts and Telegraphs) had a voice in its management.
The year's program for development surveys resulted from 
budget talks between JICA and ministry officials, the budget request and
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the MOF response. JICA departments were able to influence the structure 
of the request and its distribution by region, country and sector through 
informal and formal channels, usually through personal and working 
relationships between individual officers. The backlog of requests for 
surveys was often three times the limit of available resources, so the 
final selection was subject to many pressures. Surveys linked to loan- 
base projects were given priority, after talks with the First Economic 
Cooperation Division of the MFA Economic Cooperation Bureau. Some 
critics rather ungraciously dubbed the JICA survey budget domburi kanjo, 
or "scrambled egg accounting", in which post-budget expenditure bore no 
relation to pre-budget itemisation. Certainly the names of surveys 
requested at budget time were only a preliminary ordering of priorities. 
The final sorting was done after the budget was decided in January- 
February, by the different JICA departments in consultation with 
ministries. The priorities for final selection went beyond the rational 
process of semi-programming leading up to budget request. Survey policy 
was as dependent on the pressures of the bilateral aid relationship as 
any loan approval.
Selection of survey proposals was subject to more than 
administrative criteria and economic arguments, for the same systemic 
distortions appeared at the level of surveys as they did for other aid. 
Indonesia, Thailand and similar well-placed recipients were given 
precedence and, in the Indonesian case, the IGGI project listings were 
the reference for choice. Links to loan aid were weighed in the light 
of the availability of loan credits to particular countries: new loan
recipients usually had to wait between four and five years for the next 
credit, which affected the timing of surveys. Project expense was 
another consideration, for recipients were said to be ranked according
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to allowable cost of project, presumably calculated by credit
g
worthiness, economic prospects and the like.
Other criteria were also applied, and not only by the 
immediately responsible officers. Development surveys undertaken by 
technical assistance charted the way for capital aid in the years 
ahead. Regional bureaus and other divisions in the MFA Economic 
Cooperation Bureau (or MITI) could be involved, depending on the 
country or the interests at stake. After the budget negotiations certain 
aid relationships and certain projects impinged on policy details. At 
this point pressures from companies likely to carry out surveys were 
apparent.
A further consideration was the type of survey envisaged.
The three successive stages in project surveying - investigation,
feasibility, design and supervision - were separate policy items, the
success of one being a prerequisite for approval of the next. It was
possible for all stages to be carried out by the same group, frequently
a firm of engineering consultants, but this would not always happen.
Preliminary studies were made by teams of officials from JICA and
related ministries, although project finding and identification were
sometimes contracted out to organisations like the IDC. Surveys could
be undertaken by groups of private firms under the sponsorship of the
ECFA or by single companies themselves. The results of surveys conducted
by groups were, in principle, made available only to the commissioning
agent but, in practice, were dispersed irregularly to other interested
parties. IDC teams, for instance, could comprise specialists from
9government, business and academic circles.
It was usual for the later, technical stages of project
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assessment, such as feasibility and project design and supervision, to 
be contracted to engineering consultancy firms. This practice was 
derived from the traditionally close association of the industry with 
aid projects and from the fact that in 1976 JICA still had insufficient 
technical staff or experience to itself carry out surveys on any large 
scale. This was in spite of the conviction of many officials that JICA 
should develop this capability. Engineering consultants were a growing 
industry which was dependent on government assistance and on work 
derived from government sponsored projects. At the same time, they 
filled an important gap in the life of projects at a stage where problems 
were numerous and could easily lead to the breakdown of the aid process. 
Rondinelli lists as difficulties: (i) differences in perceptions and
goals among funding agencies, recipients, technical experts and others; 
(ii) insufficient appreciation of local conditions; and (iii) inadequate 
preparation and design skills.10 Consultants bridged stages in project 
development by the Japanese; they could offset these problems and 
compensate for the lack of expertise and local knowledge in the Japanese 
domestic administration. Interdependence with the decision-making 
process was their watchword, however, since aid policy was, for some 
companies, their own raison d'etre.
The Engineering Consultants' Industry
In contrast to the West, where engineering consulting services 
developed first in the nineteenth century, Japan's industry was still 
young in 1976.11 It grew after the Second World War under the influence 
of a few energetic and determined men. While firms depended on an 
upsurge in the domestic economy for their survival, the extension of 
the Japanese economic presence into Asia was assisted by the industry;
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so too was the expansion of exports of Japanese heavy manufactures.
The early years after the war saw the establishment of a number of
consulting firms, largely independent of existing business interests,
and by 1951 two of the most active in 1976 were in existence, Nippon
Koei (established June 1946) and Pacific Consultants (September 1951).
With the increasing expansion of the Japanese economy after the mid-
1950s, the consulting industry grew, and between 1954 and 1965, 31 firms
were set up. In 1964, the ECFA was established. Japanese reparations
contracts were responsible for much of the early growth in the overseas
consulting industry, and its further development in the 1960s was closely
associated with the expansion of Japanese Government aid flows and with
contracts resulting from assistance by multilateral organisations to 
13Asian countries. Southeast Asian economic development provided
14consultants with their most valuable market. This experience was 
typified by the case of Nippon Koei, the oldest and, in 1976, the largest 
civil engineering consulting firm in Japan.
Nippon Koei Company Limited
The roots of the Nippon Koei Company extended to prewar days,
when Kubota Yutaka founded the Korea Power Company (Chosen denryoku
kabushiki kaisha) and the Yalu River Hydro-electric Power Company
(Chosen-manshu oryokko suiryoku hatsuden kabushiki kaisha)."1'^ His
companies completed many major development projects in Korea and
Manchuria during the latter days of the Japanese Occupation, particularly
dams and water resources projects. Before and during the Second World
War, their work continued in China and Vietnam also and Kubota was
called on in 1942 to survey the Lake Toba-Asahan region of Northern
Sumatra for the Japanese Occupation Forces. 16
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After the war, former members of the companies reassembled in 
Tokyo and Kubota formed the Shinko sangyo kensetsusha in June 1946 with 
a capital of ¥190,000. Its name was changed to Nippon koei kabushiki 
kaisha in October 1947. The company undertook several domestic 
reconstruction projects, including water resources, electricity and 
other civil engineering contracts. The company's postwar overseas 
operations began with a foreign tour in late 1953 by Kubota, which 
proved a successful gamble in opening up markets for the company and, it 
seems, resulted in a broader relationship between Japan and countries of 
Southeast Asia.
Kubota was not one to lose an opportunity. In Burma, he is
said to have "come across" United States consultants' reports on proposed
electricity generation schemes and one, at Balu-Chaung, attracted his
attention. Subsequently, on the plane to Europe he drafted, and from
Paris sent, a letter requesting permission from the Burmese Government
to survey the project further. The acceptance reached him in Mexico,
he flew back to Burma in December 1953 and, as a result, a team of six
Nippon Koei engineers undertook an initial study. A contract for the
later stages of the project was not signed until April 1954 because of
competition from an English company. The Burmese had originally intended
to raise finance for the project themselves, but decided to request funds
from the Japanese Government through a reparations agreement, and Kubota
claimed that reparations were in fact first mooted because of the
17Burmese need for finance for Balu-Chaung development. The project,
18costing ¥10,390 million, was the largest single item in the reparations 
agreement and over a ten year period Nippon Koei undertook consultancy 
and supervisory responsibility for all stages.
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Kubota went to South Vietnam in 1955 and offered to survey
the Da Nhim Dam scheme, part of the Mekong River development program,
and a site he had known of during the war, when it was surveyed by the
Japanese Government. After a decision by the Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), Nippon Koei won out over a tender by a
French company, but finance again proved a problem. The Export-Import
Bank (Eximbank) was considered, but reparations talks were then in
progress and it was decided to make Da Nhim development the main
reparations project. An Eximbank loan of ¥2,700 million was made in
19November 1960 for the purpose. Between 1955 and 1964, Nippon Koei
saw the project through to its completion and followed this with a
survey of the Da Nhim power station and repairs to it in 1971-72 under
Japanese Government grant aid, and restoration of the Da Nhim-Saigon
transmission line in 1973-75, also under grant aid. These early successes
in South Vietnam assisted in Nippon Koei being asked by ECAFE's Water
Resources Bureau to undertake studies of a section of the Mekong Basin
development scheme, which led eventually to active Japanese participation
20in the Mekong Committee.
Work done for the United Nations helped extend Nippon Koei's
links with Laos initiated at the 1955 Tokyo meeting of the ECAFE. The
company was selected to undertake feasibility studies in the Upper and
Lower Nam Ngum River, and these were made between 1959 and 1962 through
a contribution from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
After the creation of the Nam Ngum Development Fund in 1966, Nippon Koei
was retained as engineering consultant and carried out surveys, design
21and construction supervision of the Nam Ngum hydro-electric project.
The Japanese Government made a grant to Laos for the Fund in 1966 and
loans in 1974 and 1976.
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This Laos connection was maintained. Japanese grants for 
extensions to Vientiane airport in 1969 and 1970 were the result of a 
Nippon Koei feasibility study and were implemented under its supervision. 
Other projects were carried out for the Mekong Committee and for the 
Asian Development Bank (ADD), and a Japanese Government grant for refugee 
resettlement in Na Phok was contracted to Nippon Koei in 1973 for design 
and construction supervision.
Links established with the UNDP through Laotian projects 
helped Nippon Koei gain the contract for survey of the Karnali Dam 
site in Nepal from 1962 to 1965. The company carried out a pre­
feasibility study on the Kulikhani hydro-electric scheme under commission 
from the OTCA in 1962-63 and completed the project with a further study 
in 1973-74 sponsored by the Japanese Government, and design and supervision
under a loan from the International Development Association (IDA) in 
221975. Nippon Koei also assisted in a study of Janakpur district 
agriculture sponsored by the OTCA, which led to a grant of machinery 
worth ¥45 million in 1972.^
Nippon Koei's ties with Indonesia - the strongest with any
of its country clients - were initiated by the reparations agreements
with Indonesia concluded in 1958. In fact, as Nishihara shows, "Kubota's
company ... gained nearly an exclusive hold over Indonesia's infrastructure
24projects under the reparations fund." It did this together with 
Kajima Construction Company, which built the projects. Kubota's desire 
to develop the Asahan region was not fulfilled under reparations, but his 
work on the so-called "3K dams" and development of the Brantas River 
region laid the foundation for a long and profitable relationship between 
the company and the Indonesian Government, and a widening aid relationship 
between Japan and Indonesia.
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Nishihara considers that major projects under the reparations
agreements were first proposed by "private experts" outside the official
reparations negotiations. He claims that Kubota lobbied successfully
with high Indonesian officials, including President Sukarno and others
25in the Ministry of Public Works, to gain the contracts. The first 
reparations projects involved surveys, design and supervision of the 
construction of the South Tulungagung reclamation scheme near Surabaya 
in East Java, which included construction of a new Neyama Tunnel for the 
diversion of water from the Brantas River. An earlier tunnel built 
during the Japanese Occupation had proved inefficient and Nippon Koei 
carried out the new work between 1959 and 1961. It became the first of 
a number of other projects in the Brantas region.
Two of the 3K dams were related to this development, those on 
the Karangkates and Konto Rivers, both tributaries of the Brantas. The 
third, the Riam Kanan dam, was located in South Kalimantan. All three 
were designed for hydro-electric generation. Studies were begun in 
1959 for the Karangkates project and in 1961 for the Kali Konto and Riam 
Kanan dams. Work on them was not completed until 1973, however, despite 
expectations of 1967 as a target date, and the high cost necessitated 
further IGGI-base loans in 1968, 1969 and 1973 totalling ¥16,398 million. 
This huge expenditure and the delays in construction occasioned some 
criticism of the selection of these particular projects under reparations 
agreements and of the methods employed by Nippon Koei in supervising the 
construction.^
Despite delays, other projects in the East Java region fell to 
Nippon Koei tender, a connection which has continued to the late 1970s. 
The company undertook survey and design in 1961-63 for the Wlingi Dam 
project, situated close to the Karangkates Dam. Japanese Government
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loans were extended in 1975 and 1976 for its completion and Nippon Koei
27again supervised construction. The firm surveyed and then completed
the Kali Porong river improvement project (loans 1970 and 1976) and Kali
Surabaya improvement (loans 1974 and 1976) and undertook a survey in
281971-72 commissioned by the OTCA of the Brantas River basin. Other 
water resources and power projects were also completed: Riam Kanan power
transmission (loan 1972), Wonogiri Dam in central Java (loan 1975), 
Bengawan Solo river basin project (OTCA study 1972) and Way Umpu and Way 
Pengubuan (South Sumatra) irrigation (loan 1974).
The same intense pattern of Nippon Koei operations was seen 
in South Korea, where Kubota and his staff had had successes in dam 
construction before the war. The Chunchon and Sumjinkang hydro­
electric projects were completed in 1962 and 1965 and in 1962 they 
undertook a survey for the So Yang Gang dam, which was taken up as a 
reparations project in 1965 and included in the Second Year Economic 
Cooperation Plan. Japanese loans were extended first in August 1967 
and later in 1968 and 1970. Nippon Koei received the contract for 
completion of the dam. It also tendered successfully for the Taechung 
multi-purpose dam project, for which a loan was made in 1974. The dam 
was still under construction in 1977.
Nippon Koei was one of the first Japanese consultant groups to
go into Africa after the war, and its work there in the mid-1960s
represented the first efforts of the newly established ECFA. Kubota's
personal connections helped there as they had done in other countries.
Nishihara quotes a source who claimed that President Sukarno offered in
291963 to introduce Kubota to President Nkrumah and the company history
30suggests the same. Assistance was gained from Ambassador Taishiro
and from the Japanese Embassy in Accra, and an invitation from the
289.
31President arrived for Kubota through diplomatic channels. A Nippon
Koei-ECFA team went to Ghana in 1964 and completed preliminary studies
of the White Volta River. 'Kubota flew to meet Nkrumah in Cairo and a
letter of intent from the Ghanaian Government followed soon after.
Arrangements were also made for the Japanese Government through the
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) to extend long-term credit
for further surveys, the first time this kind of finance had been made
32available for consultancy work.
Consultants in 1976
In 1976, there were 47 member firms of the ECFA, the main
association of engineering consultants in Japan. They embraced all
specialities, from general civil engineering to mapping, urban planning
and cement engineering. Over half of the companies had between 51 and
200 specialist staff and capitalisation was generally low, over 30
companies having assets of up to only ¥100 million. In 1972, only 3
33companies possessed capital of over ¥1,000 million. In international
terms, Japanese consultants proved to be weak competitors, gaining only
2.9 percent of UNDP contracts between 1959 and 1970, 7.3 percent of ADB
contracts up to September 1971 and only 0.6 percent of World Bank Group
34contracts between 1966 and 1970. In fact, about half of the companies
relied on overseas operations for less than 10 percent of their
business, while others depended for over 50 percent of their work on
35Japanese Government derived contracts.
The reasons for the diversity of consultancy firms lay in the 
problems they faced as an industry and as individual companies. There 
was no law regulating the industry, although companies were eligible for 
certain taxation concessions and export insurance. The weak
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international sense of the Japanese was also cited as working against
the recruitment of professional staff willing to work overseas. The
poor foreign linguistic capabilities of some companies could be decisive
in their overseas business. The Japanese university system was said to
3 6train economists and engineers too specialised for general consulting.
The low capital base of companies lessened opportunities for active 
promotion overseas and the gradual untying of Japanese aid from donor 
country procurement made their position more uncertain.
The ECFA was one of 11 or more consulting firm associations 
in Japan and was one of the most vigorous lobbyists for the consultants' 
cause. The other large group, the Japan Consulting Institute (Nihon 
puranto kyokai) was set up in 1957 to promote exports of heavy 
engineering equipment. It was absorbed into the Japan External Trade 
Organisation (JETRO) in April 1971 and until then had been very 
successful in securing contracts for exports of Japanese plant and 
equipment. The ECFA was the main spokesman for consultants in the mid- 
1970s and through it the bulk of government financial assistance to 
consultants was channelled.
The ECFA called itself "an information centre linking clients 
abroad with ECFA member consulting firms". It provided also an 
additional source of advice to Japanese Government ministries and 
agencies considering aid project implementation. It undertook surveys 
overseas at its own expense (but with MITI subsidy) and encouraged member 
firms to initiate projects themselves. The ECFA was in fact set up on 
the understanding that government ministries would support its 
financing. The then Deputy Director of MITI's Technical Cooperation 
Division, Yamaguchi Jinshu, was one of a small group in and around 
MITI who urged taxation concessions and government funding of the
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proposed group and it was agreed that these measures would apply from 
fiscal 1964. Yamaguchi became the ECFA's Director in 1964 and was 
still in that position in 1976.
The ECFA was prominent both in identifying projects and in
assisting members to secure contracts. In its own words, "to support
member companies in winning contracts for development projects, we
send survey teams to various countries and conduct site surveys, gather
37information and undertake preliminary negotiations". Survey teams
were composed of members either from one company alone or from several
member firms. Project identification was especially designed to help
members bring new projects to the attention of developing country
governments, in the hope of tendering successfully for the contract at
a later date. Of the 984 surveys undertaken between 1964 and 1974, 100
3 8or about 10 percent led to a member firm securing the contract.'
Of 1,165 projects listed in the Association's History as
surveyed between 1964 and 1973, there was a clear bias towards Asia.
644 were in that region, followed by 223 in the Middle East, 127 in the
Americas, 110 in Africa, 21 in Europe, 21 in Oceania and 19 for
international agencies. Within this distribution, Indonesia was the
country with the largest number of projects assessed (127), followed
by the Philippines (115) and Iran (78) . In all, teams were sent to 84
different countries, although it seems that EGFA assistance benefited
a few companies in particular among the 47 members. Over the period,
with the support of the ECFA, Nippon Koei took part in 164 project
surveys (14.1 percent), Pacific Consultants International (PCI) 207
39(17.8 percent) and Sanyu Consultants 273 (23.4 percent).
Success in tendering followed in ratios closely proportionate 
to company survey efforts. Of 81 major contracts gained by members
292.
between 1964 and 1973, 22 were won by Nippon Koei (27.2 percent), 13 by
PCI (16.0 percent) and 20 by Sanyu (24.7 percent). At the same time,
Sanyu, for example, concentrated its effort in only five countries: the
Philippines, Indonesia, East Pakistan (Bangladesh), Afghanistan and Iran.
PCI was heavily involved in the Middle East, while Nippon Koei spread
40its resources across many countries, which certainly proved profitable.
For consultants, aid projects were not an end in themselves but 
simply a means to increase profit and further business opportunity. Life, 
however, as an overseas consultant (as a number of executives put it) was 
not easy and earnings were hard won. Survival demanded a constant 
generation of new development projects and possibilities, which was why a 
company like Sanyu sent out so many project identification teams and why 
the investment of men, money and time in developing familiarity with 
particular countries or regions and their governments was necessary.
Overseas consulting was an industry which was created by foreign
aid. Not only did the Japanese Government support it with contracts, but
also it gave the industry direct assistance, which was itself classified
as a component of the aid program (as technical aid); consultants
therefore contributed to Japan's aid performance in two ways. The IDC
41depended on work from JICA to operate, and the ECFA relied for about
one quarter of its income on contributions from the MITI technical aid 
42budget. In the 1976 Budget ¥116.8 million was allocated for ECFA
assistance (see Table 8-5). Other consulting associations also received
43government subsidies to assist their operations.
Financial support was only one aspect of government policy 
to promote the consulting industry. The ECFA always ensured that the 
interests of the industry were well publicised: the diary of ECFA
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activities between April 1964 and December 1973 recorded constant
meetings between Association officials and bureaucrats in all related
ministries. They could not possibly have been unaware of the ECFA's
44presence or purpose. Ministries in 1976 readily acknowledged the 
ECFA's communications function in project identification and preparation.
Government assistance also allowed consultants to participate
in official JICA surveys, inclusion of consultants under provisions for
export insurance, taxation concessions (created in a law passed for the
purpose in April 1964, soon after the ECFA was established), debt
insurance and, more recently in 1977, bond insurance. There seemed,
however, to be few concrete proposals beyond these. The 1976 MITI
economic cooperation report referred vaguely to the need for guidance in
45forming company consortia, while the Advisory Council on Overseas
Economic Cooperation in 1975 suggested rather tamely that "in future, it
is desirable that consultants obtain work from the first surveys and
planning through to design and construction supervision. This can
46improve consistency in projects." The recommendations on the
consulting industry made in the 1971 report on technical cooperation
47evoked no new initiatives from the ministries. The need seen then for 
inexperienced companies to gain more overseas work by a sharing of JICA 
commissions was not satisfied, as we shall see.
The attempts by the ECFA and by other consultant associations 
in 1976 to persuade the Japanese Government to give more direct loans 
for consultancies ("engineering loans") not only publicised their own
cause but also touched some raw official nerves because of rivalries
48between the OECF and JICA regarding the implementation of surveys.
The participation of consultants in debate about aid administration 
revealed how close they were to aid policy. While aid was for them a
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means to make money, they had become essential to the aid process. They 
grew on aid and aid grew because of them. Their energy compensated for 
the conservatism and inertia of the Japanese aid bureaucracy.
Arranging Surveys
Development surveys, as we said, were carried out mainly under 
technical assistance programs administered by JICA. The later stages of 
the project - detailed design, construction supervision - were completed 
under loan agreements, the recipient government assuming formal control 
of the letting and management of contracts. These two separate sections 
of project implementation were not, however, unrelated and, as seen in 
connection with Nippon Koei, consulting work was often the link in all 
stages of projects and across projects. Explanation, however, is 
elusive: was there a causal relationship between consultants and the
movement of the "aid cycle", or were consultants the servants of the 
foreign aid process?
While the phases of project surveying were in theory 
straightforward - general pre-feasibility assessment, feasibility study, 
cost benefit analysis, design and construction - one senior JICA official, 
Tanaka Tsuneo, pointed out that in practice it was difficult for this 
order to be retained. There was a tendency, especially with projects 
becoming larger, for the project's feasibility to be assessed before 
complete surveys had been finalised, for funds to be committed before 
surveys had been made, or for surveys to be conducted according to 
cost benefit rankings of projects irrespective of the social and 
economic implications. Tanaka wrote that these inconsistencies occurred 
for several reasons, including the political nature of recipient requests, 
the eagerness of private interests for profit and the lack of government
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policy on survey methods, such as the World Bank and others had 
49instituted.
Political and economic constraints on surveys were serious 
indeed and the way these operated was directly relevant to bilateral 
aid policies. There were, however, structural problems which posed 
barriers to what JICA saw as appropriate reforms. The 1974 annual JICA 
report cited a need for survey budgets to be increased before qualitative 
improvement was possible, more planning of aid (including country 
programming, better use of international resources etc.), proper use of 
consultants by "proposal contracting" and greater consistency in 
official supervision. A more fundamental issue identified was decision­
making within the Government itself, for efficient surveying and project 
assessment depended on the rational and scientific use of information, in 
conjunction with country planning accepted by all sections of the 
administration.
The choice of consultant for feasibility studies frequently 
determined the progress of projects and bilateral aid relationships.
For surveys done under technical cooperation programs (project finding, 
pre-feasibility, feasibility), JICA was the managing agency, although 
the Mining and Metals Agency also carried out some in mining and 
prospecting. In 1976, consultants were chosen to participate in project 
surveys from fairly flexible criteria. There was no actual tender 
system in operation in Japan, although both parties, official and 
private, recognised that tendering was a possible alternative. Some of 
the larger and more experienced firms, being accustomed to tendering, did 
not oppose it. Surveys involving private consultants were supervised by 
a committee, composed of officials from the competent ministry and from 
relevant JICA departments. JICA provided the administrative backup for
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this committee.
It was not the committees but JICA which was responsible for
selecting the consultant to carry out a survey. The choice, however,
was the result of discussion between committee members and JICA personnel
and, of course, prospective consultants. The committee's effectiveness
could differ according to the area of work. Agricultural and Mining and
Industry Departments maintained supervisory committees only for
"important" projects, that is large and expensive undertakings (such as
the Purari River surveys in Papua New Guinea) or those related to
government loans or diplomatic considerations. Sources, however, from
the Social Development Cooperation Department put a figure of 90 percent
52on consultant surveys with supervisory committees.
Feasibility studies were commissioned by "invitation proposal", 
for which JICA approached a consultant group. Invitations were made 
after pre-feasibility studies done by JICA teams had been finalised and 
JICA's own analysis completed. JICA's public attitude was one of 
"fairness" (kohei no tachiba), consistent with the policy of the 
Japanese Government of promoting the development of the whole consultant 
industry. Fairness, however, was tempered by an appreciation of the 
type of survey involved and of where it was to be carried out.
Analysis of surveys listed by JICA as completed by itself
and by its predecessor, the OTCA, between 1962 and 1973, showed a
reasonable spread of work between the main consultants in different 
53sectors. While the largest general consultants carried out 
infrastructure project surveys (electrification, irrigation, water 
resources, roads, bridges etc.), surveys for specialised projects were 
contracted to firms catering to that restricted demand. Thus Japan
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Airport Consultants Incorporated completed surveys for airport projects 
(such as in Vientiane), Mitsui Kinzoku Engineering and others were used 
for mining and prospecting studies, Universal Marine Consultants 
undertook marine resources surveys, Pacific Aero or Asia Air Survey 
did mapping, while Nihon Suido Consultants or Tokyo Engineering 
Consultants were commissioned to study urban water and sewerage systems.
Government promotion of consultants aimed to build up the 
experience of the industry by encouraging the development of less 
experienced firms, but attitudes about the low quality of consultants 
were entrenched in the bureaucracy. MFA officials complained in 1976 
that consultants needed constant supervision and that the poor work
54produced confirmed that JICA was the most appropriate surveying agency.
The MAF regarded only five or six companies as being effective in 
agricultural projects, while MITI officials admitted that a wide 
performance gap existed between large and small firms in spite of 
government policies to narrow it. A company's experience, therefore, 
remained significant in the choice of consultant, notwithstanding the 
official attitude against resorting to that criterion.
Experience, however, was a broad concept and could be judged 
in many ways. Experience in the kind of project and in the country in 
question was recognised as essential. This related to the company's 
previous jobs and to its familiarity with the country, its language and 
even with the district in which the project was planned. The ability 
of the company to project itself as specialising in certain fields or 
country was often decisive. Nippon Koei, as we have seen, built its 
business on proven skills in water resources engineering and on an 
association with Indonesia, South Korea, Vietnam and Nepal. This helped 
it accumulate local knowledge, a reputation within the recipient government
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and a linguistic capacity within the firm. The establishment of branch 
offices in the country also represented a longer-term commitment by the 
company to its relations with the country, and an institutionalisation 
of its local presence.
As the example of Nippon Koei showed, country experience was
cumulative, leading to a steady stream of projects and contacts by
companies over a period of years. Project finding was crucial in company
development and consultant firms set up as subsidiaries of larger
55industrial or trading concerns (about half of the total) were able to
56draw on contracts from parent and related companies. Apart from these 
obvious ties, such firms relied on companies within their group for 
information about likely jobs. Consultants associated with trading 
companies were particularly assisted in this respect.
Independent firms faced a more difficult task in building 
overseas expertise. One company, founded in 1962 and in 1976 one of the 
most respected firms of engineering consultants in Japan, specialised in 
desert irrigation and was recognised as being best equipped to handle 
civil engineering projects in Iran. This reputation, however, took over 
ten years to build, and the company admitted to having fostered relations 
of trust and confidence with the Iranian Government "by the expenditure 
of large amounts of money and time". Past effort spent in cultivating 
younger bureaucrats, especially in the Water and Power Ministry, and 
demonstration of the company's own expertise, paid off in easy relations 
with important ministers. This company, in 1976, claimed to have 20-30 
engineers on its staff with experience in and knowledge of Iranian 
conditions. ^
This firm's second overseas survey in 1965, that for the
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Taleghan irrigation scheme, was funded by the OTCA and was the Agency's
first survey in Iran. The company carried that project through to its
construction stage. It was also involved in OTCA/JICA's agricultural
irrigation project at Sistan from 1 9 6 8 . The firm claimed success in
several South Korean projects (notably the Yong San Gang irrigation
development, the initial survey for which was requested by South Korea's
Agricultural Development Corporation) and a contract to survey the
construction of Cairo's water supply. A request for yen loans to carry
59this out was under consideration by the Japanese Government in 1976.
The choice of consultant for a Government sponsored survey
thus required detailed investigation of the background of the request to
the Japanese Government, for selection was often contingent on the
relationships between projects and companies. For that reason, the
Director of JICA's Survey and Planning Department, Tanaka Tsuneo, cited
the need to gain detailed information on proposals at the top of the
list of procedures for survey decisions. He saw this to be necessary
because of the political and economic incentives for requesting: (a) the
recipient's own political and economic judgements; (b) assessments in
Japan of the need to rectify trade imbalances; (c) diplomatic necessity;
(d) opinions of visiting technical advisers; (e) suggestions by
international organisations; and (f) profit seeking by private 
60enterprise.
The information Tanaka required, but until 1976 often gathered 
in insufficient depth by the Japanese Government, concerned where the 
proposed survey stood in the LDC's national plans, details of the survey 
itself, cost estimates, counterpart administration and so forth. 
Specifically, officials needed to know how the project to be surveyed 
was first identified and by whom, for although consultant firms were
301.
valued for their professional neutrality and objectivity, maintenance of 
those ethical standards was not always possible in a competitive 
industry. In fact, the corporate links between 20 or so consultants and 
other private enterprises suggested preferences for close association 
between consultants and affiliated companies with overseas interests. 
Many relied on affiliates for the bulk of their work, at least in the 
early years. Parent firms might also prefer consultants close to them 
to complete surveys, thus assisting in the parent's successful tendering 
if a project were found to be feasible.^1
Information, therefore, was essential both for the consultants 
and for the Japanese Government. A consultant's intelligence was best 
gained at the earliest stages of project identification, and missions 
sponsored by the ECFA were useful in this regard. About 10 percent of 
the missions led to survey contracts for member firms. In the final 
choice of a company to carry out a survey, those with knowledge of the 
project had a distinct advantage. This was accepted by officials in all 
JICA departments associated with survey work, by ministry officials and 
by consultants themselves.
After knowledge of country, even locality, and experience, 
it was advantageous to be connected with the project in some way. 
Application of all of these criteria applied especially to surveys in 
civil engineering fields, where competition between large firms of 
consultants was tough. Bigger firms found it far easier to accumulate 
inside knowledge. They had the resources to tap intelligence in many 
countries and had lines of communication to both recipient and Japanese 
governments. The lack of sophisticated data-handling mechanisms in the 
Japanese aid administration left smaller consultants at a definite
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disadvantage in the competition for contracts. Companies which had 
been associated with a project since its inception were hard to beat.
The choice was therefore dependent on factors other than 
objective assessment of the relative skills of likely contractors. 
Consultants realised the benefits of project finding, although smaller 
firms found the investment in that kind of exercise prohibitive, despite 
ECFA assistance. One of the largest companies undertook up to 6 special 
project finding surveys each year and many more project identification 
surveys. The small capital base of consultants (relative to other 
industries) demanded their constant efforts at project identification and 
promotion. Officials admitted that most projects surveyed had their 
origins in the initiatives of private enterprise, although a precise 
evaluation of that claim was difficult.
When a company wanted the Japanese Government to take up a
6 2project requested by the recipient country, the firm made representations
to JICA and to the ministries. The consultant for a survey was chosen
by the relevant JICA department after discussions with the associated
ministry. Which ministry depended on the type of survey envisaged, for
the MAF vetted agricultural surveys, MITI those for mining and industry,
6 3Construction those for public works and so on. While surveys to be 
undertaken in any one year were decided tentatively before the budget 
request for that year, changes were made after budget allocation and 
decisions about which surveys would be carried out and by whom were not 
made for budgeting. On the other hand, as the representatives of one 
firm of consultants put it, commonsense business practice and their own 
forward accounting demanded that ministries were made aware of company 
interests. It became fairly evident which projects companies would 
expect to receive in the following financial year.
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The specialist ministries had their own preferential lists of
consultants, "their own standards and favourite companies", and it seems
that the ministry's choice was a telling factor in the final decision.
JICA officials claimed that they in fact had the formal responsibility
in choosing and could thereby refuse work to consultants close to
particular ministries, in order to uphold the Government policy of
fairness in letting contracts. They admitted, however, thst such
refusals were few; the strength of ministry opinions within JICA
64departments lessened the chances of conflict considerably.
Exchange of information was greatly assisted by the ECFA,
especially in its sponsorship of project identification missions, but
it was not altogether clear what role the ECFA, and other consultant
associations, exercised in decisions about projects. Certainly the
associations participated in the daily round of informal discussions on
projects and surveys, and the MFA and other ministries were careful to
keep informed of the progress of studies and projects sponsored by the
ECFA. This was included in the ministries' aid intelligence operations.
6 5Officials of specialist ministries, especially MITI and Construction, 
were the most frequent points of contact, and MITI had an officer 
assigned specifically for ECFA liaison. Ministries were careful to 
point out, however, that the ECFA was not part of the formal decision­
making process.
The MAF, in contrast, did seek the recommendation of the 
Agricultural Development Consultants' Association (Nogyo kaihatsu 
konsarutantsu kyokai) after negotiations with companies through the 
Association.^ The advice was passed along to JICA to assist in the 
final decision, although the MAF, as we said earlier, considered that 
any choice would be between only a few companies, on the basis of
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experience in and relation to the project involved.
On balance, the ECFA and its sister associations were important 
in the early stages of projects and, despite their primary functions as 
coordinating and promotional bodies, they could influence the climate of 
opinion about appropriate consultants for proposed surveys. This 
extended to discussions with responsible officers in JICA and the 
ministries.
Design and Construction Supervision
The later stages of projects again provided work for 
engineering consultants but were usually funded by government loans or 
grants, rather than by technical assistance. It is relevant here to 
consider whether later stages of projects were in fact carried out by 
the same group which undertook feasibility studies or even project 
identification studies.
It was in a consultant firm's interest to manage all stages
of a project, but it is not altogether clear how often this happened
and it was not possible, on the available evidence, to calculate how many
of the loan projects being implemented in 1976 were managed in this way.
Since loan contracts were put out to international tender, it was not
always easy for Japanese tenders to win. Some recipient governments
preferred later stages of projects to be financed by the same donor which
provided the initial surveys. Some also preferred the same consultants
6 7to advise, even though official policy made no such provision.
Some Japanese officials declared that few projects were handled
by one company through all stages, while others considered it to be quite 
6 8common. Examination of the project listings of selected consultants
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(Table 8-6) gives some idea of how companies saw their own achievements, 
and from the figures it would seem that little pattern existed, except 
that the large proportion of consultants' work consisted of feasibility 
studies. The older and bigger firms with overall skills (Nippon Koei,
Sanyu, PCI, Electric Power Development Company, Nippon Telecommunications) 
won contracts for later stages, as did specialists like Universal Marine.
It is likely that the biases already existing in the system 
in favour of a few large companies - due to experience, resources 
available for the development of project ideas, and Japanese officials' 
attitudes to consultants - were strengthened at the later stages of 
projects. Despite Japanese Government supervision, it was not possible 
for policy on consultant promotion to be rigidly adhered to, since 
tenders were the responsibility of the recipient government. The 
principle of "fairness" could be applied less easily. The success of 
consultants was dependent more on their own efforts at the recipient 
end, and in this respect the long-term associations of companies with 
recipients took on real significance. The connections between companies 
and projects were also of influence, although there was no guarantee that 
companies could successfully tender for a project in which they had 
invested time or money.
The Japanese Government was not isolated from this selection 
process. Tenders were called by the recipient governnent but the MFA 
and the OECF, in the case of Indonesia, for example, tried to ensure 
that at least one Japanese firm was included on any short list of tenderers. 
Likewise, in cases where capital grants were being extended, the MFA's 
Second Economic Cooperation Division assisted the recipient administration
in contracting arrangements.
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As business houses consultants still worked behind the scenes 
to ensure participation in projects. In one sense, consultants acted 
as "agents" for the Japanese Government in project finding and 
identification, given the officially negative attitude to initiating aid. 
These efforts helped both consultants and the OECF, for example, when 
there were understandings about the kinds of projects the Government 
considered appropriate. It was up to consultants themselves to persuade 
governments of developing countries of the benefits of projects, and the 
Japanese Government of their long-term worth. One consultant put it 
more colourfully as "selling" ideas to recipients and "coaxing" money 
from Japanese officials. Whatever the term, the bridging, communication 
function of consultants in early and later stages of projects was clear. 
Consultants claimed a spontaneity lacking in the Government, which 
depended on requests as the formal initiation of aid work. Consultants 
were at the forefront of the "aid cycle", pushing and probing for new 
business. Commercial practice provided a momentum otherwise missing 
from the Japanese aid process.
Consultants were therefore a purposeful vehicle for the building 
of relations, at the business and government level, between developing 
countries and Japan. We noted how consultants often concentrated their 
efforts on building contacts with certain recipient governments. They 
were, of course, only one of a number of Japanese representatives, both 
official and private, in these nations, but they were one of the more 
mobile and flexible groups. Despite the focus of Japanese aid being 
narrowed onto the work of a few consultant companies operating in a 
handful of recipient countries, consultants were nevertheless instrumental
in initiating aid to new recipients.
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Nippon Koei/ for instance, broadened Japanese policy in this 
way in the early years of reparations and in promoting the Asahan project. 
In addition, it began surveys on the East Meskene irrigation project in 
Syria in 1974 with a Japanese Government loan of ¥8,858 million by 
Eximbank and city banks in June 1973. One other large firm's efforts in 
1976 to organise assistance to irrigation projects in Afghanistan might 
also produce aid flows, although its executives were somewhat pessimistic 
about their ability to persuade the Afghani Government to accept company 
proposals
Conclusion: Consultants and the Aid Cycle
Development surveys were essential to Japanese aid policy-making 
in three important ways:
(a) they provided the hard information on which aid projects were 
assessed for "aid worthiness", and were the chief source of 
general information on the detailed economic needs of recipient 
countries. An accumulation of survey reports provided a rich 
body of intelligence, if used for that purpose;
(b) they acted as the most effective filter for aid proposals and 
were essential to policy-making for types of aid and for aid 
to countries or regions. They relieved officials of much of 
the responsibility of sorting requests;
(c) they were the justification for future aid flows and could 
influence the direction and size of aid to individual 
recipients. Project feasibility was a gateway to aid beyond
the immediate project.
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Surveys did not, however, make all decisions easier for 
bureaucrats. Indeed, the system's limitations - budgets, manpower, 
regulations - imposed the need to pre-select proposals before studies 
were made, to enable a manageable aid program to be developed. 
Feasibility became a more sophisticated tool for sorting an already 
restricted list of potential aid projects.
Consultants were therefore also essential to policy-making, 
since the choice of projects to be surveyed was in itself a policy item:
(a) Consultants had an intelligence function, but a more precise 
one than surveys. In publicising their own projects they 
politicised the culling of requests but in so doing gave 
officials the information necessary on recipient thinking 
about projects. They complemented the task of officials in 
ranking requests.
(b) The informal articulation of consultants' interests, in 
helping attach priorities to proposals, influenced the 
eventual allocation of aid funds, first of technical aid and, 
later, of loan funds as projects advanced to the construction 
stage. Consultants indeed often were the main connection 
between the early and later stages of projects.
(c) This gave coherence to aid policies (especially the link 
between technical and capital aid), but at the same time led 
capital aid into predetermined paths. Allocation was 
frequently set by the manner in which a project had been 
identified and surveyed (and by whom), and by the energy of 
the company in pursuing its business in particular districts
or countries.
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(d) The projects undertaken by consultants naturally revealed, 
or generated, new aid possibilities, which companies were 
keen to promote. The consultant's aggressive search for 
such opportunities was the real drive for the "aid cycle".
The relationship, therefore, between aid and consultants was 
essentially one of interdependence. Consultants, as the most active 
section of the whole aid system, took from the ministries much of the 
responsibility for initiating new policies, but did so because they 
were private enterprises, seeking to maximise profit in an unpredictable 
business where government policies were far from clear.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis began with three principal objectives. It 
sought, firstly, to discover how Japan, an important aid donor, made 
her foreign aid policy. This task required answers to two other 
questions: how the Japanese national bureaucracy participated in the
policy process and, on a more general plane, what defined a policy 
area such as foreign aid.
Japanese Aid Policy: The Donor's Dilemma
As suggested in the Introduction to this thesis, Japanese 
foreign aid policies were not the child of political pressures, elite 
decision-making or development arguments. The evidence presented in 
the chapters above supports the hypothesis that the structure and 
style of the domestic aid administration determined policy. This 
occurred in several ways:
(a) The structure of the bureaucracy within the government and 
confusion about the purposes of aid contributed to bureaucratic 
change. Disputes over where the rightful "home" for aid lay, 
led to the rapid creation of competing administrations, and 
served to preserve and strengthen ministerial ideologies.
(b) This dissociation of structures and perceptions spilled over 
into the government context. There the primacy of procedures 
and the dominance of the short-term perspective encouraged 
the view of aid as a quantity, a bureaucratic resource which 
had to be controlled. Aid was seen not so much as a national
policy as an annually budgeted tool of policy-makers.
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(c) The internal dynamics of the aid process, which lacked real 
direction or commitment, were disordered. The relationships 
between types of aid were tenuous and constantly changing 
so, although limited, budgeting was the most effective filter 
for the mass of items and policy emphases.
(d) The inertia of the Japanese aid organisation tied policy 
into a procedural routine; the predominant motive was 
defensive. Where responsibility was diffused, political will 
inconsistent and where policies of low political import 
overlapped ministerial boundaries, the costs of coordination 
increased and policy descended into temporary compromises 
along lines already tried and tested. Innovation and the 
development of new aid policy, however, were not characteristic 
of the system, not even of its lowest levels.1 Chapter 4 
demonstrated, in fact, how the workplace environment promoted 
the defence of territory and jurisdiction, and how difficult
it proved for aid questions to be aired across ministries with 
any force. Even where it did occur, as with the creation of 
JICA, only when disputes became political did aid become an 
issue.
(e) Apart from controls and procedures, another emphasis of the 
aid bureaucracy was projects, and at this level only was there 
innovation, because of the initiative and energy of those 
outside the bureaucracy. The "aid cycle" was used to analyse 
bilateral relationships in terms of the hardening of 
directions of aid flows. The concept suggested that policies 
were themselves important in strengthening biases in the 
system and, in turn, future aid. Implementation helped
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identify new policy possibilities and narrow future policy 
options. This is one of the thesis' most far-reaching 
conclusions; it is directly relevant to questions of the 
mechanics of policy change and reform: Japanese aid policies
are to a great extent outcomes independent of policy-makers' 
actions.
(f) Aggressive and forward-looking behaviour, by consultants and 
others, had two effects: not only did it enlarge the size
and scope of aid flows, but also it tended to push policies 
into defined paths. By building up bilateral aid flows in 
restricted patterns, policy in the long-term was stifled and 
capital aid for projects was intensified. Therefore, the 
only innovative element in the aid process worked to magnify 
biases in policy, which could not be otherwise allayed.
In this respect the Japanese Government obviously faced a 
dilemma. While strongly criticised by recipients and other donors, the 
policy-making process inhibited reforms. The reliance on private 
enterprise and other lobbyists (including, irregularly, politicians) to 
bridge current and future policies, ensured that the response to 
criticism would be weak. This conclusion is significant from the point 
of view of the recipient; it suggests that an active recipient stance 
(such as that adopted, for example, by Papua New Guinea in 1976-77) 
premised on sound and clearly articulated recipient policies and an 
appreciation of the constraints of the Japanese system, would encourage 
a more positive Japanese reaction.
The Japanese aid system has much in common with those of other 
aid donors: the intrusion of other policies and interests into aid
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policy, the influence of the financial authorities and of bureaucratic
2diffusion, all exist in Western countries. Few studies have been made 
of the effect of bureaucratic factors on donor policies, although 
Tendier presented a compelling case for the impact of organisation on 
some aspects of the performance of the United States Agency for 
International Development. The analysis of the Japanese situation in 
this thesis described possible variables affecting several kinds of 
aid policy: the pattern of development of the structure and ethos of
the aid machinery; the proximity of aid divisions to other policy 
divisions; the degree of aid specialisation in the bureaucracy; 
career patterns; the differential effects of budgeting on commitment 
and disbursement of aid; the extent of cross-ministry control of aid 
management; the relationship between the policy-making and policy 
implementing machinery; the range of leverage points in the system; 
the strength of policy advisory functions and political commitment; 
the pre-occupation of policy-makers with certain bilateral ties; 
methods of project assessment; and the relationship between 
implementation by private enterprise and policy-making. The 
application of the "aid cycle" concept to analysis of donor policies 
would also appear useful in binding political and economic rationales 
for aid to the policy-making framework. It captures the continuities 
of policy and the momentum of the policy-making process.
Policy-Making in Japan
This thesis has concentrated on the bureaucracy in policy­
making. It demonstrated that the link between the bureaucratic 
process and policy was direct, irrespective of the variable influence 
of issues. Two aspects stood out in the study: bureaucratic politics
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and organisational processes. Both were interwoven in the making of 
foreign aid policy. This was apparent, for example, in respect of 
aid budgeting, policy advisory functions and behaviour within the 
ordinary division (k_a) .
Foreign aid cut across the interests of a wide variety of 
people and institutions in Japan, yet officials held sway in an area 
largely removed from the central policy interests of ministries. 
Politics touched aid intermittently and usually in regard to isolated 
projects or relationships. Ministers, for instance, were regular 
participants in some bilateral problems but, as Chapter 3 revealed, 
motives were rarely consistent.
Private enterprise did not play the dominant role in aid 
policy-making in Japan. The relationships between business and 
official policy-makers were often interdependent, for the latter looked 
to business for a great deal of information gathering and preparation 
in certain bilateral aid situations. While the early years of Japan's 
aid effort witnessed strong and commercially effective representations 
by companies that initiated close aid relationships between Japan and 
some Southeast Asian nations, in the late 1970s the "ground rules" for 
policy-making were those of the bureaucracy.
Discovering how these rules were interpreted occupied much 
of the thesis. Coordination and conflict in organisations are opposite 
sides of the same coin. Japanese culture has always placed a high 
value on the containment of dissensual behaviour and the maintenance 
of a united front. Administrators in Japan have not always succeeded
in this aim and Self's conclusion is pertinent:
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... administrative competition and co-ordination are linked 
with the pluralist and unitary tendencies of systems, and 
as such reflect conflicting values about the location of 
authority and about the relative importance of goal 
effectiveness versus goal co-ordination.3
This thesis has shown that formal coordination mechanisms did
not perform efficiently. There was a fundamental barrier to active
coordination across ministerial boundaries in Japan: the identification
with the primary work group. This pattern contrasted with horizontally
stratified French organisations, or American organisations with
multiple decision centres where there were complex arrangements for 
4coordination, and it is of relevance to all Japanese policy-making.
Heclo and Wildavsky, in their study of British budgeting, 
noted three components of effective coordination: personal ties
characterised by trust and confidence, constant exchange of 
information and ideas, and the voluntary restraint of conflicts within 
reasonable bounds. It is notable that this was typically the case 
within the primary Japanese work group, such as the division in a 
ministry. That organisational unit was, in fact, an excellent example 
of ongoing coordination of goals, perceptions and activities. Despite 
persistent tensions, the development of intra-divisional understandings 
fostered effective administration, provided there was strong leadership.
This form of coordination was rarely formalised beyond the 
work group unit. Physical barriers intervened, perceptual screens 
were altered and commitments became dislocated. There were cross­
cutting loyalties, and order was governed by several factors. The 
size of a unit and its proximity to central policy problems enhanced 
the strength of its linkages to other units, whereas divisions lower 
in the bureau hierarchy were more concerned with their own immediate
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responsibilities. There was a relation here also to the grade and 
quality of officer participating. Type of work was relevant too, and 
while technical divisions may have had grounds for easy dialogue 
between themselves, unequal power between counterpart units could 
restrict communication. The fluidity of priorities in a policy area 
such as foreign aid made this power accounting extremely complex.
The primary group was an inward-looking group. The first 
goal was internal harmony, on which depended the resolution of external 
problems. One result of primary group affiliation in Japanese 
organisations was an apparent disinclination to work from the general 
to the particular. Goals and long range strategies drew upon 
motivations arising from concrete benefits to the group rather than 
adherence to the goals per se. The most effective and sought after 
inter-group coordination was informal, or that which was outside 
"regular" and officially sanctioned channels of inter-group communication. 
It was not necessarily patterned as nemawashi (broad consultation before 
action is taken) normally is, and did not occur only prior to action 
or decision. It was not "machinery", but a cultural or habitual trait, 
fostered by the stress on personal ties and on order of ranking as a 
foundation for social relationships. The tyranny of administrative 
regulations in areas where policy responsibilities overlapped demanded 
informality. Aid procedures included unofficial consultation, although 
the effect was inevitably a series of short-term resolutions to 
problems. Dramatic shifts in policy or long-term perspectives were 
associated more often with political pressures or other critical
external influences.
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The Policy Area Approach
It was noted above that problems of coordination were derived 
partly from the changing nature of perceptions of policy. This confused 
power relations between participants and upset the manner in which they 
approached each other. Difficulties such as this were related, 
therefore, to the final problem of this thesis, the definition of policy. 
Using the policy area approach to analyse the dynamics of policy-making, 
the study was able to look beyond decisions and policies to broader 
relationships between participants and to future dimensions of policy.
The research presented here suggests that the boundaries of 
a policy are never static. This is because, firstly, the objective 
conditions of policy are in constant motion and because secondly, 
policy itself forces changes in both the perceptions held of it and 
in the relationships between elements of the policy process.
Structures vary and organisational routines based on them alter as 
power shifts within the bureaucracy. Patterns of policy-making, and 
participation in it, reflect reactions to specific views of policy 
and follow, often slowly, movements in the policy areas.
Policy areas are interdependent. Their boundaries overlap 
in a way which would suggest an intricate, but constantly moving, 
policy "map" of government, where policy contents in one field can 
vitally influence processes in another. The aid policy area, for 
example, proved to be by no means uniform. Our approach highlighted 
the diversity of institutions, behaviour and perceptions which 
existed, and revealed how those varied to influence decisions and 
their implementation. The interaction between this and other policy 
areas proved elusive, channelled as it was through individuals, their
319.
predilections and prejudices.
There were paths and guides for this evolution. Institutional 
and political stability was an important environmental factor. A 
pervasive consensus that Japan's own economic growth demanded the 
alignment of aid and other policies was also a constant reference point 
for policy-makers, although the "mind-sets" of the 1950s and the 1970s 
were decidedly different. Reactions by other donors and the 
international aid community were integral to the aid debate in Japan, 
even though policy change came only slowly.
The policy area approach is valuable because it shows that 
policy formulation involves a continuing redefinition of the broader 
reaches of policy, and constant attempts to sharpen the appreciation 
of contents and their effects. Policy is not solid and immutable, to 
be chipped away or moulded by a sculptor, but has instead an amoeba-like 
quality, continually in motion, expanding, dividing or reforming. Heclo 
and Wildavsky's conception of policy as "a series of ongoing 
understandings" marks political administrators' action over time as 
the arbiter of content. This study has shown that policy-makers are
*themselves a part of the policy they are seeking to formulate, maintain 
or revise. Their ideas and actions, the structure through which they 
operate, cannot be divorced from decisions and the body of policy.
This redefining of boundaries is articulated in patterns of 
individual interaction and later in organisation. Patterns of policy­
making represent methods which participants employ to seek their own 
ends, thereby defining policy for themselves. Needless to say, as 
policies change, the appropriate patterns vary also, although normally
after the event.
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In foreign aid, for example, jurisdictional problems provided 
one reason for an ongoing border skirmish over the defining of aid 
policy. This was particularly noticeable among younger officers whose 
attitudes were less settled and who were possibly more aware of 
undercurrents of thinking in other policy areas through informal 
communication. There was need also for a substantial input of 
information from participants beyond the bureaucracy. Thus were 
the frontiers of policy as implemented fed back to the centre of the 
policy area. Pressure groups performed a vital function in translating 
their assessments of the relevance of policy into future policy.
In these and other ways, perceptions of the policy area are 
altered and policy limits are reshaped. Of course, organisational 
channels, used formally or informally, are the medium for change. This 
is the essence of policy dynamics: a search for the definition of
policy that leads to attempts to adjust policy content to perceptions 
of what those limits are. Because the policy area is continually 
shifting, however, this search for the best balance of perception and 
structure is never-ending.
The approach naturally has its limitations. The fine balance 
of detail and generality necessary for an appreciation of the policy 
area can be easily upset. It is, in some ways, a fence-sitting 
approach, refusing to acknowledge dominance of any aspect of the 
policy process. For some, it belittles organisation and, for others, 
neutralises bureaucratic politics. In one sense, it is negative, 
implying that any organisation's responses to ideas about policy are 
too late and reforms never sufficient.
This thesis has not sought to assess the relative performance
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of alternative administrative systems for foreign aid. Many observers 
have suggested reforms in the Japanese aid administration, but it is 
hard to conclude that performance has improved. If there is to be 
reform, what is necessary above all is a more ready acknowledgement 
within Japan of the nature of aid policy and a willingness to accept 
changing perceptions. Only then can Japan achieve a closer alignment 
of development issues and policy constraints of domestic origin.
